Adaptive approach heuristics for the generalized assignment problem

The Generalized Assignment Problem consists in assigning a setof tasks to a set of agents with minimum cost. Each agent hasa limited amount of a single resource and each task must beassigned to one and only one agent, requiring a certain amountof the resource of the agent. We present new metaheuristics forthe generalized assignment problem based on hybrid approaches.One metaheuristic is a MAX-MIN Ant System (MMAS), an improvedversion of the Ant System, which was recently proposed byStutzle and Hoos to combinatorial optimization problems, and itcan be seen has an adaptive sampling algorithm that takes inconsideration the experience gathered in earlier iterations ofthe algorithm. Moreover, the latter heuristic is combined withlocal search and tabu search heuristics to improve the search.A greedy randomized adaptive search heuristic (GRASP) is alsoproposed. Several neighborhoods are studied, including one basedon ejection chains that produces good moves withoutincreasing the computational effort. We present computationalresults of the comparative performance, followed by concludingremarks and ideas on future research in generalized assignmentrelated problems.

A generalized assignment game

The proposed game is a natural extension of the Shapley and Shubik Assignment Game to the case where each seller owns a set of different objets instead of only one indivisible object. We propose definitions of pairwise stability and group stability that are adapted to our framework. Existence of both pairwise and group stable outcomes is proved. We study the structure of the group stable set and we finally prove that the set of group stable payoffs forms a complete lattice with one optimal group stable payoff for each side of the market.

On Cooperative solutions of a generalized assignment game: limit theorems to the set of competitive equilibria

We study two cooperative solutions of a market with indivisible goods modeled as a generalized assignment game: Set-wise stability and Core. We first establish that the Set-wise stable set is contained in the Core and it contains the non-empty set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. We then state and prove three limit results for replicated markets. First, the sequence of Cores of replicated markets converges to the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs when the number of replicas tends to infinity. Second, the Set-wise stable set of a two-fold replicated market already coincides with the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. Third, for any number of replicas there is a market with a Core payoff that is not a competitive equilibrium payoff.

A simulation-based algorithm for solving the resource-assignment problem in satellite telecommunication networks

This paper proposes an heuristic for the scheduling of capacity requests and the periodic assignment of radio resources in geostationary (GEO) satellite networks with star topology, using the Demand Assigned Multiple Access (DAMA) protocol in the link layer, and Multi-Frequency Time Division Multiple Access (MF-TDMA) and Adaptive Coding and Modulation (ACM) in the physical layer.

On the structure of cooperative and competitive solutions for a generalized assignment game

We study cooperative and competitive solutions for a many- to-many generalization of Shapley and Shubik (1972)'s assignment game. We consider the Core, three other notions of group stability and two al- ternative definitions of competitive equilibrium. We show that (i) each group stable set is closely related with the Core of certain games defined using a proper notion of blocking and (ii) each group stable set contains the set of payoff vectors associated to the two definitions of competitive equilibrium. We also show that all six solutions maintain a strictly nested structure. Moreover, each solution can be identified with a set of ma- trices of (discriminated) prices which indicate how gains from trade are distributed among buyers and sellers. In all cases such matrices arise as solutions of a system of linear inequalities. Hence, all six solutions have the same properties from a structural and computational point of view.

The Multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multi-unit demands: competitive equilibria

A multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multiunit demands consists of a set of sellers that own a given number of indivisible units of (potentially many different) goods and a set of buyers who value those units and want to buy at most an exogenously fixed number of units. We define a competitive equilibrium for this generalized assignment game and prove its existence by using only linear programming. In particular, we show how to compute equilibrium price vectors from the solutions of the dual linear program associated to the primal linear program defined to find optimal assignments. Using only linear programming tools, we also show (i) that the set of competitive equilibria (pairs of price vectors and assignments) has a Cartesian product structure: each equilibrium price vector is part of a competitive equilibrium with all optimal assignments, and vice versa; (ii) that the set of (restricted) equilibrium price vectors has a natural lattice structure; and (iii) how this structure is translated into the set of agents' utilities that are attainable at equilibrium.

