Informational matching
Contribuinte(s) |
Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa |
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Data(s) |
15/09/2005
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Resumo |
This paper analyzes the problem of matching heterogeneous agents in aBayesian learning model. One agent gives a noisy signal to another agent,who is responsible for learning. If production has a strong informationalcomponent, a phase of cross-matching occurs, so that agents of low knowledgecatch up with those of higher one. It is shown that:(i) a greater informational component in production makes cross-matchingmore likely;(ii) as the new technology is mastered, production becomes relatively morephysical and less informational;(iii) a greater dispersion of the ability to learn and transfer informationmakes self-matching more likely; and(iv) self-matching leads to more self-matching, whereas cross-matching canmake less productive agents overtake more productive ones. |
Identificador | |
Idioma(s) |
eng |
Direitos |
L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess <a href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/">http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/</a> |
Palavras-Chave | #Microeconomics #diffusion of information #bayesian learning #matching #assortative mating |
Tipo |
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |