On punishment and well-being

The existence of punishment opportunities has been shown to cause efficiency in public goods experiments to increase considerably. In this paper we ask whether punishment also has a downside in terms of process dissatisfaction. We conduct an experiment to study the conjecture that an environment with stronger punishment possibilities leads to higher material but lower subjective well-being. The more general motivation for our study stems from the notion that people??s subjective well-being may be affected by the institutional environment they find themselves in. Our findings show that harsher punishment possibilities lead to signficantly higher well-being, controlling for earnings and other relevant variables. People derive independent satisfaction from interacting under the protection of strong punishment possibilities. These results complement the evidence on the neural basis of altruistic punishment reported in de Quervain et al. (2004).

Assessment of current anglo-saxon proposals about criminal justice and the justification of legal punishment: Moore, Duff and Finnis on retribution, and the challenging compatibility with the up-and-coming Restorative Justice

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Inter-group conflict and intra-group punishment in an experimental contest game

We study how conflict in a contest game is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to punish each other. Our main motivation stems from the analysis of socio-political conflict. The relevant theoretical prediction in our setting is that conflict expenditures are independent of group size and independent of whether punishment is available or not. We find, first, that our results contradict the independence of group-size prediction: conflict expenditures of groups are substantially larger than those of individuals, and both are substantially above equilibrium. Towards the end of the experiment material losses in groups are 257% of the predicted level. There is, however, substantial heterogeneity in the investment behaviour of individual group members. Second, allowing group members to punish each other after individual contributions to the contest effort are revealed leads to even larger conflict expenditures. Now material losses are 869% of the equilibrium level and there is much less heterogeneity in individual group members' investments. These results contrast strongly with those from public goods experiments where punishment enhances efficiency and leads to higher material payoffs.

Crime and punishment: Further results

I consider a general specification of criminals' objective functionand argue that, when the general non-expected utility theory issubstituted for the traditional expected utility theory, thehigh-fine-low-probability result (Becker, 1968) only holds underspecific and strong restrictions.

Degradation of pheromone and plant volatile components by a same Odorant-Degrading Enzyme in the cotton leafworm, Spodoptera littoralis

Background: Odorant-Degrading Enzymes (ODEs) are supposed to be involved in the signal inactivation step within the olfactory sensilla of insects by quickly removing odorant molecules from the vicinity of the olfactory receptors. Only three ODEs have been both identified at the molecular level and functionally characterized: two were specialized in the degradation of pheromone compounds and the last one was shown to degrade a plant odorant. Methodology: Previous work has shown that the antennae of the cotton leafworm Spodoptera littoralis , a worldwide pest of agricultural crops, express numerous candidate ODEs. We focused on an esterase overexpressed in males antennae, namely SlCXE7. We studied its expression patterns and tested its catalytic properties towards three odorants, i.e. the two female sex pheromone components and a green leaf volatile emitted by host plants. Conclusion: SlCXE7 expression was concomitant during development with male responsiveness to odorants and during adult scotophase with the period of male most active sexual behaviour. Furthermore, SlCXE7 transcription could be induced by male exposure to the main pheromone component, suggesting a role of Pheromone-Degrading Enzyme. Interestingly, recombinant SlCXE7 was able to efficiently hydrolyze the pheromone compounds but also the plant volatile, with a higher affinity for the pheromone than for the plant compound. In male antennae, SlCXE7 expression was associated with both long and short sensilla, tuned to sex pheromones or plant odours, respectively. Our results thus suggested that a same ODE could have a dual function depending of it sensillar localisation. Within the pheromone-sensitive sensilla, SlCXE7 may play a role in pheromone signal termination and in reduction of odorant background noise, whereas it could be involved in plant odorant inactivation within the short sensilla.

On the design of peer punishment experiments

We discuss how technologies of peer punishment might bias the results that are observed in experiments. A crucial parameter is the “fine-to-fee” ratio, which describes by how much the punished subjects income is reduced relatively to the fee the punishing subject has to pay to inflict punishment. We show that a punishment technology commonly used in experiments embeds a variable fine-to-fee ratio and show that it confounds the empirical findings about why, whom, and how much subjects punish.

Predictive and distributed routing balancing (PR-DRB): high speed interconnection networks

Current parallel applications running on clusters require the use of an interconnection network to perform communications among all computing nodes available. Imbalance of communications can produce network congestion, reducing throughput and increasing latency, degrading the overall system performance. On the other hand, parallel applications running on these networks posses representative stages which allow their characterization, as well as repetitive behavior that can be identified on the basis of this characterization. This work presents the Predictive and Distributed Routing Balancing (PR-DRB), a new method developed to gradually control network congestion, based on paths expansion, traffic distribution and effective traffic load, in order to maintain low latency values. PR-DRB monitors messages latencies on intermediate routers, makes decisions about alternative paths and record communication pattern information encountered during congestion situation. Based on the concept of applications repetitiveness, best solution recorded are reapplied when saved communication pattern re-appears. Traffic congestion experiments were conducted in order to evaluate the performance of the method, and improvements were observed.

