It's what you say not what you pay

We study manager-employee interactions in experiments set in a corporate environment where payoffs depend on employees coordinating at high effort levels; the underlying game being played repeatedly by employees is a weak-link game. In the absence of managerial intervention subjects invariably slip into coordination failure. To overcome a history of coordination failure, managers have two instruments at their disposal, increasing employees' financial incentives to coordinate and communication with employees. We find that communication is a more effective tool than incentive changes for leading organizations out of performance traps. Examining the content of managers' communication, the most effective messages specifically request a high effort, point out the mutual benefits of high effort, and imply that employees are being paid well.

Measuring sustained superior performance at the firm level

This paper proposes a two-dimensional Strategic Performance Measure (SPM) to evaluate the achievement of sustained superior performance. This proposal builds primarily on the fact that, under the strategic management perspective, a firm's prevalent objective is the pursuit of sustained superior performance. Three basic conceptual dimensions stem from this objective: relativity, sign dependence, and dynamism. These are the foundations of the SPM, which carries out a separate evaluation of the attained superior performance and of its sustainability over time. In contrast to existing measures of performance, the SPM provides: (i) a dynamic approach by considering the progress or regress in performance over time, and (ii) a cardinal measurement of performance differences and its changes over time. The paper also proposes an axiomatic framework that a measure of strategic performance should comply with to be theoretically and managerially sound. Finally, an empirical illustration of the Spanish banking sector during 1987-1999 is herein provided by discussing some relevant cases.

Single period Markowitz portfolio selection, performance gauging and duality: a variation on Luenberger's shortage function

Markowitz portfolio theory (1952) has induced research into the efficiency of portfolio management. This paper studies existing nonparametric efficiency measurement approaches for single period portfolio selection from a theoretical perspective and generalises currently used efficiency measures into the full mean-variance space. Therefore, we introduce the efficiency improvement possibility function (a variation on the shortage function), study its axiomatic properties in the context of Markowitz efficient frontier, and establish a link to the indirect mean-variance utility function. This framework allows distinguishing between portfolio efficiency and allocative efficiency. Furthermore, it permits retrieving information about the revealed risk aversion of investors. The efficiency improvement possibility function thus provides a more general framework for gauging the efficiency of portfolio management using nonparametric frontier envelopment methods based on quadratic optimisation.

Seniority-based pay: is it used as a motivation device?

The purpose of this article is to explain what factors determine the use of seniority-based pay for production workers in Spanish manufacturing industry. The data used in order to achieve these objectives was taken from 774 Spanish industrial plants. The estimation of several ordered probit models enabled us to see that in firms where it was more costly for management to engage in opportunistic behaviour, deferred payment shows a negative relation to the use of devices, like monitoring or incentive payment, designed to align workers’ objectives with those of the company.

The Effect of relationship lending on firm performance

We examine how relationship lending affects firm performance using a panel dataset of about 70,000 small and medium Spanish firms in the period 1993-2004. We model firm performance jointly with the firm's choice of the number of bank relationships. Controlling for firm fixed effects and using instrumental variables for the decision on the number of bank relationships, we find that firms maintaining exclusive bank relationships have lower profitability. The result is consistent with the view that banks appropriate most of the value generated through close relationships with its borrowers as long as they do not face competition from other lenders.

Publishing performance of spanish academics: 1970-2004: institutions, researchers et al.

This work complements some of the results appearing in the article ?Publishing Performance in Economics: Spanish Rankings? by Dolado et al. . Specifically we focus on the robustness of the results regardless of the time span considered, the effect of the choice of a particular database on the final results, and the effects on changes in the unit of institutional measure (departments versus institutions as a whole). Differences are significant when we expand the time period considered. There are also significant but small differences if we combine datasets to derive the rankings. Finally, department rankings offer a more precise picture of the situation of the Spanish academics, although results do not differ substantially from those obtained when overall institutions are considered.

Market Competition and Lower Tier Incentives

The relationship between competition and performance-related pay has been analysed in single-principal-single-agent models. While this approach yields good predictions for managerial pay schemes, the predictions fail to apply for employees at lower tiers of a firm's hierarchy. In this paper, a principal-multi-agent model of incentive pay is developed which makes it possible to analyze the effect of changes in the competitiveness of markets on lower tier incentive payment schemes. The results explain why the payment schemes of agents located at low and mid tiers are less sensitive to changes in competition when aggregated firm data is used. JEL classification numbers: D82, J21, L13, L22. Keywords: Cournot competition, Contract delegation, Moral hazard, Entry, Market size, Wage cost.