Generating highly balanced sudoku problems as hard problems

Sudoku problems are some of the most known and enjoyed pastimes, with a never diminishing popularity, but, for the last few years those problems have gone from an entertainment to an interesting research area, a twofold interesting area, in fact. On the one side Sudoku problems, being a variant of Gerechte Designs and Latin Squares, are being actively used for experimental design, as in [8, 44, 39, 9]. On the other hand, Sudoku problems, as simple as they seem, are really hard structured combinatorial search problems, and thanks to their characteristics and behavior, they can be used as benchmark problems for refining and testing solving algorithms and approaches. Also, thanks to their high inner structure, their study can contribute more than studies of random problems to our goal of solving real-world problems and applications and understanding problem characteristics that make them hard to solve. In this work we use two techniques for solving and modeling Sudoku problems, namely, Constraint Satisfaction Problem (CSP) and Satisfiability Problem (SAT) approaches. To this effect we define the Generalized Sudoku Problem (GSP), where regions can be of rectangular shape, problems can be of any order, and solution existence is not guaranteed. With respect to the worst-case complexity, we prove that GSP with block regions of m rows and n columns with m = n is NP-complete. For studying the empirical hardness of GSP, we define a series of instance generators, that differ in the balancing level they guarantee between the constraints of the problem, by finely controlling how the holes are distributed in the cells of the GSP. Experimentally, we show that the more balanced are the constraints, the higher the complexity of solving the GSP instances, and that GSP is harder than the Quasigroup Completion Problem (QCP), a problem generalized by GSP. Finally, we provide a study of the correlation between backbone variables – variables with the same value in all the solutions of an instance– and hardness of GSP.

A numerical algorithm for finding solutions of a generalized Nash equilibrium problem

A family of nonempty closed convex sets is built by using the data of the Generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP). The sets are selected iteratively such that the intersection of the selected sets contains solutions of the GNEP. The algorithm introduced by Iusem-Sosa (2003) is adapted to obtain solutions of the GNEP. Finally some numerical experiments are given to illustrate the numerical behavior of the algorithm.

Generalized three-sided assignment markets: consistency and the core

A class of three-sided markets (and games) is considered, where value is generated by pairs or triplets of agents belonging to different sectors, as well as by individuals. For these markets we analyze the situation that arises when some agents leave the market with some payoff To this end, we introduce the derived market (and game) and relate it to the Davis and Maschler (1965) reduced game. Consistency with respect to the derived market, together with singleness best and individual anti-monotonicity axiomatically characterize the core for these generalized three-sided assignment markets. These markets may have an empty core, but we define a balanced subclass, where the worth of each triplet is defined as the addition of the worths of the pairs it contains. Keywords: Multi-sided assignment market, Consistency, Core, Nucleolus. JEL Classification: C71, C78

In whose backyard? A generalized bidding approach

We analyze situations in which a group of agents (and possibly a designer) have to reach a decision that will affect all the agents. Examples of such scenarios are the location of a nuclear reactor or the siting of a major sport event. To address the problem of reaching a decision, we propose a one-stage multi-bidding mechanism where agents compete for the project by submitting bids. All Nash equilibria of this mechanism are efficient. Moreover, the payoffs attained in equilibrium by the agents satisfy intuitively appealing lower bounds..

On Boas-Type Problem

R.P. Boas has found necessary and sufficient conditions of belonging of function to Lipschitz class. From his findings it turned out, that the conditions on sine and cosine coefficients for belonging of function to Lip α(0 & α & 1) are the same, but for Lip 1 are different. Later his results were generalized by many authors in the viewpoint of generalization of condition on the majorant of modulus of continuity. The aim of this paper is to obtain Boas-type theorems for generalized Lipschitz classes. To define generalized Lipschitz classes we use the concept of modulus of smoothness of fractional order.

Addressing the net balances problem as a prerequisite for EU budget reform: a proposal

Conflict among member states regarding the distribution of net financial burdens has been allowed to contaminate the entire design of the EU budget with very negative consequences in terms of equity, efficiency and transparency. To get around this problem and pave the way for a substantive budget reform, we propose to decouple distributional negotiations from the rest of the budget process by linking member state net balances in a rigid manner to relative prosperity. This would be achieved through the introduction of a system of compensating horizontal transfers that would take to its logical conclusion the Commission's proposal for a generalized compensation mechanism. We discuss the impact of the proposed scheme on member states? incentives and illustrate its financial implications using revenue and expenditure projections for 2013 that are based on the current Financial Perspectives and Own Resources Decision.

The simultaneous conjugacy problem in groups of piecewise linear functions

Guba and Sapir asked, in their joint paper [8], if the simultaneous conjugacy problem was solvable in Diagram Groups or, at least, for Thompson's group F. We give an elementary proof for the solution of the latter question. This relies purely on the description of F as the group of piecewise linear orientation-preserving homeomorphisms of the unit. The techniques we develop allow us also to solve the ordinary conjugacy problem as well, and we can compute roots and centralizers. Moreover, these techniques can be generalized to solve the same questions in larger groups of piecewise-linear homeomorphisms.

Alternative ways to estimate change points in multinomial sequences. An application to an authorship attribution problem

The statistical analysis of literary style is the part of stylometry that compares measurable characteristicsin a text that are rarely controlled by the author, with those in other texts. When thegoal is to settle authorship questions, these characteristics should relate to the author’s style andnot to the genre, epoch or editor, and they should be such that their variation between authors islarger than the variation within comparable texts from the same author.For an overview of the literature on stylometry and some of the techniques involved, see for exampleMosteller and Wallace (1964, 82), Herdan (1964), Morton (1978), Holmes (1985), Oakes (1998) orLebart, Salem and Berry (1998).Tirant lo Blanc, a chivalry book, is the main work in catalan literature and it was hailed to be“the best book of its kind in the world” by Cervantes in Don Quixote. Considered by writterslike Vargas Llosa or Damaso Alonso to be the first modern novel in Europe, it has been translatedseveral times into Spanish, Italian and French, with modern English translations by Rosenthal(1996) and La Fontaine (1993). The main body of this book was written between 1460 and 1465,but it was not printed until 1490.There is an intense and long lasting debate around its authorship sprouting from its first edition,where its introduction states that the whole book is the work of Martorell (1413?-1468), while atthe end it is stated that the last one fourth of the book is by Galba (?-1490), after the death ofMartorell. Some of the authors that support the theory of single authorship are Riquer (1990),Chiner (1993) and Badia (1993), while some of those supporting the double authorship are Riquer(1947), Coromines (1956) and Ferrando (1995). For an overview of this debate, see Riquer (1990).Neither of the two candidate authors left any text comparable to the one under study, and thereforediscriminant analysis can not be used to help classify chapters by author. By using sample textsencompassing about ten percent of the book, and looking at word length and at the use of 44conjunctions, prepositions and articles, Ginebra and Cabos (1998) detect heterogeneities that mightindicate the existence of two authors. By analyzing the diversity of the vocabulary, Riba andGinebra (2000) estimates that stylistic boundary to be near chapter 383.Following the lead of the extensive literature, this paper looks into word length, the use of the mostfrequent words and into the use of vowels in each chapter of the book. Given that the featuresselected are categorical, that leads to three contingency tables of ordered rows and therefore tothree sequences of multinomial observations.Section 2 explores these sequences graphically, observing a clear shift in their distribution. Section 3describes the problem of the estimation of a suden change-point in those sequences, in the followingsections we propose various ways to estimate change-points in multinomial sequences; the methodin section 4 involves fitting models for polytomous data, the one in Section 5 fits gamma modelsonto the sequence of Chi-square distances between each row profiles and the average profile, theone in Section 6 fits models onto the sequence of values taken by the first component of thecorrespondence analysis as well as onto sequences of other summary measures like the averageword length. In Section 7 we fit models onto the marginal binomial sequences to identify thefeatures that distinguish the chapters before and after that boundary. Most methods rely heavilyon the use of generalized linear models