Coalition formation in a contest game with three heterogeneous players

We analyze the incentives for cooperation of three players differing in their efficiency of effort in a contest game. We concentrate on the non-cooperative bargaining foundation of coalition formation, and therefore, we adopt a two-stage model. In the first stage, individuals form coalitions following a bargaining protocol similar to the one proposed by Gul (1989). Afterwards, coalitions play the contest game of Esteban and Ray (1999) within the resulting coalition structure of the first stage. We find that the grand coalition forms whenever the distribution of the bargaining power in the coalition formation game is equal to the distribution of the relative efficiency of effort. Finally, we use the case of equal bargaining power for all individuals to show that other types of coalition structures may be observed as well.

Inter-group conflict and intra-group punishment in an experimental contest game

We study how conflict in a contest game is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to punish each other. Our main motivation stems from the analysis of socio-political conflict. The relevant theoretical prediction in our setting is that conflict expenditures are independent of group size and independent of whether punishment is available or not. We find, first, that our results contradict the independence of group-size prediction: conflict expenditures of groups are substantially larger than those of individuals, and both are substantially above equilibrium. Towards the end of the experiment material losses in groups are 257% of the predicted level. There is, however, substantial heterogeneity in the investment behaviour of individual group members. Second, allowing group members to punish each other after individual contributions to the contest effort are revealed leads to even larger conflict expenditures. Now material losses are 869% of the equilibrium level and there is much less heterogeneity in individual group members' investments. These results contrast strongly with those from public goods experiments where punishment enhances efficiency and leads to higher material payoffs.

Coupling digital and physical worlds in an AR magic show performance: lessons learned

“Magic for a Pixeloscope” is a one hour show conceived to berepresented in a theater scenario that merges mixed and augmented reality (MR/AR) and full-body interaction with classical magic to create new tricks. The show was conceived by an interdisciplinary team composed by a magician, twointeraction designers, a theater director and a stage designer. Themagician uses custom based hardware and software to createnew illusions which are a starting point to explore new languagefor magical expression. In this paper we introduce a conceptualframework used to inform the design of different tricks; weexplore the design and production of some tricks included in theshow and we describe the feedback received on the world premiere and some of the conclusions obtained.

MAGIC TeV Gamma-Ray Observations of Markarian 421 during Multiwavelength Campaigns in 2006

Wide-range spectral coverage of blazar-type active galactic nuclei is of paramount importance for understanding the particle acceleration mechanisms assumed to take place in their jets. The Major Atmospheric Gamma Imaging Cerenkov (MAGIC) telescope participated in three multiwavelength (MWL) campaigns, observing the blazar Markarian (Mkn) 421 during the nights of April 28 and 29, 2006, and June 14, 2006. Aims. We analyzed the corresponding MAGIC very-high energy observations during 9 nights from April 22 to 30, 2006 and on June 14, 2006. We inferred light curves with sub-day resolution and night-by-night energy spectra. Methods. MAGIC detects γ-rays by observing extended air showers in the atmosphere. The obtained air-shower images were analyzed using the standard MAGIC analysis chain. Results. A strong γ-ray signal was detected from Mkn 421 on all observation nights. The flux (E > 250 GeV) varied on night-by-night basis between (0.92±0.11) × 10-10 cm-2 s-1 (0.57 Crab units) and (3.21±0.15) × 10-10 cm-2 s-1 (2.0 Crab units) in April 2006. There is a clear indication for intra-night variability with a doubling time of 36± min on the night of April 29, 2006, establishing once more rapid flux variability for this object. For all individual nights γ-ray spectra could be inferred, with power-law indices ranging from 1.66 to 2.47. We did not find statistically significant correlations between the spectral index and the flux state for individual nights. During the June 2006 campaign, a flux substantially lower than the one measured by the Whipple 10-m telescope four days later was found. Using a log-parabolic power law fit we deduced for some data sets the location of the spectral peak in the very-high energy regime. Our results confirm the indications of rising peak energy with increasing flux, as expected in leptonic acceleration models.

