Imperfect competition and market liquidity with a supply informed trader

We develop a model of insider trading where agents have private information either about liquidation value or about supply and behave strategically to maximize their profits. The supply informed trader plays a dual role in market making and in information revelation. This trader not only reveals a part of the information he owns, but he also induces the other traders to reveal more of their private information. The presence of different types of information decreases market liquidity and induces non-monotonicity of the market indicators with respect to the variance of liquidation value. Replacing the noise introduced by liquidity traders with a random supply also allows us to study the effect the shocks on different components of supply have on prices and quantities.

Environmental regulation: choice of instruments under imperfect compliance

Compliance is an important issue in environmental regulation. In this paper, we discuss some of the key elements of the problem and analyze a situation where emissions are not random and firms are risk-neutral. We study the firm's decision on emissions and compliance when the environmental regulation is based on standards and the enforcement agency audits the firm with a certain probability. We then compare total emissions when environmental regulation is based on different instruments: standards, taxes, and tradable permits. We show that when compliance is an issue, environmental taxes are superior to the other instruments. We also analyze the (static) efficiency of the solution.

Cooperative strategies for imperfect CSI scenarios based on distributed Alamouti

Les comunicacions cooperatives estan guanyant un gran interès en les comunicacions modernes degut a que permeten millorar la transmissió dʼinformació entre un emissor i un receptor utilitzant una sèrie de terminals situats entre ells. Aquest projecte és un estudi complet del sistemes cooperatius, analitzant el seu rendiment i comparant lʼús dʼun sol dʼaquests terminals amb lʼús del codi Alamouti, que utilitza dos terminals. Primer hi ha una introducció als sistemes cooperatius i a la teoria de la informació. Després hem estudiat un sistema cooperatiu amb la teoria de la informació com a base, en termes de probabilitat de fallada del sistema, i posteriorment lʼhem adaptat a un sistema cooperatiu real utilitzant una modulació QPSK, estudiant la seva probabilitat dʼerror de paquet. Finalment es proposen diversos protocols que permeten millorar el rendiment del sistema cooperatiu estudiat.

Additional utility of insiders with imperfect dynamical information

In this paper we consider an insider with privileged information thatis affected by an independent noise vanishing as the revelation timeapproaches. At this time, information is available to every trader. Ourfinancial markets are based on Wiener space. In probabilistic terms weobtain an infinite dimensional extension of Jacod s theorem to covercases of progressive enlargement of filtrations. The application ofthis result gives the semimartingale decomposition of the originalWiener process under the progressively enlarged filtration. As anapplication we prove that if the rate at which the additional noise inthe insider s information vanishes is slow enough then there is noarbitrage and the additional utility of the insider is finite.

Firm investment in imperfect capital markets: A structural estimation

We set up a dynamic model of firm investment in which liquidity constraintsenter explicity into the firm's maximization problem. The optimal policyrules are incorporated into a maximum likelihood procedure which estimatesthe structural parameters of the model. Investment is positively related tothe firm's internal financial position when the firm is relatively poor. This relationship disappears for wealthy firms, which can reach theirdesired level of investment. Borrowing is an increasing function of financial position for poor firms. This relationship is reversed as a firm's financial position improves, and large firms hold little debt.Liquidity constrained firms may be unused credits lines and the capacity toinvest further if they desire. However the fear that liquidity constraintswill become binding in the future induces them to invest only when internalresources increase.We estimate the structural parameters of the model and use them to quantifythe importance of liquidity constraints on firms' investment. We find thatliquidity constraints matter significantly for the investment decisions of firms. If firms can finance investment by issuing fresh equity, rather than with internal funds or debt, average capital stock is almost 35% higher overa period of 20 years. Transitory shocks to internal funds have a sustained effect on the capital stock. This effect lasts for several periods and ismore persistent for small firms than for large firms. A 10% negative shock to firm fundamentals reduces the capital stock of firms which face liquidityconstraints by almost 8% over a period as opposed to only 3.5% for firms which do not face these constraints.

Parental altruism under imperfect information: Theory and evidence

Can we reconcile the predictions of the altruism model of the familywith the evidence on intervivos transfers in the US? This paper expandsthe altruism model by introducing e ?ort of the child and by relaxingthe assumption of perfect information of the parent about the labormarket opportunities of the child. First, I solve and simulate a modelof altruism under imperfect information. Second, I use cross-sectionaldata to test a prediction of the model: Are parental transfers especiallyresponsive to the income variations of children who are very attached tothe labor market? The results suggest that imperfect information accountsfor several patterns of intergenerational transfers in the US.

Increasing returns, imperfect competition and factor prices

We show how, in general equilibrium models featuring increasing returns, imperfectcompetition and endogenous markups, changes in the scale of economic activity affectincome distribution across factors. Whenever final goods are gross-substitutes (gross-complements), a scale expansion raises (lowers) the relative reward of the scarce factoror the factor used intensively in the sector characterized by a higher degree of product differentiation and higher fixed costs. Under very reasonable hypothesis, our theory suggests that scale is skill-biased. This result provides a microfoundation for the secular increase in the relative demand for skilled labor. Moreover, it constitutes an important link among major explanations for the rise in wage inequality: skill-biased technical change, capital-skill complementarities and international trade. We provide new evidence on the mechanism underlying the skill bias of scale.

Parental altruism under imperfect information: Theory and evidence

Can we reconcile the predictions of the altruism model of the family withthe evidence on parental monetary transfers in the US? This paper providesa new assessment of this question. I expand the altruism model by introducingeffort of the child and by relaxing the assumption of perfect informationof the parent about the labor market opportunities of the child. First,I solve and simulate a model of altruism and labor supply under imperfectinformation. Second, I use cross-sectional data to test the following prediction of the model: Are parental transfers especially responsive tothe income variations of children who are very attached to the labor market? The results of the analysis suggest that imperfect informationaccounts for many of the patterns of intergenerational transfers in theUS.

