Noise and aggregation of information in large markets

We study a novel class of noisy rational expectations equilibria in markets with largenumber of agents. We show that, as long as noise increases with the number of agents inthe economy, the limiting competitive equilibrium is well-defined and leads to non-trivialinformation acquisition, perfect information aggregation, and partially revealing prices,even if per capita noise tends to zero. We find that in such equilibrium risk sharing and price revelation play dierent roles than in the standard limiting economy in which per capita noise is not negligible. We apply our model to study information sales by a monopolist, information acquisition in multi-asset markets, and derivatives trading. Thelimiting equilibria are shown to be perfectly competitive, even when a strategic solutionconcept is used.

First impressions matter: Signalling as a source of policy dynamics

We first establish that policymakers on the Bank of England's Monetary PolicyCommittee choose lower interest rates with experience. We then reject increasingconfidence in private information or learning about the structure of the macroeconomy as explanations for this shift. Instead, a model in which voters signal theirhawkishness to observers better fits the data. The motivation for signalling is consistent with wanting to control inflation expectations, but not career concerns orpleasing colleagues. There is also no evidence of capture by industry. The papersuggests that policy-motivated reputation building may be important for explainingdynamics in experts' policy choices.

What do outside experts bring to a committee? Evidence from the Bank of England

We test whether outside experts have information not available to insiders by usingthe voting record of the Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee. Memberswith more private information should vote more often against conventional wisdom,which we measure as the average belief of market economists about future interest rates. We find evidence that external members indeed have information notavailable to internals, but also use a quasi-natural experiment to show they mayexaggerate their expertise to obtain reappointment. This implies that an optimalcommittee, even outside monetary policy, should potentially include outsiders, butneeds to manage career concerns.

The benefits of limited feedback in organizations

In most firms, managers periodically assess workers' performance. Evidence suggeststhat managers withhold information during these reviews, and some observersargue that this necessarily reduces surplus. This paper assesses the validity of thisargument when workers have career concerns. Disclosure has two effects: it exposesthe worker to uncertainty about future effort levels, but allows him to use current effortto influence his employer's beliefs about future effort. The surplus-maximizingdisclosure policy reveals output realizations in the center of the distribution, butnot in the tails. Thus, it is efficient for firms to reveal some but not all performanceinformation.

Linear Aggregation In The Social Accounting Matrix Framework

In economic literature, information deficiencies and computational complexities have traditionally been solved through the aggregation of agents and institutions. In inputoutput modelling, researchers have been interested in the aggregation problem since the beginning of 1950s. Extending the conventional input-output aggregation approach to the social accounting matrix (SAM) models may help to identify the effects caused by the information problems and data deficiencies that usually appear in the SAM framework. This paper develops the theory of aggregation and applies it to the social accounting matrix model of multipliers. First, we define the concept of linear aggregation in a SAM database context. Second, we define the aggregated partitioned matrices of multipliers which are characteristic of the SAM approach. Third, we extend the analysis to other related concepts, such as aggregation bias and consistency in aggregation. Finally, we provide an illustrative example that shows the effects of aggregating a social accounting matrix model.

A new approach to real time traffic sign recognition based on colour information

The automatic interpretation of conventional traffic signs is very complex and time consuming. The paper concerns an automatic warning system for driving assistance. It does not interpret the standard traffic signs on the roadside; the proposal is to incorporate into the existing signs another type of traffic sign whose information will be more easily interpreted by a processor. The type of information to be added is profuse and therefore the most important object is the robustness of the system. The basic proposal of this new philosophy is that the co-pilot system for automatic warning and driving assistance can interpret with greater ease the information contained in the new sign, whilst the human driver only has to interpret the "classic" sign. One of the codings that has been tested with good results and which seems to us easy to implement is that which has a rectangular shape and 4 vertical bars of different colours. The size of these signs is equivalent to the size of the conventional signs (approximately 0.4 m2). The colour information from the sign can be easily interpreted by the proposed processor and the interpretation is much easier and quicker than the information shown by the pictographs of the classic signs

Aggregation of liposomes induced by calcium: A structural and kinetic study

In this work, the calcium-induced aggregation of phosphatidylserine liposomes is probed by means of the analysis of the kinetics of such process as well as the aggregate morphology. This novel characterization of liposome aggregation involves the use of static and dynamic light-scattering techniques to obtain kinetic exponents and fractal dimensions. For salt concentrations larger than 5 mM, a diffusion-limited aggregation regime is observed and the Brownian kernel properly describes the time evolution of the diffusion coefficient. For slow kinetics, a slightly modified multiple contact kernel is required. In any case, a time evolution model based on the numerical resolution of Smoluchowski's equation is proposed in order to establish a theoretical description for the aggregating system. Such a model provides an alternative procedure to determine the dimerization constant, which might supply valuable information about interaction mechanisms between phospholipid vesicles.

Social Media in health. What are the safety concerns for healthcare consumers?

Recent literature has discussed the unintended consequences of clinical information technologies (IT) on patient safety, yet there has been little discussion about the safety concerns in the area of consumer health IT. This paper presents a range of safety concerns for consumers in social media, with a case study on YouTube. We conducted a scan of abstracts on 'quality criteria' related to YouTube. Five areas regarding the safety of YouTube for consumers were identifi ed: (a) harmful health material targeted at consumers (such as inappropriate marketing of tobaccoor direct-to-consumer drug advertising); (b) public display of unhealthy behaviour (such as people displaying self-injury behaviours or hurting others); (c) tainted public health messages (i.e. the rise of negative voices againstpublic health messages); (d) psychological impact from accessing inappropriate, offensive or biased social media content; and (e) using social media to distort policy and research funding agendas. The examples presented should contribute to a better understanding about how to promote a safe consumption and production of social media for consumers, and an evidence-based approach to designing social media interventions for health. The potential harm associated with the use of unsafe social media content on the Internet is a major concern. More empirical and theoretical studies are needed to examine how social media infl uences consumer health decisions, behaviours and outcomes, and devise ways to deter the dissemination of harmful infl uences in social media.

Security prices and market transparency: the role of prior information

This paper analyzes the role of traders' priors (proper versus improper) on the implications of market transparency by comparing a pre-trade transparent market with an opaque market in a set-up based on Madhavan (1996). We show that prices may be more informative in the opaque market, regardless of how priors are modelled. In contrast, the comparison of market liquidity and volatility in the two market structures are affected by prior specification. Key words: Market microstructure, Transparency, Prior information

Firm Size and Geographical Aggregation: An Empirical Appraisal in Industrial Location

This paper assesses empirically the importance of size discrimination and disaggregate data for deciding where to locate a start-up concern. We compare three econometric specifications using Catalan data: a multinomial logit with 4 and 41 alternatives (provinces and comarques, respectively) in which firm size is the main covariate; a conditional logit with 4 and 41 alternatives including attributes of the sites as well as size-site interactions; and a Poisson model on the comarques and the full spatial choice set (942 municipalities) with site-specific variables. Our results suggest that if these two issues are ignored, conclusions may be misleading. We provide evidence that large and small firms behave differently and conclude that Catalan firms tend to choose between comarques rather than between municipalities. Moreover, labour-intensive firms seem more likely to be located in the city of Barcelona. Keywords: Catalonia, industrial location, multinomial response model. JEL: C250, E30, R00, R12

Delegation and information sharing in oligopoly

Information sharing in oligopoly has been analyzed by assuming that firms behave as a sole economic agent. In this paper I assume that ownership and management are separated. Managers are allowed to falsely report their costs to owners and rivals. Under such circumstances, if owners want to achieve information sharing they must use managerial contracts that implement truthful cost reporting by managers as a dominant strategy. I show that, contrary to the classical result, without the inclusion of message-dependent payments in managerial contracts there will be no information sharing. On the other hand, with the inclusion of such publicly observable payments and credible ex-ante commitment by owners not to modify these payments, there will be perfect information sharing without the need for third parties. Keywords: Information sharing, Delegation, Managerial contracts. JEL classification numbers: D21, D82, L13, L21

The Instrumental voter goes to the news-agent: demand for information, election closeness, and the media

This paper studies the impact of instrumental voting on information demand and mass media behaviour during electoral campaigns. If voters act instrumentally then information demand should increase with the closeness of an election. Mass media are modeled as profit-maximizing firms that take into account information demand, the value of customers to advertisers and the marginal cost of customers. Information supply should be larger in electoral constituencies where the contest is expected to be closer, there is a higher population density, and customers are on average more profitable for advertisers. The impact of electorate size is theoretically undetermined. These conclusions are then tested with comfortable results on data from the 1997 general election in Britain.

Spatial competition between two candidates of different quality: the effects of candidate ideology and private information

This paper examines competition in a spatial model of two-candidate elections, where one candidate enjoys a quality advantage over the other candidate. The candidates care about winning and also have policy preferences. There is two-dimensional private information. Candidate ideal points as well as their tradeoffs between policy preferences and winning are private information. The distribution of this two-dimensional type is common knowledge. The location of the median voter's ideal point is uncertain, with a distribution that is commonly known by both candidates. Pure strategy equilibria always exist in this model. We characterize the effects of increased uncertainty about the median voter, the effect of candidate policy preferences, and the effects of changes in the distribution of private information. We prove that the distribution of candidate policies approaches the mixed equilibrium of Aragones and Palfrey (2002a), when both candidates' weights on policy preferences go to zero.

Information-sharing implications of horizontal mergers

We analyze the effects of uncertainty and private information on horizontal mergers. Firms face uncertain demands or costs and receive private signals. They may decide to merge sharing their private information. If the uncertainty parameters are independent and the signals are perfect, uncertainty generates an informational advantage only to the merging firms, increasing merger incentives and decreasing free-riding effects. Thus, mergers become more profitable and stable. These results generalize to the case of correlated parameters if the correlation is not very severe, and for perfect correlation if the firms receive noisy signals. From the normative point of view, mergers are socially less harmful compared to deterministic markets and may even be welfare enhancing. If the signals are, instead, publicly observed, uncertainty does not necessarily give more incentives to merge, and mergers are not always less socially harmful.