Evaluating the impact of public subsidies on a firm's performance: A quasi-experimental approach

Many regional governments in developed countries design programs to improve the competitiveness of local firms. In this paper, we evaluate the effectiveness of public programs whose aim is to enhance the performance of firms located in Catalonia (Spain). We compare the performance of publicly subsidised companies (treated) with that of similar, but unsubsidised companies (non-treated). We use the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) methodology to construct a control group which, with respect to its observable characteristics, is as similar as possible to the treated group, and that allows us to identify firms which retain the same propensity to receive public subsidies. Once a valid comparison group has been established, we compare the respective performance of each firm. As a result, we find that recipient firms, on average, change their business practices, improve their performance, and increase their value added as a direct result of public subsidy programs.

Informational matching

This paper analyzes the problem of matching heterogeneous agents in aBayesian learning model. One agent gives a noisy signal to another agent,who is responsible for learning. If production has a strong informationalcomponent, a phase of cross-matching occurs, so that agents of low knowledgecatch up with those of higher one. It is shown that:(i) a greater informational component in production makes cross-matchingmore likely;(ii) as the new technology is mastered, production becomes relatively morephysical and less informational;(iii) a greater dispersion of the ability to learn and transfer informationmakes self-matching more likely; and(iv) self-matching leads to more self-matching, whereas cross-matching canmake less productive agents overtake more productive ones.

Evaluating the impact of public subsidies on a firm's performance: a quasi-experimental approach

Many regional governments in developed countries design programs to improve the competitiveness of local firms. In this paper, we evaluate the effectiveness of public programs whose aim is to enhance the performance of firms located in Catalonia (Spain). We compare the performance of publicly subsidised companies (treated) with that of similar, but unsubsidised companies (non-treated). We use the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) methodology to construct a control group which, with respect to its observable characteristics, is as similar as possible to the treated group, and that allows us to identify firms which retain the same propensity to receive public subsidies. Once a valid comparison group has been established, we compare the respective performance of each firm. As a result, we find that recipient firms, on average, change their business practices, improve their performance, and increase their value added as a direct result of public subsidy programs.

Evaluating the impact of public subsidies on a firm's performance: a quasi-experimental approach

Many regional governments in developed countries design programs to improve the competitiveness of local firms. In this paper, we evaluate the effectiveness of public programs whose aim is to enhance the performance of firms located in Catalonia (Spain). We compare the performance of publicly subsidised companies (treated) with that of similar, but unsubsidised companies (non-treated). We use the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) methodology to construct a control group which, with respect to its observable characteristics, is as similar as possible to the treated group, and that allows us to identify firms which retain the same propensity to receive public subsidies. Once a valid comparison group has been established, we compare the respective performance of each firm. As a result, we find that recipient firms, on average, change their business practices, improve their performance, and increase their value added as a direct result of public subsidy programs.

Phase-field model for Hele-Shaw flows with arabitrary contrast II: numerical approach

We present a phase-field model for the dynamics of the interface between two inmiscible fluids with arbitrary viscosity contrast in a rectangular Hele-Shaw cell. With asymptotic matching techniques we check the model to yield the right Hele-Shaw equations in the sharp-interface limit, and compute the corrections to these equations to first order in the interface thickness. We also compute the effect of such corrections on the linear dispersion relation of the planar interface. We discuss in detail the conditions on the interface thickness to control the accuracy and convergence of the phase-field model to the limiting Hele-Shaw dynamics. In particular, the convergence appears to be slower for high viscosity contrasts.

Matching stages of heavy-ion collision models

Heavy-ion reactions and other collective dynamical processes are frequently described by different theoretical approaches for the different stages of the process, like initial equilibration stage, intermediate locally equilibrated fluid dynamical stage, and final freeze-out stage. For the last stage, the best known is the Cooper-Frye description used to generate the phase space distribution of emitted, noninteracting particles from a fluid dynamical expansion or explosion, assuming a final ideal gas distribution, or (less frequently) an out-of-equilibrium distribution. In this work we do not want to replace the Cooper-Frye description, but rather clarify the ways of using it and how to choose the parameters of the distribution and, eventually, how to choose the form of the phase space distribution used in the Cooper-Frye formula. Moreover, the Cooper-Frye formula is used in connection with the freeze-out problem, while the discussion of transition between different stages of the collision is applicable to other transitions also. More recently, hadronization and molecular dynamics models have been matched to the end of a fluid dynamical stage to describe hadronization and freeze-out. The stages of the model description can be matched to each other on space-time hypersurfaces (just like through the frequently used freeze-out hypersurface). This work presents a generalized description of how to match the stages of the description of a reaction to each other, extending the methodology used at freeze-out, in simple covariant form which is easily applicable in its simplest version for most applications.

