Portfolio choice beyond the traditional approach

This paper surveys asset allocation methods that extend the traditional approach. An important feature of the the traditional approach is that measures the risk and return tradeoff in terms of mean and variance of final wealth. However, there are also other important features that are not always made explicit in terms of investor s wealth, information, and horizon: The investor makes a single portfolio choice based only on the mean and variance of her final financial wealth and she knows the relevant parameters in that computation. First, the paper describes traditional portfolio choice based on four basic assumptions, while the rest of the sections extend those assumptions. Each section will describe the corresponding equilibrium implications in terms of portfolio advice and asset pricing.

Insurance with frequent trading: A dynamic analysis of efficient insurance markets

This paper extends existing insurance results on the type of insurance contracts needed for insurance market efficiency toa dynamic setting. It introduces continuosly open markets that allow for more efficient asset allocation. It alsoeliminates the role of preferences and endowments in the classification of risks, which is done primarily in terms of the actuarial properties of the underlying riskprocess. The paper further extends insurability to include correlated and catstrophic events. Under these very general conditions the paper defines a condition that determines whether a small number of standard insurance contracts (together with aggregate assets) suffice to complete markets or one needs to introduce such assets as mutual insurance.

Complements and substitutes in multilateral assignment markets

[cat] En aquest treball provo que, en mercats d’assignació amb més de dos costats, agents de diferents sectors poden no ser complementaris mentre que agents del mateix sector poden no ser substituts. Shapley (1962) va provar que això mai pot succeïr quan el mercat d’assignació només té dos costats. No obstant, demostro que existeixen condicions suficients que garanteixen la substitutabilitat i la complementarietat entre agents en aquests tipus de mercats. A més, provo que, quan els béns al mercat son homogenis, el resultat de Shapley (1962) es manté.

Complements and substitutes in multilateral assignment markets

[cat] En aquest treball provo que, en mercats d’assignació amb més de dos costats, agents de diferents sectors poden no ser complementaris mentre que agents del mateix sector poden no ser substituts. Shapley (1962) va provar que això mai pot succeïr quan el mercat d’assignació només té dos costats. No obstant, demostro que existeixen condicions suficients que garanteixen la substitutabilitat i la complementarietat entre agents en aquests tipus de mercats. A més, provo que, quan els béns al mercat son homogenis, el resultat de Shapley (1962) es manté.

A cooperative appproach to queue allocation of indivisible objects

We consider the allocation of a finite number of indivisible objects to the same number of agents according to an exogenously given queue. We assume that the agents collaborate in order to achieve an efficient outcome for society. We allow for side-payments and provide a method for obtaining stable outcomes.

Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems

We study a simple model of assigning indivisible objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We completely describe all rules satisfying efficiency and resource-monotonicity. The characterized rules assign the objects in a sequence of steps such that at each step there is either a dictator or two agents "trade" objects from their hierarchically specified "endowments."

Personal redistribution and the regional allocation of public investment

How should an equity-motivated policy-marker allocate public capital (infrastructure) across regions. Should it aim at reducing interregional differences in per capita output, or at maximizing total output? Such a normative question is examined in a model where the policy-marker is exclusively concerned about personal inequality and has access to two policy instruments. (i) a personal tax-transfer system (taxation is distortionary), and (ii) the regional allocation of public investment. I show that the case for public investment as a significant instrument for interpersonal redistribution is rather weak. In the most favorable case, when the tax code is constrained to be uniform across regions, it is optimal to distort the allocation of public investment in favor of the poor regions, but only to a limited extent. The reason is that poor individuals are relatively more sensitive to public trans fers, which are maximized by allocating public investment efficiently. If! the tax code can vary across regions then the optimal policy may involve an allocation of public investment distorted in favor of the rich regions.

Degree Dissertation Report Asset Management

L'objectiu d'aquest treball no és oferir els mateixos serveis que els productes comercials, sinó utilitzar el coneixement bàsic en aquest sector per crear una aplicació simple

Bandwidth allocation based on real time calculations using the convolution approach

This paper focuses on one of the methods for bandwidth allocation in an ATM network: the convolution approach. The convolution approach permits an accurate study of the system load in statistical terms by accumulated calculations, since probabilistic results of the bandwidth allocation can be obtained. Nevertheless, the convolution approach has a high cost in terms of calculation and storage requirements. This aspect makes real-time calculations difficult, so many authors do not consider this approach. With the aim of reducing the cost we propose to use the multinomial distribution function: the enhanced convolution approach (ECA). This permits direct computation of the associated probabilities of the instantaneous bandwidth requirements and makes a simple deconvolution process possible. The ECA is used in connection acceptance control, and some results are presented

