The Barcelonnettes: an example of network-entrepreneurs in XIX century Mexico. An explanation based on a theory of bounded rational choice with social embeddedness

A theory of network-entrepreneurs or "spin-off system" is presented in this paper for the creation of firms based on the community’s social governance. It is argued that firm’s capacity for accumulation depends on the presence of employees belonging to the same social/ethnic group with expectations of "inheriting" the firm and becoming entrepreneurs once they have been selected for their merits and loyalty towards their patrons. Such accumulation is possible because of the credibility of the patrons’ promises of supporting newcomers due to high social cohesion and specific social norms prevailing in the community. This theory is exemplified through the case of the Barcelonnettes, a group of immigrants from the Alps in the South of France (Provence) who came to Mexico in the XIX Century.

Rational sabotage in cooperative production

In this paper we consider a model of cooperative production in which rational agents have the possibility to engage in sabotage activities that decrease output. It is shown that sabotage depends on the interplay between the degree of congestion, the technology of sabotage, the number of agents the degree of meritocracy and the form of the sharing rule. In particular it is shown that, ceteries paribus, meritocratic systems give more incentives to sabotage than egalitarian systems. We address two questions: The degree of meritocracy that is compatible with absence of sabotage and the existence of a Nash equilibrium with and without sabotage.

Normal forms for rational difference equations with applications to the global periodicity problem

We propose a classification and derive the associated normal forms for rational difference equations with complex coefficients. As an application, we study the global periodicity problem for second order rational difference equations with complex coefficients. We find new necessary conditions as well as some new examples of globally periodic equations.

Rational first integrals in the Darboux theory of integrability in Cn

"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt."

Sobolev mappings, degree, homotopy classes and rational homology spheres

"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt."

Construcció d'una aplicació web utilitzant el mètode Rational Unified Process

Construcció d'una aplicació web a partir de les especificacions d'un client imaginari. Estudi i utilització del mètode Rational Unified Process, el més habitual actualment en la construcció de software. Disseny d'una base de dades i implementació del model lògic mitjançant un SGBD punter al mercat com Oracle.

La incapacidad de amar en A pair of blue eyes de Thomas Hardy

A Pair of Blue Eyes ha estat considerada tradicionalment como el primer exemple de pessimisme i fatalisme en les novel·les de Hardy. Aquest treball pretén mostrar que la novel·la no segueix aquest patró, sinó que en base al model aristotèlic de catarsis, mostra l’ error que suposa seguir falsos models amorosos.

Charge transfer in DNA: hole charge is confined to a single base pair due to solvation effects

We include solvation effects in tight-binding Hamiltonians for hole states in DNA. The corresponding linear-response parameters are derived from accurate estimates of solvation energy calculated for several hole charge distributions in DNA stacks. Two models are considered: (A) the correction to a diagonal Hamiltonian matrix element depends only on the charge localized on the corresponding site and (B) in addition to this term, the reaction field due to adjacent base pairs is accounted for. We show that both schemes give very similar results. The effects of the polar medium on the hole distribution in DNA are studied. We conclude that the effects of polar surroundings essentially suppress charge delocalization in DNA, and hole states in (GC)n sequences are localized on individual guanines

Rational Partisan Theory with fiscal policy and an independent central bank

The empirical evidence testing the validity of the rational partisan theory (RPT) has been mixed. In this article, we argue that the inclusion of other macroeconomic policies and the presence of an independent central bank can partly contribute to explain this inconclusiveness. This article expands Alesina s (1987) RPT model to include an extra policy and an independent central bank. With these extensions, the implications of RPT are altered signi ficantly. In particular, when the central bank is more concerned about output than public spending (an assumption made by many papers in this literature), then the direct relationship between in flation and output derived in Alesina (1987) never holds. Keywords: central bank, conservativeness, political uncertainty. JEL Classi fication: E58, E63.

Quotient spaces of boundedly rational types

By identifying types whose low-order beliefs up to level li about the state of nature coincide, weobtain quotient type spaces that are typically smaller than the original ones, preserve basic topologicalproperties, and allow standard equilibrium analysis even under bounded reasoning. Our Bayesian Nash(li; l-i)-equilibria capture players inability to distinguish types belonging to the same equivalence class.The case with uncertainty about the vector of levels (li; l-i) is also analyzed. Two examples illustratethe constructions.

Are self-regarding subjects more rational?

Through an experiment, we investigate how the level of rationality relatesto concerns for equality and efficiency. Subjects perform dictator games anda guessing game. More rational subjects are not more frequently of the selfregardingtype. When performing a comparison within the same degree of rationality,self-regarding subjects show more strategic sophistication than othersubjects.

Boundedly rational credit cycles

We propose an evolutionary model of a credit market. We show that theeconomy exhibits credit cycles. The model predicts dynamics which are consistent with some evidence about the Great Depression. Real shocks triggerepisodes of credit--crunch which are observed in the process of adjustmenttowards the post shock equilibrium.

Rational reasoning or adaptive behavior? Evidence from two-person beauty contest games

Many experiments have shown that human subjects do not necessarily behave in line with game theoretic assumptions and solution concepts. The reasons for this non-conformity are multiple. In this paper we study the argument whether a deviation from game theory is because subjects are rational, but doubt that others are rational as well, compared to the argument that subjects, in general, are boundedly rational themselves. To distinguish these two hypotheses, we study behavior in repeated 2-person and many-person Beauty-Contest-Games which are strategically different from one another. We analyze four different treatments and observe that convergence toward equilibrium is driven by learning through the information about the other player s choice and adaptation rather than self-initiated rational reasoning.