Optimized dark matter searches in deep observations of Segue 1 with MAGIC

We present the results of stereoscopic observations of the satellite galaxy Segue 1 with the MAGIC Telescopes, carried out between 2011 and 2013. With almost 160 hours of good-quality data, this is the deepest observational campaign on any dwarf galaxy performed so far in the very high energy range of the electromagnetic spectrum. We search this large data sample for signals of dark matter particles in the mass range between 100 GeV and 20 TeV. For this we use the full likelihood analysis method, which provides optimal sensitivity to characteristic gamma-ray spectral features, like those expected from dark matter annihilation or decay. In particular, we focus our search on gamma-rays produced from different final state Standard Model particles, annihilation with internal bremsstrahlung, monochromatic lines and box-shaped signals. Our results represent the most stringent constraints to the annihilation cross-section or decay lifetime obtained from observations of satellite galaxies, for masses above few hundred GeV. In particular, our strongest limit (95% confidence level) corresponds to a ~ 500 GeV dark matter particle annihilating into τ+τ−, and is of order langleσannvrangle simeq 1.2 × 10−24 cm3 s−1 a factor ~ 40 above the langleσannvrangle simeq thermal value.

Classical references and their significance in The Magic Mountain by Thomas Mann

Although Thomas Mann’s novel The Magic Mountain has been the object of innumerable studies, this paper suggests that so far none of these has given truly close attention to the significance of the classical references in this novel with regard to the search for a true humanism. This is probably owing to the generally held belief that the influence of the classical tradition is relatively inconsequential in relation to the ample conjunction of philosophical ideas on which the novel is based. This article takes a differing view and, through a close analysis and comment of the explicit and implicit classical notions in the text, concludes that these ideas are also a valuable key to a greater comprehension of the ideological design of the main character, Hans Castorp, and to a certain degree they also help to continue to reflect on the most enigmatic and controversial episode of the novel: the young protagonist’s descent to the plain from the magical mountain (Zauberberg) in order to take part in the great tragedy of World War I, alien as is any war to the prevalent but ultimately futile desire that love (Liebe) should in the end prevail in the life of humans.

When does universal peace prevail? Secession and group formation in rent seeking contests and policy conflicts

This paper analyzes secession and group formation in a general model of contest inspired by Esteban and Ray (1999). This model encompasses as special cases rent seeking contests and policy conflicts, where agents lobby over the choice of a policy in a one-dimensional policy space. We show that in both models the grand coalition is the efficient coalition structure and agents are always better off in the grand coalition than in a symmetric coalition structure. Individual agents (in the rent seeking contest) and extremists (in the policy conflict) only have an incentive to secede when they anticipate that their secession will not be followed by additional secessions. Incentives to secede are lower when agents cooperate inside groups. The grand coalition emerges as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of a sequential game of coalition formation in rent seeking contests.

Does affirmative action reduce effort incentives? A contest game analysis

In this paper a contest game with heterogeneous players is analyzed in which heterogeneity could be the consequence of past discrimination. Based on the normative perception of the heterogeneity there are two policy options to tackle this heterogeneity: either it is ignored and the contestants are treated equally, or affirmative action is implemented which compensates discriminated players. The consequences of these two policy options are analyzed for a simple two-person contest game and it is shown that the frequently criticized trade-off between affirmative action and total effort does not exist: Instead, affirmative action fosters effort incentives. A generalization to the n-person case and to a case with a partially informed contest designer yields the same result if the participation level is similar under each policy.

All-pay auction equilibria in contests

We analyze (non-deterministic) contests with anonymous contest success functions. There is no restriction on the number of contestants or on their valuations for the prize. We provide intuitive and easily verifiable conditions for the existence of an equilibrium with properties similar to the one of the (deterministic) all-pay auction. Since these conditions are fulfilled for a wide array of situations, the predictions of this equilibrium are very robust to the specific details of the contest. An application of this result contributes to fill a gap in the analysis of the popular Tullock rent- seeking game because it characterizes properties of an equilibrium for increasing returns to scale larger than two, for any number of contestants and in contests with or without a common value. Keywords: (non-) deterministic contest, all-pay auction, contest success functions. JEL Classification Numbers: C72 (Noncooperative Games), D72 (Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections), D44 (Auctions).