Robust power allocation algorithms for MIMO OFDM systems with imperfect CSI

This paper presents a Bayesian approach to the design of transmit prefiltering matrices in closed-loop schemes robust to channel estimation errors. The algorithms are derived for a multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) system. Two different optimizationcriteria are analyzed: the minimization of the mean square error and the minimization of the bit error rate. In both cases, the transmitter design is based on the singular value decomposition (SVD) of the conditional mean of the channel response, given the channel estimate. The performance of the proposed algorithms is analyzed,and their relationship with existing algorithms is indicated. As withother previously proposed solutions, the minimum bit error rate algorithmconverges to the open-loop transmission scheme for very poor CSI estimates.

People favour imperfect catching by assuming a stable world

The visual angle that is projected by an object (e.g. a ball) on the retina depends on the object's size and distance. Without further information, however, the visual angle is ambiguous with respect to size and distance, because equal visual angles can be obtained from a big ball at a longer distance and a smaller one at a correspondingly shorter distance. Failure to recover the true 3D structure of the object (e.g. a ball's physical size) causing the ambiguous retinal image can lead to a timing error when catching the ball. Two opposing views are currently prevailing on how people resolve this ambiguity when estimating time to contact. One explanation challenges any inference about what causes the retinal image (i.e. the necessity to recover this 3D structure), and instead favors a direct analysis of optic flow. In contrast, the second view suggests that action timing could be rather based on obtaining an estimate of the 3D structure of the scene. With the latter, systematic errors will be predicted if our inference of the 3D structure fails to reveal the underlying cause of the retinal image. Here we show that hand closure in catching virtual balls is triggered by visual angle, using an assumption of a constant ball size. As a consequence of this assumption, hand closure starts when the ball is at similar distance across trials. From that distance on, the remaining arrival time, therefore, depends on ball's speed. In order to time the catch successfully, closing time was coupled with ball's speed during the motor phase. This strategy led to an increased precision in catching but at the cost of committing systematic errors.

Is bundling anticompetitive?

I analyze the implications of bundling on price competition in a market for complementary products. Using a model of imperfect competition with product differentiation, I identify the incentives to bundle for two types of demand functions and study how they change with the size of the bundle. With an inelastic demand, bundling creates an advantage over uncoordinated rivals who cannot improve by bundling. I show that this no longer holds with an elastic demand. The incentives to bundle are stronger and the market outcome is symmetric bundling, the most competitive one. Profits are lowest and consumer surplus is maximized.

Analyzing aggregate real exchange rate persistence through the lens of sectoral data

In this paper we analyze the persistence of aggregate real exchange rates (RERs) for a group of EU-15 countries by using sectoral data. The tight relation between aggregate and sectoral persistence recently investigated by Mayoral (2008) allows us to decompose aggregate RER persistence into the persistence of its different subcomponents. We show that the distribution of sectoral persistence is highly heterogeneous and very skewed to the right, and that a limited number of sectors are responsible for the high levels of persistence observed at the aggregate level. We use quantile regression to investigate whether the traditional theories proposed to account for the slow reversion to parity (lack of arbitrage due to nontradibilities or imperfect competition and price stickiness) are able to explain the behavior of the upper quantiles of sectoral persistence. We conclude that pricing to market in the intermediate goods sector together with price stickiness have more explanatory power than variables related to the tradability of the goods or their inputs.

Venezuelan economic laboratory. The Case of the altruistic economy of Felipe Pérez Martí

Felipe Pérez Martí, who was the Venezuelan Minister of Planning and Development in the government of Hugo Chávez, proposes an economic model that he calls the altruistic economy or fourth way, which leads cooperative game theory to its logical extremes postulating a pure communism. Here we sustain that, first, it is impossible in the model of Pérez Martí to marginally allocate non-primary goods to those most in need or who most value them, facing a problem of defective economic calculation, and second, in order to achieve equality, he would have to replace his atomic local planners by a central planner, who would be unable to overcome the problem of imperfect and and incomplete information.

Immigrants'assimilation process in a segmented labor market

While much of the literature on immigrants' assimilation has focused on countries with a large tradition of receiving immigrants and with flexible labor markets, very little is known on how immigrants adjust to other types of host economies. With its severe dual labor market, and an unprecedented immigration boom, Spain presents a quite unique experience to analyze immigrations' assimilation process. Using data from the 2000 to 2008 Labor Force Survey, we find that immigrants are more occupationally mobile than natives, and that much of this greater flexibility is explained by immigrants' assimilation process soon after arrival. However, we find little evidence of convergence, especially among women and high skilled immigrants. This suggests that instead of integrating, immigrants occupationally segregate, providing evidence consistent with both imperfect substitutability and immigrants' human capital being under-valued. Additional evidence on the assimilation of earnings and the incidence of permanent employment by different skill levels also supports the hypothesis of segmented labor markets.

A Folk Theorem for Games when Frequent Monitoring Decreases Noise

This paper studies frequent monitoring in an infinitely repeated game with imperfect public information and discounting, where players observe the state of a continuous time Brownian process at moments in time of length _. It shows that a limit folk theorem can be achieved with imperfect public monitoring when players monitor each other at the highest frequency, i.e., _. The approach assumes that the expected joint output depends exclusively on the action profile simultaneously and privately decided by the players at the beginning of each period of the game, but not on _. The strong decreasing effect on the expected immediate gains from deviation when the interval between actions shrinks, and the associated increase precision of the public signals, make the result possible in the limit. JEL: C72/73, D82, L20. KEYWORDS: Repeated Games, Frequent Monitoring, Public Monitoring, Brownian Motion.