One, two, (three), infinity: Newspaper and lab beauty-contest experiments

"Beauty-contest" is a game in which participants have to choose, typically, a number in [0,100], the winner being the person whose number is closest to a proportion of the average of all chosen numbers. We describe and analyze Beauty-contest experiments run in newspapers in UK, Spain, and Germany and find stable patterns of behavior across them, despite the uncontrollability of these experiments. These results are then compared with lab experiments involving undergraduates and game theorists as subjects, in what must be one of the largest empirical corroborations of interactive behavior ever tried. We claim that all observed behavior, across a wide variety of treatments and subject pools, can be interpretedas iterative reasoning. Level-1 reasoning, Level-2 reasoning and Level-3 reasoning are commonly observed in all the samples, while the equilibrium choice (Level-Maximum reasoning) is only prominently chosen by newspaper readers and theorists. The results show the empirical power of experiments run with large subject-pools, and open the door for more experimental work performed on the rich platform offered by newspapers and magazines.

Rational reasoning or adaptive behavior? Evidence from two-person beauty contest games

Many experiments have shown that human subjects do not necessarily behave in line with game theoretic assumptions and solution concepts. The reasons for this non-conformity are multiple. In this paper we study the argument whether a deviation from game theory is because subjects are rational, but doubt that others are rational as well, compared to the argument that subjects, in general, are boundedly rational themselves. To distinguish these two hypotheses, we study behavior in repeated 2-person and many-person Beauty-Contest-Games which are strategically different from one another. We analyze four different treatments and observe that convergence toward equilibrium is driven by learning through the information about the other player s choice and adaptation rather than self-initiated rational reasoning.

On p-beauty contest integer games

In this paper we provide a full characterization of the pure-strategyNash Equilibria for the p-Beauty Contest Game when we restrict player schoices to integer numbers. Opposed to the case of real number choices,equilibrium uniqueness may be lost depending on the value of p and thenumber of players: in particular, as p approaches 1 any symmetric profileconstitutes a Nash Equilibrium. We also show that any experimental p-BeautyContest Game can be associated to a game with the integer restriction andthus multiplicity of equilibria becomes an issue. Finally, we show thatin these games the iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies maynot lead to a single outcome while the iterated best-reply process alwaysdoes (though the outcome obtained depends on the initial conditions).

Finite mixture analysis of beauty-contest data using generalised beta distributions

This paper introduces a mixture model based on the beta distribution, without preestablishedmeans and variances, to analyze a large set of Beauty-Contest data obtainedfrom diverse groups of experiments (Bosch-Domenech et al. 2002). This model gives a bettert of the experimental data, and more precision to the hypothesis that a large proportionof individuals follow a common pattern of reasoning, described as iterated best reply (degenerate),than mixture models based on the normal distribution. The analysis shows thatthe means of the distributions across the groups of experiments are pretty stable, while theproportions of choices at dierent levels of reasoning vary across groups.

Coalition formation in a contest game with three heterogeneous players

We analyze the incentives for cooperation of three players differing in their efficiency of effort in a contest game. We concentrate on the non-cooperative bargaining foundation of coalition formation, and therefore, we adopt a two-stage model. In the first stage, individuals form coalitions following a bargaining protocol similar to the one proposed by Gul (1989). Afterwards, coalitions play the contest game of Esteban and Ray (1999) within the resulting coalition structure of the first stage. We find that the grand coalition forms whenever the distribution of the bargaining power in the coalition formation game is equal to the distribution of the relative efficiency of effort. Finally, we use the case of equal bargaining power for all individuals to show that other types of coalition structures may be observed as well.

Does affirmative action reduce effort incentives? A contest game analysis

In this paper a contest game with heterogeneous players is analyzed in which heterogeneity could be the consequence of past discrimination. Based on the normative perception of the heterogeneity there are two policy options to tackle this heterogeneity: either it is ignored and the contestants are treated equally, or affirmative action is implemented which compensates discriminated players. The consequences of these two policy options are analyzed for a simple two-person contest game and it is shown that the frequently criticized trade-off between affirmative action and total effort does not exist: Instead, affirmative action fosters effort incentives. A generalization to the n-person case and to a case with a partially informed contest designer yields the same result if the participation level is similar under each policy.

Inter-group conflict and intra-group punishment in an experimental contest game

We study how conflict in a contest game is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to punish each other. Our main motivation stems from the analysis of socio-political conflict. The relevant theoretical prediction in our setting is that conflict expenditures are independent of group size and independent of whether punishment is available or not. We find, first, that our results contradict the independence of group-size prediction: conflict expenditures of groups are substantially larger than those of individuals, and both are substantially above equilibrium. Towards the end of the experiment material losses in groups are 257% of the predicted level. There is, however, substantial heterogeneity in the investment behaviour of individual group members. Second, allowing group members to punish each other after individual contributions to the contest effort are revealed leads to even larger conflict expenditures. Now material losses are 869% of the equilibrium level and there is much less heterogeneity in individual group members' investments. These results contrast strongly with those from public goods experiments where punishment enhances efficiency and leads to higher material payoffs.

Foundations for contest success functions

In the literature the outcome of contests is either interpreted as win probabilities or as shares of the prize. With this in mind, we examine two approaches to contest success functions. In the first we analyze the implications of contestants' incomplete information concerning the "type" of the contest administrator. While in the case of two contestants this approach can rationalize prominent contest success functions, we show that it runs into difficulties when there are more agents. Our second approach interprets contest success functions as sharing rules and establishes a connection to bargaining and claims problems which is independent of the number of contestants. Both approaches provide foundations for popular contest success functions and guidelines for the definition of new ones. Keywords: Endogenous Contests, Contest Success Function. JEL Classification: C72 (Noncooperative Games), D72 (Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections), D74 (Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances).

Welfare Maximizing Contest Success Functions when the Planner Cannot Commit

We analyze how a contest organizer chooses optimally the winner when the contestants' efforts are already exerted and commitment to the use of a given contest success function is not possible. We de…ne the notion of rationalizability in mixed-strategies to capture such a situation. Our approach allows to derive different contest success functions depending on the aims and attitudes of the decider. We derive contest success functions which are closely related to commonly used functions providing new support for them. By taking into account social welfare considerations our approach bridges the contest literature and the recent literature on political economy. Keywords: Endogenous Contests, Contest Success Function, Mixed-Strategies. JEL Classi…cation: C72 (Noncooperative Games), D72 (Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections), D74 (Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances)

Anàlisi d'un spot televisiu segons el model proposat per Frederic Chaume : Estudi d'un cas: Beauty is nothing without brains

L’estudi de les situacions comunicatives sempre m’ha atret de manera significativa. El món de la publicitat, també. L’assignatura de Semiòtica audiovisual ha estat el vincle que ha inspirat el tema d’aquest treball. L’idea inicial era la d’analitzar des d’una perspectiva semiòtica un document audiovisual, concretament, Beauty is nothing without brains, un espot televisiu de Mercedes-Benz emès als Estats Units l’any 2007. Es pretenia identificar i analitzar cadascun dels elements que configuren la comunicació audiovisual i presentar possibles versions traductològiques del mateix. La dificultat de crear un esquema d’anàlisi que em permetés estructurar-ne l’estudi va conduir-me a Frederic Chaume. És llavors quan aconsegueixo concretar el tema del treball: es pretén analitzar aquest document audiovisual seguint el model proposat per Chaume, responent a un hipotètic encàrrec de traducció el qual demana la seva adaptació al mercat català.

Catalan beauty and the transnational beast: Barcelona on screen

This article explores the case of Barcelona as paradigmatic global city in such transnational productions as Vicky Cristina Barcelona by Woody Allen (2008) and Biutiful by Alejandro González Iñárritu (2010). Allen"s film shows the extreme dilution that national and linguistic identity undergoes under foreign eyes in its rendition of a"hip Barcelona" for tourists"invaded" by transnational subjects in search of bourgeois pleasures. Maybe in pursuit of a more"real" city, Iñárritu"s Biutiful moves to the Barcelona of the immigrants and the undocumented, a transnational and paradoxical location inhabited by those who need to cross borders in order to survive. Through reference to the work of Manuel Castells, Saskia Sassen, Neil Smith and Michel De Certeau among others, we argue that neither of these representations of the city is more real or unreal than the other. In their drastically divergent ways, both films contribute their external perspectives to the imaginary construction of Barcelona as a fascinating global city and can be seen as a dyptich of a transnational Barcelona. Further, they contribute to the ongoing debate about the polarization between the local and the global, the construction of urban boarders inside cities through gentrification, the transformation of the places we (would like to) inhabit, and the translation of all these into visual terms.

