Structural inferences from first-price auction experiments

We use structural methods to assess equilibrium models of bidding with data from first-price auction experiments. We identify conditions to test the Nash equilibrium models for homogenous and for heterogeneous constant relative risk aversion when bidders private valuations are independent and uniformly drawn. The outcomes of our study indicate that behavior may have been affected by the procedure used to conduct the experiments and that the usual Nash equilibrium model for heterogeneous constant relative risk averse bidders does not consistently explain the observed overbidding. From an empirical standpoint, our analysis shows the possible drawbacks of overlooking the homogeneity hypothesis when testing symmetric equilibrium models of bidding and it puts in perspective the sensitivity of structural inferences to the available information.

All-pay auction equilibria in contests

We analyze (non-deterministic) contests with anonymous contest success functions. There is no restriction on the number of contestants or on their valuations for the prize. We provide intuitive and easily verifiable conditions for the existence of an equilibrium with properties similar to the one of the (deterministic) all-pay auction. Since these conditions are fulfilled for a wide array of situations, the predictions of this equilibrium are very robust to the specific details of the contest. An application of this result contributes to fill a gap in the analysis of the popular Tullock rent- seeking game because it characterizes properties of an equilibrium for increasing returns to scale larger than two, for any number of contestants and in contests with or without a common value. Keywords: (non-) deterministic contest, all-pay auction, contest success functions. JEL Classification Numbers: C72 (Noncooperative Games), D72 (Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections), D44 (Auctions).

Preferred suppliers in auction markets

In a procurement setting, this paper examines agreements between a buyer and one of the suppliers which would increase their joint surplus. The provisions of such agreements depend on the buyer's ability to design the rules of the final procurement auction. When the buyer has no such ability, their joint surplus can be increased by an agreement which grants to the preferred supplier a right-of-first-refusal on the lowest price offer from the other suppliers. When the buyer does have this ability, one agreement which maximizes their joint surplus includes a revelation game for the cost of the preferred supplier and a reserve price in the procurement auction based on that cost.

The Complete Information First. Price Auction or the Importance of Being Indivisible

Abstract Despite the popularity of auction theoretical thinking, it appears that no one has presented an elementary equilibrium analysis of the first-price sealed-bid auction mechanism under complete information. This paper aims to remedy that omission. We show that the existence of pure strategy undominated Nash equilibria requires that the bidding space is not "too divisible" (that is, a continuum). In fact, when bids must form part of a finite grid there always exists a "high price equilibrium". However, there might also be "low price equilibria" and when the bidding space is very restrictive the revenue obtained in these "low price equilibria" might be very low. We discuss the properties of the equilibria and an application of auction theoretical thinking in which "low price equilibria" may be relevant. Keywords: First-price auctions, undominated Nash equilibria. JEL Classification Numbers: C72 (Noncooperative Games), D44 (Auctions).

A general continuous auction model with insiders

We analyse in a unified way how the presence of a trader with privilege information makes the market to be efficient when the release time is known. We establish a general relation between the problem of finding an equilibrium and the problem of enlargement of filtrations. We also consider the case where the time of announcement is random. In such a case the market is not fully efficient and there exists equilibrium if the sensitivity of prices with respect to the global demand is time decreasing according with the distribution of the random time.

Parental care time in four European countries: comparing types and contexts

The intensity of parental investments in child care time is expected to vary across families with different norms and time-constraints. Additionally, it should also differ across countries, since the abilities of parents to harmonize family and work vary by national context. In our opinion, however, this question remains inconclusive for two main reasons: 1) only some countries have been studied from a comparative approach; 2) previous studies have not paid enough attention to the analysis of how the conditional effects of education and employment affect parental investments.In this paper we used nationally representative time-use data from Denmark, Flanders, Spain and the United Kingdom (N=4,031) to explore how employment and education predict variations in child care time. IN Britain and Spain employment has a strong negative effect on fathers’ child care, but a weaker one in Flanders and particularly in Denmark. In contrast, maternal employment has a strong negative impact in all four countries. Education increases child care time significantly only among Spanish mothers and fathers, as well as British mothers. Nonetheless, we find that college-educated mothers under similar time-constraints increase substantially their expected child care time in Britain, Flanders and Spain; for fathers we find a more mixed picture. Routine child care activities are more sensitive to both maternal and paternal employment than interactive child care activities. Finally, we observe that working a public sector job generally increases a total time allocated to parental care, controlling for several demographic and socioeconomic variables.

Quotient spaces of boundedly rational types

By identifying types whose low-order beliefs up to level li about the state of nature coincide, weobtain quotient type spaces that are typically smaller than the original ones, preserve basic topologicalproperties, and allow standard equilibrium analysis even under bounded reasoning. Our Bayesian Nash(li; l-i)-equilibria capture players inability to distinguish types belonging to the same equivalence class.The case with uncertainty about the vector of levels (li; l-i) is also analyzed. Two examples illustratethe constructions.

Selling to consumers with endogenous types

For many goods (such as experience goods or addictive goods), consumers preferences may change over time. In this paper, we examine a monopolist s optimal pricing schedule when current consumption can affect a consumer s valuation in the future and valuations are unobservable. We assume that consumers are anonymous, i.e. the monopolist can t observe a consumer s past consumption history. For myopic consumers, the optimal consumption schedule is distorted upwards, involving substantial discounts for low valuation types. This pushes low types into higher valuations, from which rents can be extracted.For forward looking consumers, there may be a further upward distortion of consumption due to a reversal of the adverse selection effect; low valuation consumers now have a strong interest in consumption in order to increase their valuations. Firms will find it profitable to educate consumers and encourage forward looking behavior.