Solving Large Location-Allocation problems by Clustering and Simulated Annealing

Globalization involves several facility location problems that need to be handled at large scale. Location Allocation (LA) is a combinatorial problem in which the distance among points in the data space matter. Precisely, taking advantage of the distance property of the domain we exploit the capability of clustering techniques to partition the data space in order to convert an initial large LA problem into several simpler LA problems. Particularly, our motivation problem involves a huge geographical area that can be partitioned under overall conditions. We present different types of clustering techniques and then we perform a cluster analysis over our dataset in order to partition it. After that, we solve the LA problem applying simulated annealing algorithm to the clustered and non-clustered data in order to work out how profitable is the clustering and which of the presented methods is the most suitable

Optimum power allocation for parallel Gaussian channels with arbitrary input distributions

The mutual information of independent parallel Gaussian-noise channels is maximized, under an average power constraint, by independent Gaussian inputs whose power is allocated according to the waterfilling policy. In practice, discrete signalling constellations with limited peak-to-average ratios (m-PSK, m-QAM, etc) are used in lieu of the ideal Gaussian signals. This paper gives the power allocation policy that maximizes the mutual information over parallel channels with arbitrary input distributions. Such policy admits a graphical interpretation, referred to as mercury/waterfilling, which generalizes the waterfilling solution and allows retaining some of its intuition. The relationship between mutual information of Gaussian channels and nonlinear minimum mean-square error proves key to solving the power allocation problem.

Optimum power allocation for multiuser OFDM with arbitrary signal constellations

This paper formulates power allocation policies that maximize the region of mutual informationsachievable in multiuser downlink OFDM channels. Arbitrary partitioning ofthe available tones among users and arbitrary modulation formats, possibly different forevery user, are considered. Two distinct policies are derived, respectively for slow fadingchannels tracked instantaneously by the transmitter and for fast fading channels knownonly statistically thereby. With instantaneous channel tracking, the solution adopts theform of a multiuser mercury/waterfilling procedure that generalizes the single-user mercury/waterfilling introduced in [1, 2]. With only statistical channel information, in contrast,the mercury/waterfilling interpretation is lost. For both policies, a number of limitingregimes are explored and illustrative examples are provided.

Parental investments in children: how bargaining and educational homogamy affect time allocation

This study examines parental time investment in their children, distinguishing between developmental and non-developmental care. Our analyses centre on three influential determinants: educational background, marital homogamy, and spouses' relative bargaining power. We find that the emphasis on quality care time is correlated with parents' education, and that marital homogamy reduces couple specialization, but only among the highly educated. In line with earlier research, we identify gendered parental behaviour. The presence of boys is an important condition for fathers' time dedication, but primarly among lower educated fathers. To the extent that parental stimulation is decisive for child outcomes, our findings suggest the persistence of important inequalities. This emerges through our special attention to behavioural differences across the educational distribution among households.

On Certain Greedoid Polyhedra, Partially Indexable Scheduling Problems, and Extended Restless Bandit Allocation Indices

We present a polyhedral framework for establishing general structural properties on optimal solutions of stochastic scheduling problems, where multiple job classes vie for service resources: the existence of an optimal priority policy in a given family, characterized by a greedoid (whose feasible class subsets may receive higher priority), where optimal priorities are determined by class-ranking indices, under restricted linear performance objectives (partial indexability). This framework extends that of Bertsimas and Niño-Mora (1996), which explained the optimality of priority-index policies under all linear objectives (general indexability). We show that, if performance measures satisfy partial conservation laws (with respect to the greedoid), which extend previous generalized conservation laws, then the problem admits a strong LP relaxation over a so-called extended greedoid polytope, which has strong structural and algorithmic properties. We present an adaptive-greedy algorithm (which extends Klimov's) taking as input the linear objective coefficients, which (1) determines whether the optimal LP solution is achievable by a policy in the given family; and (2) if so, computes a set of class-ranking indices that characterize optimal priority policies in the family. In the special case of project scheduling, we show that, under additional conditions, the optimal indices can be computed separately for each project (index decomposition). We further apply the framework to the important restless bandit model (two-action Markov decision chains), obtaining new index policies, that extend Whittle's (1988), and simple sufficient conditions for their validity. These results highlight the power of polyhedral methods (the so-called achievable region approach) in dynamic and stochastic optimization.

Money, Fame and the Allocation of Talent: Brain Drain, the Matthew Effect and the Institution of Science

The earning structure in science is known to be flat relative to the one in the private sector, which could cause a brain drain toward the private sector. In this paper, we assume that agents value both money and fame and study the role of the institution of science in the allocation of talent between the science sector and the private sector. Following works on the Sociology of Science, we model the institution of science as a mechanism distributing fame (i.e. peer recognition). We show that since the intrinsic performance is less noisy signal of talent in the science sector than in the private sector, a good institution of science can mitigate the brain drain. We also find that providing extra monetary incentives through the market might undermine the incentives provided by the institution and thereby worsen the brain drain. Finally, we study the optimal balance between monetary and non-monetary incentives in science.