Anàlisi d'un spot televisiu segons el model proposat per Frederic Chaume : Estudi d'un cas: Beauty is nothing without brains

L’estudi de les situacions comunicatives sempre m’ha atret de manera significativa. El món de la publicitat, també. L’assignatura de Semiòtica audiovisual ha estat el vincle que ha inspirat el tema d’aquest treball. L’idea inicial era la d’analitzar des d’una perspectiva semiòtica un document audiovisual, concretament, Beauty is nothing without brains, un espot televisiu de Mercedes-Benz emès als Estats Units l’any 2007. Es pretenia identificar i analitzar cadascun dels elements que configuren la comunicació audiovisual i presentar possibles versions traductològiques del mateix. La dificultat de crear un esquema d’anàlisi que em permetés estructurar-ne l’estudi va conduir-me a Frederic Chaume. És llavors quan aconsegueixo concretar el tema del treball: es pretén analitzar aquest document audiovisual seguint el model proposat per Chaume, responent a un hipotètic encàrrec de traducció el qual demana la seva adaptació al mercat català.

The Instrumental voter goes to the news-agent: demand for information, election closeness, and the media

This paper studies the impact of instrumental voting on information demand and mass media behaviour during electoral campaigns. If voters act instrumentally then information demand should increase with the closeness of an election. Mass media are modeled as profit-maximizing firms that take into account information demand, the value of customers to advertisers and the marginal cost of customers. Information supply should be larger in electoral constituencies where the contest is expected to be closer, there is a higher population density, and customers are on average more profitable for advertisers. The impact of electorate size is theoretically undetermined. These conclusions are then tested with comfortable results on data from the 1997 general election in Britain.

When does universal peace prevail? Secession and group formation in rent seeking contests and policy conflicts

This paper analyzes secession and group formation in a general model of contest inspired by Esteban and Ray (1999). This model encompasses as special cases rent seeking contests and policy conflicts, where agents lobby over the choice of a policy in a one-dimensional policy space. We show that in both models the grand coalition is the efficient coalition structure and agents are always better off in the grand coalition than in a symmetric coalition structure. Individual agents (in the rent seeking contest) and extremists (in the policy conflict) only have an incentive to secede when they anticipate that their secession will not be followed by additional secessions. Incentives to secede are lower when agents cooperate inside groups. The grand coalition emerges as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of a sequential game of coalition formation in rent seeking contests.

Una universidad donde confluyen la educación, la investigación y la ciudadanía

El projecte de recerca s'ha basat en el projecte Miquel Martí i Pol, que ha consistit en la creació i manteniment d'un jardí dedicat a la memòria del poeta, amb persones en situació d'exclusió social (per motius de malaltia mental, immigració, pobresa) i estudiants de teràpia ocupacional de la Universitat de Vic, des d'una sinergia única entre la Universitat de Vic i institucions públiques, socials i empresarials. La recerca ve a cobrir la falta de coneixement sobre l'impacte terapèutic de la jardineria, com afirmava Sempik al 2003. Així mateix, genera coneixements sobre l'ocupació humana, la ciutadania, les comunitats inclusives, les aliances estratègiques i sobre noves praxis educatives en el marc del nou Espai Europeu d'Educació Superior (EEES). El marc teòric s'ha basat en una visió transdisciplinària, des de l'educació, la filosofia, la psicologia, la sociologia, la teràpia ocupacional, la política, l'ecologia i l'antropologia. S'ha desenvolupat una recerca inspirada per la investigació acció participativa que ha aprofundit en el significat que ha tingut aquesta experiència per a les persones implicades en el procés de creació del jardí: les persones procedents de col•lectius en situació d'exclusió, els estudiants, així com els representants de les institucions públiques, socials, empresarials i la pròpia Universitat de Vic. Així es van desenvolupar una sèrie d'entrevistes a fons i formularis amb 5 jardiners; 2 estudiants; la Consellera d'Acció Social de l'Ajuntament de Vic; el Conseller d'Acció Social del Consell Comarcal d'Osona; el President de Caritas; la terapeuta ocupacional de la Fundació Centre Mèdic Psicopedagògic d'Osona; la Rectora de la Universitat de Vic; la Directora de l'EUCS i el President del Rotary Club. Els temes que han sorgit en la recerca són: La construcció de l'ocupació significativa; la jardineria com a font de benestar; un espai de bellesa; la dignitat de la ciutadania; la creació de comunitats inclusives; una Universitat al servei de la Humanitat: noves praxis educatives; l'art de les aliances estratègiques i de les sinergies. Els coneixements generats tenen relació amb els estudis de teràpia ocupacional, així com per a educació social, infermeria, psicologia i ciències ambientals. A més a més són una aposta per al desenvolupament de noves praxis educatives en el nou EEES. El treball ha estat qualificat com a excel•lent per unanimitat del tribunal.