Informational matching


Autoria(s): Rendón, Silvio
Contribuinte(s)

Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa

Data(s)

15/09/2005

Resumo

This paper analyzes the problem of matching heterogeneous agents in aBayesian learning model. One agent gives a noisy signal to another agent,who is responsible for learning. If production has a strong informationalcomponent, a phase of cross-matching occurs, so that agents of low knowledgecatch up with those of higher one. It is shown that:(i) a greater informational component in production makes cross-matchingmore likely;(ii) as the new technology is mastered, production becomes relatively morephysical and less informational;(iii) a greater dispersion of the ability to learn and transfer informationmakes self-matching more likely; and(iv) self-matching leads to more self-matching, whereas cross-matching canmake less productive agents overtake more productive ones.

Identificador

http://hdl.handle.net/10230/327

Idioma(s)

eng

Direitos

L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons

info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess

<a href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/">http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/</a>

Palavras-Chave #Microeconomics #diffusion of information #bayesian learning #matching #assortative mating
Tipo

info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper