16 resultados para Version Control
em Consorci de Serveis Universitaris de Catalunya (CSUC), Spain
Resumo:
La función de la aplicación Sky Net (un sistema de control de versiones y sincronización de documentos on-line) será la de ofrecer un conjunto de herramientas capaces de establecer una comunicación cliente-servidor de forma transparente utilizando carpetas del disco duro. De esta forma el usuario final podrá tener todos sus documentos guardados en un servidor, poderlos recuperar en el momento que se desee, y tener los mismos documentos en todas las estaciones de trabajo que estén conectadas a la aplicación. Además se le añade una función de control de versiones que permitirá guardar el contenido de una carpeta bajo un identificador (nombre o versión), y poderlo recuperar más adelante aunque ya hayamos hecho modificaciones en los documentos de dicha carpeta. El proyecto se compone de dos aplicaciones: Sky Catcher, la aplicación cliente, y Sky Node, la aplicación servidor.
Resumo:
Removal of introns during pre-mRNA splicing is a critical process in gene expression, and understanding its control at both single-gene and genomic levels is one of the great challenges in Biology. Splicing takes place in a dynamic, large ribonucleoprotein complex known as the spliceosome. Combining Genetics and Biochemistry, Saccharomyces cerevisiae provides insights into its mechanisms, including its regulation by RNA-protein interactions. Recent genome-wide analyses indicate that regulated splicing is broad and biologically relevant even in organisms with a relatively simple intronic structure, such as yeast. Furthermore, the possibility of coordination in splicing regulation at genomic level is becoming clear in this model organism. This should provide a valuable system to approach the complex problem of the role of regulated splicing in genomic expression.
Resumo:
This paper studies non-autonomous Lyness type recurrences of the form xn+2 = (an+xn+1)=xn, where fang is a k-periodic sequence of positive numbers with primitive period k. We show that for the cases k 2 f1; 2; 3; 6g the behavior of the sequence fxng is simple (integrable) while for the remaining cases satisfying this behavior can be much more complicated (chaotic). We also show that the cases where k is a multiple of 5 present some di erent features.
Resumo:
Control of brown spot of pear requires fungicide treatments of pear trees during the growing season. Scheduling fungicide sprays with the Brown spot of pear forecasting system (BSPcast) provides significantfungicide savings but does not increase the efficacy of disease control. Modifications in BSPcast wereintroduced in order to increase system performance. The changes consisted of: (1) the use of a daily infectionrisk (Rm≥0.2) instead of the 3-day cumulative risk (CR≥0.4) to guide the fungicide scheduling, and (2) theinclusion of the effect of relative humidity during interrupted wetness periods. Trials were performed during2 years in an experimental pear orchard in Spain. The modifications introduced did not result in increaseddisease control efficacy, compared with the original BSPcast system. In one year, no reduction in the numberof fungicide applications was obtained using the modified BSPcast system in comparison to the original system, but in the second year the number of treatments was reduced from 15 to 13. The original BSPcast model overestimated the daily infection risk in 6.5% of days with wetness periods with low relative humidity during the wetness interruption, and in these cases the modified version was more adequate
Resumo:
We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents generating it. The problem is formulated in the preferences-endowments space. The solution is defined recursively, incorporating notions of consistency and fairness and relying on properties satisfied by the Shapley value for Transferable Utility (TU) games. We show a solution exists, and call it the Ordinal Shapley value (OSV). We characterize the OSV using the notion of coalitional dividends, and furthermore show it is monotone and anonymous. Finally, similarly to the weighted Shapely value for TU games, we construct a weighted OSV as well.
Resumo:
The paper provides a description and analysis of the Hodgskin section of Theories of Surplus Value and the general law section of the first version of Volume III of Capital. It then considers Part III of Volume III, the evolution of Marx's thought and various interpretations of his theory in the light of this analysis. It is suggested that Marx thought that the rate of profit must fall and even in the 1870s hoped to be able to provide a demonstration of this. However the main conclusions are: 1. Marx's major attempt to show that the rate of profit must fall occurred in the general law section. 2. Part III does not contain a demonstration that the rate of profit must fall. 3. Marx was never able to demonstrate that the rate of profit must fall and he was aware of this.
