Adaptive business intelligence for an open negotiation environment

Engineering of negotiation model allows to develop effective heuristic for business intelligence. Digital ecosystems demand open negotiation models. To define in advance effective heuristics is not compliant with the requirement of openness. The new challenge is to develop business intelligence in advance exploiting an adaptive approach. The idea is to learn business strategy once new negotiation model rise in the e-market arena. In this paper we present how recommendation technology may be deployed in an open negotiation environment where the interaction protocol models are not known in advance. The solution we propose is delivered as part of the ONE Platform, open source software that implements a fully distributed open environment for business negotiation

Sistema de vigilància

El present projecte, de caire teòric, pretén ser una aproximació als conceptes de vigilància tecnològica o intel·ligència competitiva, la seva relació amb la gestió del coneixement, el que signifiquen i quina és la situació d'aquestes disciplines en el nostre entorn proper. Tan mateix, i partint d'aquesta base de coneixement teòric, també s'ha treballat en el plantejament del que podria ser una metodologia d'aplicació en una organització del concepte d'inteligència competitiva, les seves etapes a seguir i el que cal coordinar o tenir present en cadascuna d'elles.

Ús del Capital Social i la Intel.ligència Competitiva per part de les Universitats en el procés d"adaptació a l"EEES

En la present comunicació s'exposen els resultats del projecte ¿Análisis de los procedimientos de interacción entorno-universidad en el proceso de adaptación e implementación de titulaciones oficiales al EEES" finançat pel Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación, en la convocatòria d'Estudios y Anàlisis, 2008. Un dels objectius d'aquest projecte era conèixer, de forma exploratòria, quines eines havien emprat lesUniversitats per tal d'adaptar les seves titulacions al nou EEES, considerant diversosfactors. Entre aquests, l'ús del Capital Social del qual disposen les Universitats, entès tant de d¿una òptica interna com externa. A la vegada, es pretenia analitzar si la Universitat disposa de veritables eines d'Intel·ligència Competitiva per tal d'interpretar adequadament el seu entorn. D'entre diverses conclusions, s'extreu que les Universitats no aprofiten suficientment els contactes que generen amb el seu entorn per tal de potenciar la seva competitivitat i les noves titulacions adaptades a l'EEES.

Inteligencia competitiva: corpus teórico y prácticas.

Este artículo tiene como objetivo presentar un estado de la cuestión del principal corpus teórico de la inteligencia competitiva (IC). La literatura actual está compuesta por trabajos realizados por profesionales y por académicos. Este hecho y su origen multidisciplinar están originando cierta dispersión de temas vinculados a los procesos de IC y a su organización, que requieren de cierta unificación. Se exponen las temáticas detectadas: terminología, organización de la función, descripción de los procesos, evaluación,modelos existentes, y factores facilitadores e inhibidores de las prácticas de IC. Por último, se señala la necesidad de seguir con trabajos empíricos que validen el constructo existente, y de profundizar en dos líneas de investigación: la integración de los marcos teóricos existentes y la identificación de los factores facilitadores e inhibidores de las prácticas.

Collaborations and alliances: social intelligence applied to academic libraries

This article analyzes the different forms of library cooperation and the different types of relations that can be established for collaboration among libraries.

Codes of best practice in competitive markets for managers

We study firms' corporate governance in environments where possibly heterogeneous shareholders compete for possibly heterogeneous managers. A firm, formed by a shareholder and a manager, can sign either an incentive contract or a contract including a Code of Best Practice. A Code allows for a better manager's control but makes manager's decisions hard to react when market conditions change. It tends to be adopted in markets with low volatility and in low-competitive environments. The firms with the best projects tend to adopt the Code when managers are not too heterogeneous while the best managers tend to be hired through incentive contracts when the projects are similar. Although the matching between shareholders and managers is often positively assortative, the shareholders with the best projects might be willing to renounce to hire the best managers, signing contracts including Codes with lower-ability managers.

Empleabilidad y Adaptabilidad de los jóvenes con inteligencia límite y sus procesos de integración laboral: Hacia un modelo de formación y de orientación para su inserción en el mundo del trabajo

ii. Aquest estudi planteja un model de formació i d'orientació per la millora de l’empleabilitat i l’adaptabilitat d’un grup especialment vulnerable, els joves amb intel•ligència límit, a partir d’un procés de detecció de necessitats de les competències bàsiques i laborals exigides pel mercat de treball. El model sorgeix de l’estudi dels programes i actuacions de formació i d’orientació que els serveis locals d’ocupació i/o d'integració laboral dissenyen i desenvolupen per la inserció laboral dels joves amb intel•ligència límit en el mercat de treball obert i competitiu.

The Multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multi-unit demands: competitive equilibria

A multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multiunit demands consists of a set of sellers that own a given number of indivisible units of (potentially many different) goods and a set of buyers who value those units and want to buy at most an exogenously fixed number of units. We define a competitive equilibrium for this generalized assignment game and prove its existence by using only linear programming. In particular, we show how to compute equilibrium price vectors from the solutions of the dual linear program associated to the primal linear program defined to find optimal assignments. Using only linear programming tools, we also show (i) that the set of competitive equilibria (pairs of price vectors and assignments) has a Cartesian product structure: each equilibrium price vector is part of a competitive equilibrium with all optimal assignments, and vice versa; (ii) that the set of (restricted) equilibrium price vectors has a natural lattice structure; and (iii) how this structure is translated into the set of agents' utilities that are attainable at equilibrium.

On Cooperative solutions of a generalized assignment game: limit theorems to the set of competitive equilibria

We study two cooperative solutions of a market with indivisible goods modeled as a generalized assignment game: Set-wise stability and Core. We first establish that the Set-wise stable set is contained in the Core and it contains the non-empty set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. We then state and prove three limit results for replicated markets. First, the sequence of Cores of replicated markets converges to the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs when the number of replicas tends to infinity. Second, the Set-wise stable set of a two-fold replicated market already coincides with the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. Third, for any number of replicas there is a market with a Core payoff that is not a competitive equilibrium payoff.

Product differentiation, competitive pressure and the effects of innovation on the success and survivability of firms in oligopoly markets

In a recent paper Tishler and Milstein (2009) fi…nd that increased competition may increase aggregate R&D spending while market output decreases. Therefore, they obtain the surprising result that R&D spending is excessive when competition becomes intense. Their result is based on the standard linear demand function for differentiated products introduced by Bowley (1924) where decreased product differentiation is interpreted as more competitive pressure. In this paper I show that at an aggregate level this interpretation is problematic because equilibrium effects are dominated by a demand reduction effect. A slight modifi…cation of the standard demand function eliminates this effect. For the Tishler and Milstein (2009) setting it is shown that then increased competition increases both R&D spending and aggregate market output. Therefore, at least for consumers, more intense competition increases welfare. Journal of Economic Literature Classi…fication Numbers: D43, L1, O3. Keywords: Oligopoly markets, Product differentiation, Competitive pressure.

Innovation or Imitation? The effect of spillovers and competitive pressure on firms' R&D strategy choice

This article provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of a firm's optimal R&D strategy choice. In this paper a firm's R&D strategy is assumed to be endogenous and allowed to depend on both internal firms. characteristics and external factors. Firms choose between two strategies, either they engage in R&D or abstain from own R&D and imitate the outcomes of innovators. In the theoretical model this yields three types of equilibria in which either all firms innovate, some firms innovate and others imitate, or no firm innovates. Firms'equilibrium strategies crucially depend on external factors. We find that the efficiency of intellectual property rights protection positively affects firms'incentives to engage in R&D, while competitive pressure has a negative effect. In addition, smaller firms are found to be more likely to become imitators when the product is homogeneous and the level of spillovers is high. These results are supported by empirical evidence for German .rms from manufacturing and services sectors. Regarding social welfare our results indicate that strengthening intellectual property protection can have an ambiguous effect. In markets characterized by a high rate of innovation a reduction of intellectual property rights protection can discourage innovative performance substantially. However, a reduction of patent protection can also increase social welfare because it may induce imitation. This indicates that policy issues such as the optimal length and breadth of patent protection cannot be resolved without taking into account specific market and firm characteristics. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C35, D43, L13, L22, O31. Keywords: Innovation; imitation; spillovers; product differentiation; market competition; intellectual property rights protection.

Integració d'un business intelligence en un ERP

Aquest projecte mostra la importància que pot tenir un sistema basat en Business Intelligence, dins d’una empresa o organització, donant una eina per augmentar la competitivitat, treballant les dades que s’obtenen dels diferents sistemes de gestió que hi ha dins l’empresa. Aquest gran nombre de dades històriques les transformarem per formar una base de dades de qualitat, i les explorarem per tal d’extreure’n informació útil en format gràfic, per ajudar a la pressa de decisions per part dels directius.

Collective intelligence

Estudio e implantación de algoritmos de recomendación, búsqueda, ranking y aprendizaje.

Collective Intelligence for OER Sustainability

To thrive, the Open Educational Resource (OER) movement, or a given initiative, must make sense of a complex, changing environment. Since "sustainability" is a desirable systemic capacity that our community should display, we consider a number of principles that sharpen the concept: resilience, sensemaking and complexity. We outline how these motivate the concept of collective intelligence (CI), we give examples of what OER-CI might look like, and we describe the emerging Cohere CI platform we are developing in response to these requirements.