The Limits of Discrete Time Repeated Games:Some Notes and Comments

This paper studies the limits of discrete time repeated games with public monitoring. We solve and characterize the Abreu, Milgrom and Pearce (1991) problem. We found that for the "bad" ("good") news model the lower (higher) magnitude events suggest cooperation, i.e., zero punishment probability, while the highrt (lower) magnitude events suggest defection, i.e., punishment with probability one. Public correlation is used to connect these two sets of signals and to make the enforceability to bind. The dynamic and limit behavior of the punishment probabilities for variations in ... (the discount rate) and ... (the time interval) are characterized, as well as the limit payo¤s for all these scenarios (We also introduce uncertainty in the time domain). The obtained ... limits are to the best of my knowledge, new. The obtained ... limits coincide with Fudenberg and Levine (2007) and Fudenberg and Olszewski (2011), with the exception that we clearly state the precise informational conditions that cause the limit to converge from above, to converge from below or to degenerate. JEL: C73, D82, D86. KEYWORDS: Repeated Games, Frequent Monitoring, Random Pub- lic Monitoring, Moral Hazard, Stochastic Processes.

Engaging students in an e-learning experience : how to manage information resources through wikis and web blogs

The purpose of this paper is to describe the collaboration between librarians and scholars, from a virtual university, in order to facilitate collaborative learning on how to manage information resources. The personal information behaviour of e-learning students when managing information resources for academic, professional and daily life purposes was studied from 24 semi-structured face-to-face interviews. The results of the content analysis of the interview' transcriptions, highlighted that in the workplace and daily life contexts, competent information behaviour is always linked to a proactive attitude, that is to say, that participants seek for information without some extrinsic reward or avoiding punishment. In the academic context, it was observed a low level of information literacy and it seems to be related with a prevalent uninvolved attitude.

The evolution of personally disadvantageous punishment among cofoundresses of the ant Acromyrmex versicolor

Cofoundresses of the desert fungus garden ant Acromyrmex versicolorexhibit a forager specialist who subsumes all foraging risk priorto first worker eclosion (Rissing et al. 1989). In an experimentdesigned to mimic a "cheater" who refuses foraging assignment whenher lot, cofoundresses delayed/failed to replace their forager,often leading to demise of their garden (Rissing et al. 1996). Thecheater on task assignment is harmed, but so too is the punisher,as all will die without a healthy garden. In this paper we studythrough simulation the cofoundress interaction with haploid, asexualgenotypes which either replace a cheater or not (punishment), underboth foundress viscosity (likely for A. versicolor) and randomassortment. We find replacement superior to punishment only whenthere is no foraging risk and cheating is not costly to groupsurvival. Generally, punishment is evolutionarily superior,especially as forager risk increases, under both forms of dispersal.

Optimal magnitude and probability of fines

The economic literature on crime and punishment focuses on the trade-off between probability and severity of punishment, and suggests that detection probability and fines are substitutes. In this paper it is shown that, in presence of substantial underdeterrence caused by costly detection and punishment, these instruments may become complements. When offenders are poor, the deterrent value of monetary sanctions is low. Thus, the government does not invest a lot in detection. If offenders are rich, however, the deterrent value of monetary sanctions is high, so it is more profitable to prosecute them.

The economics of organized crime and optimal law enforcement

This paper extends the optimal law enforcement literature to organized crime.We model the criminal organization as a vertical structure where the principal extracts some rents from the agents through extortion. Depending on the principal's information set, threats may or may not be credible. As long as threats are credible, the principal is able to fully extract rents.In that case, the results obtained by applying standard theory of optimal law enforcement are robust: we argue for a tougher policy. However, when threats are not credible, the principal is not able to fully extract rents and there is violence. Moreover, we show that it is not necessarily true that a tougher law enforcement policy should be chosen when in presence of organized crime.

Optimal law enforcement and criminal organization

In this paper, we take an organizational view of organized crime. In particular, we study the organizational consequences of product illegality attending at the following characteristics: (i) contracts are not enforceable in court, (ii) all participants are subject to the risk of being punished, (iii) employees present a major threat to the entrepreneur having the most detailed knowledge concerning participation, (iv) separation between ownership and management is difficult because record-keeping and auditing augments criminal evidence.

Engaging students in an e-learning experience : how to manage information resources through wikis and web blogs

The purpose of this paper is to describe the collaboration between librarians and scholars, from a virtual university, in order to facilitate collaborative learning on how to manage information resources. The personal information behaviour of e-learning students when managing information resources for academic, professional and daily life purposes was studied from 24 semi-structured face-to-face interviews. The results of the content analysis of the interview' transcriptions, highlighted that in the workplace and daily life contexts, competent information behaviour is always linked to a proactive attitude, that is to say, that participants seek for information without some extrinsic reward or avoiding punishment. In the academic context, it was observed a low level of information literacy and it seems to be related with a prevalent uninvolved attitude.

Action Dominates Valence in Anticipatory Representations in the Human Striatum and Dopaminergic Midbrain

The acquisition of reward and the avoidance of punishment could logically be contingent on either emitting or withholding particular actions. However,the separate pathways inthe striatumfor go and no-go appearto violatethis independence, instead coupling affect and effect. Respect for this interdependence has biased many studies of reward and punishment, so potential action- outcome valence interactions during anticipatory phases remain unexplored. In a functional magnetic resonance imaging study with healthy human volunteers, we manipulated subjects" requirement to emit or withhold an action independent from subsequent receipt of reward or avoidance of punishment. During anticipation, in the striatum and a lateral region within the substantia nigra/ventral tegmental area (SN/VTA), action representations dominated over valence representations. Moreover, we did not observe any representation associated with different state values through accumulation of outcomes, challenging a conventional and dominant association between these areas and state value representations. In contrast, a more medial sector of the SN/VTA responded preferentially to valence, with opposite signs depending on whether action was anticipatedto be emitted or withheld. This dominant influence of action requires an enriched notion of opponency between reward and punishment.