Edge matching puzzles as hard SAT/CSP benchmarks

Recently, edge matching puzzles, an NP-complete problem, have rececived, thanks to money-prized contests, considerable attention from wide audiences. We consider these competitions not only a challenge for SAT/CSP solving techniques but also as an opportunity to showcase the advances in the SAT/CSP community to a general audience. This paper studies the NP-complete problem of edge matching puzzles focusing on providing generation models of problem instances of variable hardness and on its resolution through the application of SAT and CSP techniques. From the generation side, we also identify the phase transition phenomena for each model. As solving methods, we employ both; SAT solvers through the translation to a SAT formula, and two ad-hoc CSP solvers we have developed, with different levels of consistency, employing several generic and specialized heuristics. Finally, we conducted an extensive experimental investigation to identify the hardest generation models and the best performing solving techniques.

Dynamic matching and bargaining: the role of deadlines

We consider a dynamic model where traders in each period are matched randomly into pairs who then bargain about the division of a fixed surplus. When agreement is reached the traders leave the market. Traders who do not come to an agreement return next period in which they will be matched again, as long as their deadline has not expired yet. New traders enter exogenously in each period. We assume that traders within a pair know each other's deadline. We define and characterize the stationary equilibrium configurations. Traders with longer deadlines fare better than traders with short deadlines. It is shown that the heterogeneity of deadlines may cause delay. It is then shown that a centralized mechanism that controls the matching protocol, but does not interfere with the bargaining, eliminates all delay. Even though this efficient centralized mechanism is not as good for traders with long deadlines, it is shown that in a model where all traders can choose which mechanism to

Median stable matching for college admission

We give a simple and concise proof that so-called generalized median stable matchings are well-defined stable matchings for college admissions problems. Furthermore, we discuss the fairness properties of median stable matchings and conclude with two illustrative examples of college admissions markets, the lattices of stable matchings, and the corresponding generalized median stable matchings.

Corrigendum to "On randomized matching mechanisms" [Economic Theory 8(1996)377-381]

Ma (1996) studied the random order mechanism, a matching mechanism suggested by Roth and Vande Vate (1990) for marriage markets. By means of an example he showed that the random order mechanism does not always reach all stable matchings. Although Ma's (1996) result is true, we show that the probability distribution he presented - and therefore the proof of his Claim 2 - is not correct. The mistake in the calculations by Ma (1996) is due to the fact that even though the example looks very symmetric, some of the calculations are not as ''symmetric.''

Paths to stability for matching markets with couples

We study two-sided matching markets with couples and show that for a natural preference domain for couples, the domain of weakly responsive preferences, stable outcomes can always be reached by means of decentralized decision making. Starting from an arbitrary matching, we construct a path of matchings obtained from `satisfying' blocking coalitions that yields a stable matching. Hence, we establish a generalization of Roth and Vande Vate's (1990) result on path convergence to stability for decentralized singles markets. Furthermore, we show that when stable matchings exist, but preferences are not weakly responsive, for some initial matchings there may not exist any path obtained from `satisfying' blocking coalitions that yields a stable matching.

Procedurally fair and stable matching

We motivate procedural fairness for matching mechanisms and study two procedurally fair and stable mechanisms: employment by lotto (Aldershof et al., 1999) and the random order mechanism (Roth and Vande Vate, 1990, Ma, 1996). For both mechanisms we give various examples of probability distributions on the set of stable matchings and discuss properties that differentiate employment by lotto and the random order mechanism. Finally, we consider an adjustment of the random order mechanism, the equitable random order mechanism, that combines aspects of procedural and "endstate'' fairness. Aldershof et al. (1999) and Ma (1996) that exist on the probability distribution induced by both mechanisms. Finally, we consider an adjustment of the random order mechanism, the equitable random order mechanism.

On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model

For the many-to-one matching model in which firms have substitutable and quota q-separable preferences over subsets of workers we show that the workers-optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof for the workers. In order to prove this result, we also show that under this domain of preferences (which contains the domain of responsive preferences of the college admissions problem) the workers-optimal stable matching is weakly Pareto optimal for the workers and the Blocking Lemma holds as well. We exhibit an example showing that none of these three results remain true if the preferences of firms are substitutable but not quota q-separable.

On bilateral agreements: just a matter of matching

This paper aims at assessing the importance of the initial technological endowments when firms decide to establish a technological agreement. We propose a Bertrand duopoly model where firms evaluate the advantages they can get from the agreement according to its length. Allowing them to exploit a learning process, we depict a strict connection between the starting point and the final result. Moreover, as far as learning is evaluated as an iterative process, the set of initial conditions that lead to successful ventures switches from a continuum of values to a Cantor set.

The principal-agent matching market

We propose a model based on competitive markets in order to analyze an economy with several principals and agents. We model the principal-agent economy as a two-sided matching game and characterize the set of stable outcomes of this principal-agent matching market. A simple mechanism to implement the set of stable outcomes is proposed. Finally, we put forward examples of principal-agent economies where the results fit into.