El Impacto de la gestión activa en la performance de los fondos de inversión de renta fija

Este trabajo tiene como objetivo estudiar el impacto de las estrategias activas de gestión en la performance de los fondos de inversión de renta fija y se realiza en tres fases, en primer lugar, a partir de la información homogénea disponible para cualquier partícipe se elabora un perfil de riesgo de los fondos a partir de los tipos de riesgo asociados a la renta fija. En segundo lugar, se propone una medida de performance que permite la comparación entre fondos, a dos niveles: por un lado, tomando como benchmark una cartera puramente pasiva y por otro lado, adecuando el benchmark al vencimiento de la cartera. En tercer lugar se realiza un contraste con el fin de determinar el impacto en la performance de los fondos estudiados de los indicadores de actividad de la estrategia asociados al perfil de riesgo del fondo.

All-pay auction equilibria in contests

We analyze (non-deterministic) contests with anonymous contest success functions. There is no restriction on the number of contestants or on their valuations for the prize. We provide intuitive and easily verifiable conditions for the existence of an equilibrium with properties similar to the one of the (deterministic) all-pay auction. Since these conditions are fulfilled for a wide array of situations, the predictions of this equilibrium are very robust to the specific details of the contest. An application of this result contributes to fill a gap in the analysis of the popular Tullock rent- seeking game because it characterizes properties of an equilibrium for increasing returns to scale larger than two, for any number of contestants and in contests with or without a common value. Keywords: (non-) deterministic contest, all-pay auction, contest success functions. JEL Classification Numbers: C72 (Noncooperative Games), D72 (Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections), D44 (Auctions).

La performance teatral del juglar contemporani Matteo Belli

En aquesta dissertació he intentat recórrer els principals elements que caracteritzen el treball teatral de l’actor contemporani bolonyès Matteo Belli. La primera part se centra en les informacions bàsiques, necessàries per col•locar correctament el fenòmen tan complex com fascinant del joglar. En segona instància, he pensat en aprofundir l’aspecte de la comicitat introduint directament el treball de Belli, i relacionar-lo, per dir-ho així, amb el panorama actual del teatre contemporani. A més a més, he presentat alguns exemples relacionats amb algunes obres d’artistes moderns i contemporanis italians, d’aquesta manera prentenc comprendre millor el procés de voluntarietat que s’amaga darrere la comicitat i els seus mecanismes intrínsecs. Per concloure, he inclòs una entrevista amb ell, que em va concedir en aquests quatre anys de recerca, on es pot apreciar, no només un gran coneixement del món de l’espectacle, sinó que també una profunda espessor cultural.

Evaluating the impact of public subsidies on a firm's performance: A quasi-experimental approach

Many regional governments in developed countries design programs to improve the competitiveness of local firms. In this paper, we evaluate the effectiveness of public programs whose aim is to enhance the performance of firms located in Catalonia (Spain). We compare the performance of publicly subsidised companies (treated) with that of similar, but unsubsidised companies (non-treated). We use the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) methodology to construct a control group which, with respect to its observable characteristics, is as similar as possible to the treated group, and that allows us to identify firms which retain the same propensity to receive public subsidies. Once a valid comparison group has been established, we compare the respective performance of each firm. As a result, we find that recipient firms, on average, change their business practices, improve their performance, and increase their value added as a direct result of public subsidy programs.

Comparing the early research performance of PhD graduates in labor economics in Europe and the USA

This paper analyzes the early research performance of PhD graduates in labor economics, addressing the following questions: Are there major productivity differences between graduates from American and European institutions? If so, how relevant is the quality of the training received (i.e. ranking of institution and supervisor) and the research environment in the subsequent job placement institution? The population under study consists of labor economics PhD graduates who received their degree in the years 2000 to 2005 in Europe or the USA. Research productivity is evaluated alternatively as the number of publications or the quality-adjusted number of publications of an individual. When restricting the analysis to the number of publications, results suggest a higher productivity by graduates from European universities than from USA universities, but this difference vanishes when accounting for the quality of the publication. The results also indicate that graduates placed at American institutions, in particular top ones, are likely to publish more quality-adjusted articles than their European counterparts. This may be because, when hired, they already have several good acceptances or because of more focused research efforts and clearer career incentives.