A maximal domain of preferences for tops-only rules in the division problem

The division problem consists of allocating an amount M of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents. Sprumont (1991) showed that if agents have single-peaked preferences over their shares, the uniform rule is the unique strategy-proof, efficient, and anonymous rule. Ching and Serizawa (1998) extended this result by showing that the set of single-plateaued preferences is the largest domain, for all possible values of M, admitting a rule (the extended uniform rule) satisfying strategy-proofness, efficiency and symmetry. We identify, for each M and n, a maximal domain of preferences under which the extended uniform rule also satisfies the properties of strategy-proofness, efficiency, continuity, and "tops-onlyness". These domains (called weakly single-plateaued) are strictly larger than the set of single-plateaued preferences. However, their intersection, when M varies from zero to infinity, coincides with the set of single-plateaued preferences.

How universal is behavior? A four country comparison of spite, cooperation and errors in voluntary contribution mechanisms

This paper studies behavior in experiments with a linear voluntary contributions mechanism for public goods conducted in Japan, the Netherlands, Spain and the USA. The same experimental design was used in the four countries. Our 'contribution function' design allows us to obtain a view of subjects' behavior from two complementary points of view. If yields information about situations where, in purely pecuniary terms, it is a dominant strategy to contribute all the endowment and about situations where it is a dominant strategy to contribute nothing. Our results show, first, that differences in behavior across countries are minor. We find that when people play "the same game" they behave similarly. Second, for all four countries our data are inconsistent with the explanation that subjects contribute only out of confusion. A common cooperative motivation is needed to explain the date.

On the number of K3,3-minor-free and maximal K3,3-minor-free graphs

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Maximal C*-algebras of quotients and injective envelopes of C*-algebras

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Contraction groups in complete Kac-Moody groups

Let G be an abstract Kac-Moody group over a finite field and G the closure of the image of G in the automorphism group of its positive building. We show that if the Dynkin diagram associated to G is irreducible and neither of spherical nor of affine type, then the contraction groups of elements in G which are not topologically periodic are not closed. (In those groups there always exist elements which are not topologically periodic.)

New estimates for the maximal singular integral

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A characterization of two weight norm inequalities for maximal singular integrals

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Agency cost of government ownership: a study of voluntary audit comitte formation in China

In this paper, we investigate the agency costs of government ownership and their impact on corporate governance and firm value. China is used as a laboratory because of the prevalent state shareholdings in exchange-listed firms. In this context, we specifically consider the trade-offs involved in the voluntary formation of an audit committee when the controlling shareholder is the state. The decision to improve corporate governance (in this case, introduce an audit committee) is shown to be value relevant and a function of existing agency relationships and non-trivial implementation costs. Our findings are robust to the level of pyramid groups, the ownership-control wedge, and financial leverage. The research adds to the debate regarding the effect of government shareholdings on corporate culture and performance - a topic that hastaken on renewed importance in recent times.

Maximal operators and differentiation theorems for sparse sets

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Two weight inequalities for maximal truncations of dyadic Calderón-Zygmund operators

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The Division problem with voluntary participation

The division problem consists of allocating a given amount of an homogeneous and perfectly divisible good among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences on the set of their potential shares. A rule proposes a vector of shares for each division problem. The literature has implicitly assumed that agents will find acceptable any share they are assigned to. In this paper we consider the division problem when agents' participation is voluntary. Each agent has an idiosyncratic interval of acceptable shares where his preferences are single-peaked. A rule has to propose to each agent either to not participate or an acceptable share because otherwise he would opt out and this would require to reassign some of the remaining agents' shares. We study a subclass of efficient and consistent rules and characterize extensions of the uniform rule that deal explicitly with agents' voluntary participation.

Counterexamples to some pointwise estimates of the maximal Cauchy transform in terms of the Cauchy transform

Motivated by the work of Mateu, Orobitg, Pérez and Verdera, who proved inequalities of the form $T_*f\lesssim M(Tf)$ or $T_*f\lesssim M^2(Tf)$ for certain singular integral operators $T$, such as the Hilbert or the Beurling transforms, we study the possibility of establishing this type of control for the Cauchy transform along a Lipschitz graph. We show that this is not possible in general, and we give a partial positive result when the graph is substituted by a Jordan curve.

Implementació de la cerca d'un subgraf comú maximal a dos grafs mitjançant colles

La memòria que ací es presenta s'emmarca dins de l'àrea de teoria de grafs. En concret es treballa la implementació d'un algorisme per trobar el subgraf comú maximal (SCM) de dos grafs mitjançant la cerca de colles maximals (CM). L'aportació principal del projecte consisteix en, donats dos grafs qualsevol, trobar el seu graf associat per tal de poder cercar la seva colla maximal (CM). I així, utilitzant funcions existents en el llenguatge de programació, poder trobar el seu subgraf comú maximal (SCM), necessari per calcular la distància entre grafs i així determinar quan d'isomorfs són.

The equity core and the Lorenz-maximal allocations in the equal division core

In this paper, we characterize the non-emptiness of the equity core (Selten, 1978) and provide a method, easy to implement, for computing the Lorenz-maximal allocations in the equal division core (Dutta-Ray, 1991). Both results are based on a geometrical decomposition of the equity core as a finite union of polyhedrons. Keywords: Cooperative game, equity core, equal division core, Lorenz domination. JEL classification: C71