29 resultados para health-care
em Consorci de Serveis Universitaris de Catalunya (CSUC), Spain
Resumo:
The Hausman (1978) test is based on the vector of differences of two estimators. It is usually assumed that one of the estimators is fully efficient, since this simplifies calculation of the test statistic. However, this assumption limits the applicability of the test, since widely used estimators such as the generalized method of moments (GMM) or quasi maximum likelihood (QML) are often not fully efficient. This paper shows that the test may easily be implemented, using well-known methods, when neither estimator is efficient. To illustrate, we present both simulation results as well as empirical results for utilization of health care services.
Resumo:
Prevention has been a main issue of recent policy orientations in health care. This renews the interest on how different organizational designs and the definition of payment schemes to providers may affect the incentives to provide preventive health care. We present, both the normative and the positive analyses of the change from independent providers to integrated services. We show the evaluation of that change to depend on the particular way payment to providers is done. We focus on the externality resulting from referral decisions from primary to acute care providers. This makes our analysis complementary to most works in the literature allowing to address in a more direct way the issue of preventive health care.
Resumo:
We address the question of how a third-party payer (e.g. an insurer) decides what providers to contract with. Three different mechanisms are studied and their properties compared. A first mechanism consists in the third-party payer setting up a bargaining procedure with both providers jointly and simultaneously. A second mechanism envisages the outcome of the same simultaneous bargaining but independently with every provider. Finally, the last mechanism is of different nature. It is the so-called "any willing provider" where the third-party payer announces a contract and every provider freely decides to sign it or not. The main finding is that the decision of the third-party payer depends on the surplus to be shared. When it is relatively high the third-party payer prefers the any willing provider system. When, on the contrary, the surplus is relatively low, the third-party payer will select one of the other two systems accor ing to how bargaining power is distributed.
Resumo:
In several instances, third-party payers negotiate prices of health care services with providers. We show that a third-party payer may prefer to deal with a professional association than with the sub-set constituted by the more efficient providers, and then apply the same price to all providers. The reason for it is the increase in the bargaining position of providers. The more efficient providers are also the ones with higher profits in the event of negotiation failure. This allows them to ext act a higher surplus from the third-party payer.
Resumo:
Objective: This study examines health care utilization of immigrants relative to the native-born populations aged 50 years and older in eleven European countries. Methods. We analyzed data from the Survey of Health Aging and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) from 2004 for a sample of 27,444 individuals in 11 European countries. Negative Binomial regression was conducted to examine the difference in number of doctor visits, visits to General Practitioners (GPs), and hospital stays between immigrants and the native-born individuals. Results: We find evidence those immigrants above age 50 use health services on average more than the native-born populations with the same characteristics. Our models show immigrants have between 6% and 27% more expected visits to the doctor, GP or hospital stays when compared to native-born populations in a number of European countries. Discussion: Elderly immigrant populations might be using health services more intensively due to cultural reasons.
Resumo:
This paper addresses the impact of payment systems on the rate of technology adoption. We present a model where technological shift is driven by demand uncertainty, increased patients' benefit, financial variables, and the reimbursement system to providers. Two payment systems are studied: cost reimbursement and (two variants of) DRG. According to the system considered, adoption occurs either when patients' benefits are large enough or when the differential reimbursement across technologies offsets the cost of adoption. Cost reimbursement leads to higher adoption of the new technology if the rate of reimbursement is high relative to the margin of new vs. old technology reimbursement under DRG. Having larger patient benefits favors more adoption under the cost reimbursement payment system, provided that adoption occurs initially under both payment systems.
Resumo:
This paper reports an analysis of the evolution of income related health inequalities in Spain over the period 1987-2001. We use recently developed methods in order to cardinalise and model self assessed health within a regression framework, decompose the sources of inequality and explain the observed differences between 1987 (one year after the 1986 General Health Act was approved) and 2001 (the latest available representative data on health for the Spanish population). The results show that the period has witnessed a reduction in income related health inequality. The driver of such reduction has been the weakening of the income health gradient, which lends support to the hypothesis that the important health policy reforms implemented over the period have been successful in the objective of reducing socio-economic inequalities in health. Our results also suggest that actions aimed at improving the health of those with low levels of education and of those who are not actively participating in the labor market would lead to further reductions in income related health inequality.
Resumo:
The general issues of equity and efficiency are placed at the center of the analysis of resource allocation problems in health care. We examine them using axiomatic bargaining theory. We study different solutions that have been proposed and relate them to previous literature on health care allocation. In particular, we focus on the solutions based on axiomatic bargaining with claims and suggest that they may be particularly appealing as distributive criteria in health policy. Finally, we present the results of a survey that tries to elicit moral intuitions of people about resource allocation problems and their different solutions.
Resumo:
In this paper we address the importance of distributive effects in the social valuation of QALY's. We propose a social welfarefunction that generalises the functions traditionally used in the health economic literature. The novelty is that, depending on the individual health gains, our function can representeither preferences for concentrating or preferences for spreading total gain or both together, an issue which has notbeen addressed until now. Based on an experiment, we observe that this generalisation provides a suitable approximation tothe sampled social preferences.
Resumo:
The Person Trade-Off (PTO) is a methodology aimed at measuring thesocial value of health states. The rest of methodologies would measure individualutility and would be less appropriate for taking resource allocation decisions.However few studies have been conducted to test the validity of the method.We present a pilot study with this objective. The study is based on theresult of interviews to 30 undergraduate students in Economics. We judgethe validity of PTO answers by their adequacy to three hypothesis of rationality.First, we show that, given certain rationality assumptions, PTO answersshould be predicted from answers to Standard Gamble questions. This firsthypothesis is not verified. The second hypothesis is that PTO answersshould not vary with different frames of equivalent PTO questions. Thissecond hypothesis is also not verified. Our third hypothesis is that PTOvalues should predict social preferences for allocating resources betweenpatients. This hypothesis is verified. The evidence on the validity of themethod is then conflicting.
Resumo:
This paper analyzes the nature of health care provider choice inthe case of patient-initiated contacts, with special reference toa National Health Service setting, where monetary prices are zeroand general practitioners act as gatekeepers to publicly financedspecialized care. We focus our attention on the factors that mayexplain the continuously increasing use of hospital emergencyvisits as opposed to other provider alternatives. An extendedversion of a discrete choice model of demand for patient-initiatedcontacts is presented, allowing for individual and town residencesize differences in perceived quality (preferences) betweenalternative providers and including travel and waiting time asnon-monetary costs. Results of a nested multinomial logit model ofprovider choice are presented. Individual choice betweenalternatives considers, in a repeated nested structure, self-care,primary care, hospital and clinic emergency services. Welfareimplications and income effects are analyzed by computingcompensating variations, and by simulating the effects of userfees by levels of income. Results indicate that compensatingvariation per visit is higher than the direct marginal cost ofemergency visits, and consequently, emergency visits do not appearas an inefficient alternative even for non-urgent conditions.
Resumo:
The consolidation of a universal health system coupled with a process of regionaldevolution characterise the institutional reforms of the National Health System(NHS) in Spain in the last two decades. However, scarce empirical evidence hasbeen reported on the effects of both changes in health inputs, outputs andoutcomes, both at the country and at the regional level. This paper examinesthe empirical evidence on regional diversity, efficiency and inequality ofthese changes in the Spanish NHS using cross-correlation, panel data andexpenditure decomposition analysis. Results suggest that besides significantheterogeneity, once we take into account region-specific needs there is evidenceof efficiency improvements whilst inequalities in inputs and outcomes, althoughmore visible , do not appear to have increased in the last decade. Therefore,the devolution process in the Spanish Health System offers an interesting casefor the experimentation of health reforms related to regional diversity butcompatible with the nature of a public NHS, with no sizeable regionalinequalitiest.
Resumo:
We apply a multilevel hierarchical model to explore whether anaggregation fallacy exists in estimating the income elasticity of healthexpenditure by ignoring the regional composition of national healthexpenditure figures. We use data for 110 regions in eight OECD countriesin 1997: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden andUnited Kingdom. In doing this we have tried to identify two sources ofrandom variation: within countries and between-countries. Our resultsshow that: 1- Variability between countries amounts to (SD) 0.5433, andjust 13% of that can be attributed to income elasticity and the remaining87% to autonomous health expenditure; 2- Within countries, variabilityamounts to (SD) 1.0249; and 3- The intra-class correlation is 0.5300. Weconclude that we have to take into account the degree of fiscaldecentralisation within countries in estimating income elasticity ofhealth expenditure. Two reasons lie behind this: a) where there isdecentralisation to the regions, policies aimed at emulating diversitytend to increase national health care expenditure; and b) without fiscaldecentralisation, central monitoring of finance tends to reduce regionaldiversity and therefore decrease national health expenditure.
Resumo:
The organisation of inpatient care provision has undergone significant reform in many southern European countries. Overall across Europe, public management is moving towards the introduction of more flexibility and autonomy . In this setting, the promotion of the further decentralisation of health care provision stands out as a key salient policy option in all countries that have hitherto had a traditionally centralised structure. Yet, the success of the underlying incentives that decentralised structures create relies on the institutional design at the organisational level, especially in respect of achieving efficiency and promoting policy innovation without harming the essential principle of equal access for equal need that grounds National Health Systems (NHS). This paper explores some of the specific organisational developments of decentralisation structures drawing from the Spanish experience, and particularly those in the Catalonia. This experience provides some evidence of the extent to which organisation decentralisation structures that expand levels of autonomy and flexibility lead to organisational innovation while promoting activity and efficiency. In addition to this pure managerial decentralisation process, Spain is of particular interest as a result of the specific regional NHS decentralisation that started in the early 1980 s and was completed in 2002 when all seventeen autonomous communities that make up the country had responsibility for health care services.Already there is some evidence to suggest that this process of decentralisation has been accompanied by a degree of policy innovation and informal regional cooperation. Indeed, the Spanish experience is relevant because both institutional changes took place, namely managerial decentralisation leading to higher flexibility and autonomy- alongside an increasing political decentralisation at the regional level. The coincidence of both processes could potentially explain why some organisation and policy innovation resulting from policy experimentation at the regional level might be an additional featureto take into account when examining the benefits of decentralisation.