The evolution of conventions under incomplete information

We formulate an evolutionary learning process in the spirit ofYoung (1993a) for games of incomplete information. The process involves trembles. For many games, if the amount of trembling is small, play will be in accordance with the games' (semi-strict) Bayesian equilibria most of the time. This supports the notion of Bayesian equilibrium. Further, often play will most of the time be in accordance with exactly one Bayesian equilibrium. This gives a selection among the Bayesian equilibria. For two specific games of economic interest wecharacterize this selection. The first is an extension to incomplete information of the prototype strategic conflict known as Chicken. The second is an incomplete information bilateral monopoly, which is also an extension to incompleteinformation of Nash's demand game, or a simple version ofthe so-called sealed bid double auction. For both gamesselection by evolutionary learning is in favor of Bayesianequilibria where some types of players fail to coordinate, such that the outcome is inefficient.

Ignorance promotes competition: An auction model with endogenous private valuations

We study a situation in which an auctioneer wishes to sell an object toone of N risk-neutral bidders with heterogeneous preferences. Theauctioneer does not know bidders preferences but has private informationabout the characteristics of the ob ject, and must decide how muchinformation to reveal prior to the auction. We show that the auctioneerhas incentives to release less information than would be efficient andthat the amount of information released increases with the level ofcompetition (as measured by the number of bidders). Furthermore, in aperfectly competitive market the auctioneer would provide the efficientlevel of information.

Auction theory, sequential local service privatization, and the effects of geographical scale economies on effective competition

A sequential weakly efficient two-auction game with entry costs, interdependence between objects, two potential bidders and IPV assumption is presented here in order to give some theoretical predictions on the effects of geographical scale economies on local service privatization performance. It is shown that the first object seller takes profit of this interdependence. The interdependence externality rises effective competition for the first object, expressed as the probability of having more than one final bidder. Besides, if there is more than one final bidder in the first auction, seller extracts the entire bidder¿s expected future surplus differential between having won the first auction and having lost. Consequences for second object seller are less clear, reflecting the contradictory nature of the two main effects of object interdependence. On the one hand, first auction winner becomes ¿stronger¿, so that expected payments rise in a competitive environment. On the other hand, first auction loser becomes relatively ¿weaker¿, hence (probably) reducing effective competition for the second object. Additionally, some contributions to static auction theory with entry cost and asymmetric bidders are presented in the appendix

Petrou types D and II perfect-fluid solutions in generalized Kerr-Schild form.

Petrov types D and II perfect-fluid solutions are obtained starting from conformally flat perfect-fluid metrics and by using a generalized KerrSchild ansatz. Most of the Petrov type D metrics obtained have the property that the velocity of the fluid does not lie in the two-space defined by the principal null directions of the Weyl tensor. The properties of the perfect-fluid sources are studied. Finally, a detailed analysis of a new class of spherically symmetric static perfect-fluid metrics is given.

On the preservation of combinatorial types for maps on trees

We study the preservation of the periodic orbits of an A-monotone tree map f:T→T in the class of all tree maps g:S→S having a cycle with the same pattern as A. We prove that there is a period-preserving injective map from the set of (almost all) periodic orbits of ƒ into the set of periodic orbits of each map in the class. Moreover, the relative positions of the corresponding orbits in the trees T and S (which need not be homeomorphic) are essentially preserved

Evaluación de los factores de riesgo y los tipos de superficie para el desarrollo de las úlceras por presión en el enfermo crítico = Assessment of risk factors and the types of surface for the development of pressure ulcers on critical ill patients

The main objective of this article is to assess the risk factors and the types of surface for the development of pressure ulcers (PU) on critical ill patients in an Intensive Care Unit (ICU)

Capillarity and fibre types in locomotory muscles of wild yellow-legged gulls (Larus cachinnans)

This study analyzes the capillarity and fibre-type distribution of six locomotory muscles of gulls. The morphological basis and the oxygen supply characteristics of the skeletal muscle of a species with a marked pattern of gliding flight are established, thus contributing to a better understanding of the physiology of a kind of flight with low energetic requirements. The four wing muscles studied (scapulotriceps, pectoralis, scapulohumeralis, and extensor metacarpi) exhibited higher percentages of fast oxidative glycolytic fibres (>70%) and lower percentages of slow oxidative fibres (<16%) than the muscles involved in nonflight locomotion (gastrocnemius and iliotibialis). Capillary densities ranged from 816 to 1,233 capillaries mm(-2), having the highest value in the pectoralis. In this muscle, the fast oxidative glycolytic fibres had moderate staining for succinate dehydrogenase and relatively large fibre sizes, as deduced from the low fibre densities (589-665 fibres mm(-2)). All these findings are seen as an adaptive response for gliding, when the wing is held outstretched by isometric contractions. The leg muscles studied included a considerable population of slow oxidative fibres (>14% in many regions), which suggests that they are adapted to postural activities. Regional variations in the relative distributions of fibre types in muscle gastrocnemius may reflect different functional demands placed on this muscle during terrestrial and aquatic locomotion. The predominance of oxidative fibres and capillary densities under 1,000 capillaries mm(-2) in leg muscles is probably a consequence of an adaptation for slow swimming and maintenance of the posture on land rather than for other locomotory capabilities, such as endurance or sprint activities.