Foundations for contest success functions

In the literature the outcome of contests is either interpreted as win probabilities or as shares of the prize. With this in mind, we examine two approaches to contest success functions. In the first we analyze the implications of contestants' incomplete information concerning the "type" of the contest administrator. While in the case of two contestants this approach can rationalize prominent contest success functions, we show that it runs into difficulties when there are more agents. Our second approach interprets contest success functions as sharing rules and establishes a connection to bargaining and claims problems which is independent of the number of contestants. Both approaches provide foundations for popular contest success functions and guidelines for the definition of new ones. Keywords: Endogenous Contests, Contest Success Function. JEL Classification: C72 (Noncooperative Games), D72 (Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections), D74 (Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances).

Welfare Maximizing Contest Success Functions when the Planner Cannot Commit

We analyze how a contest organizer chooses optimally the winner when the contestants' efforts are already exerted and commitment to the use of a given contest success function is not possible. We de…ne the notion of rationalizability in mixed-strategies to capture such a situation. Our approach allows to derive different contest success functions depending on the aims and attitudes of the decider. We derive contest success functions which are closely related to commonly used functions providing new support for them. By taking into account social welfare considerations our approach bridges the contest literature and the recent literature on political economy. Keywords: Endogenous Contests, Contest Success Function, Mixed-Strategies. JEL Classi…cation: C72 (Noncooperative Games), D72 (Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections), D74 (Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances)

One, two, (three), infinity: Newspaper and lab beauty-contest experiments

"Beauty-contest" is a game in which participants have to choose, typically, a number in [0,100], the winner being the person whose number is closest to a proportion of the average of all chosen numbers. We describe and analyze Beauty-contest experiments run in newspapers in UK, Spain, and Germany and find stable patterns of behavior across them, despite the uncontrollability of these experiments. These results are then compared with lab experiments involving undergraduates and game theorists as subjects, in what must be one of the largest empirical corroborations of interactive behavior ever tried. We claim that all observed behavior, across a wide variety of treatments and subject pools, can be interpretedas iterative reasoning. Level-1 reasoning, Level-2 reasoning and Level-3 reasoning are commonly observed in all the samples, while the equilibrium choice (Level-Maximum reasoning) is only prominently chosen by newspaper readers and theorists. The results show the empirical power of experiments run with large subject-pools, and open the door for more experimental work performed on the rich platform offered by newspapers and magazines.

Rational reasoning or adaptive behavior? Evidence from two-person beauty contest games

Many experiments have shown that human subjects do not necessarily behave in line with game theoretic assumptions and solution concepts. The reasons for this non-conformity are multiple. In this paper we study the argument whether a deviation from game theory is because subjects are rational, but doubt that others are rational as well, compared to the argument that subjects, in general, are boundedly rational themselves. To distinguish these two hypotheses, we study behavior in repeated 2-person and many-person Beauty-Contest-Games which are strategically different from one another. We analyze four different treatments and observe that convergence toward equilibrium is driven by learning through the information about the other player s choice and adaptation rather than self-initiated rational reasoning.

On p-beauty contest integer games

In this paper we provide a full characterization of the pure-strategyNash Equilibria for the p-Beauty Contest Game when we restrict player schoices to integer numbers. Opposed to the case of real number choices,equilibrium uniqueness may be lost depending on the value of p and thenumber of players: in particular, as p approaches 1 any symmetric profileconstitutes a Nash Equilibrium. We also show that any experimental p-BeautyContest Game can be associated to a game with the integer restriction andthus multiplicity of equilibria becomes an issue. Finally, we show thatin these games the iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies maynot lead to a single outcome while the iterated best-reply process alwaysdoes (though the outcome obtained depends on the initial conditions).

Search for very high energy gamma-ray emission from pulsar-pulsar wind nebula systems with the MAGIC telescope

The MAGIC collaboration has searched for high-energy gamma-ray emission of some of the most promising pulsar candidates above an energy threshold of 50 GeV, an energy not reachable up to now by other ground-based instruments. Neither pulsed nor steady gamma-ray emission has been observed at energies of 100 GeV from the classical radio pulsars PSR J0205+6449 and PSR J2229+6114 (and their nebulae 3C58 and Boomerang, respectively) and the millisecond pulsar PSR J0218+4232. Here, we present the flux upper limits for these sources and discuss their implications in the context of current model predictions.