Resumo:
This paper examines, both descriptively and analytically, Marx's arguments for the falling rate of profit from the Hodgskin section of Theories of Surplus Value, The General Law section of the recently published Volume 33 of the Collected Works and Chapter 3 of Volume III of Capital. The conclusions are as follows: First, Marx realised that his main attempt to give an intrinsic explanation of the falling rate of profit, which occurred in the General Law section, had failed; but he still hoped that he would be able to demonstrate it in the future. Second, the Hodgskin and General Law sections contain a number of subsidiary explanations, mostly related to resource scarcity, some of which are correct. Third, Part III of volume III does not contain a demonstration of the falling rate of profit, but a description of the role of the falling rate of profit in capitalist development. Forth, it also contains suppressed references to resource scarcity. And finally, in Chapter 3 of Volume III, Marx says that it is resource scarcity that causes the fall in the rate of profit described in Part III of the same volume. The key to all these conclusions in the careful analysis of the General Law section.
Resumo:
The paper presents a foundation model for Marxian theories of the breakdown of capitalism based on a new falling rate of profit mechanism. All of these theories are based on one or more of "the historical tendencies": a rising capital-wage bill ratio, a rising capitalist share and a falling rate of profit. The model is a foundation in the sense that it generates these tendencies in the context of a model with a constant subsistence wage. The newly discovered generating mechanism is based on neo-classical reasoning for a model with land. It is non-Ricardian in that land augmenting technical progress can be unboundedly rapid. Finally, since the model has no steady state, it is necessary to use a new technique, Chaplygin's method, to prove the result.
Resumo:
Marxs conclusions about the falling rate of profit have been analysed exhaustively. Usually this has been done by building models which broadly conform to Marxs views and then showing that his conclusions are either correct or, more frequently, that they can not be sustained. By contrast, this paper examines, both descriptively and analytically, Marxs arguments from the Hodgskin section of Theories of Surplus Value, the General Law section of the recently published Volume 33 of the Collected Works and Chapter 3 of Volume III of Capital. It also gives a new interpretation of Part III of this last work. The main conclusions are first, that Marx had an intrinsic explanation of the falling rate of profit but was unable to give it a satisfactory demonstration and second, that he had a number of subsidiary explanations of which the most important was resource scarcity. The paper closes with an assessment of the pedigree of various currents of Marxian thought on this issue.
Resumo:
This paper develops a theory of the joint allocation of formal control and cash-flow rights in venture capital deals. We argue that when the need for investor support calls for very high-powered outside claims, entrepreneurs should optimally retain formal control in order to avoid excessive interference. Hence, we predict that risky claims should be be negatively correlated to control rights, both along the life of a start-up and across deals. This challenges the idea that risky claims should a ways be associated to more formal control, and is in line with contractual terms increasingly used in venture capital, in corporate venturing and in partnership deals between biotech start-ups and large drug companies. The paper provides a theoretical explanation to some puzzling evidence documented in Gompers (1997) and Kaplan and Stromberg (2000), namely the inclusion in venture capital contracts of contingencies that trigger both a reduction in VC control and the conversion! of her preferred stocks into common stocks.
Resumo:
Report for the scientific sojourn carried out at the Music Technology Area (Sound Processing and Control Lab), Faculty of Music, McGill University, Montreal, Canada, from October to December 2005.The aim of this research is to study the singing voice for controlling virtual musical instrument synthesis. It includes analysis and synthesis algorithms based on spectral audio processing. After digitalising the acoustic voice signal in the computer, a number of expressive descriptors of the singer are extracted. This process is achieved synchronously, thus all the nuance of the singer performance have been tracked. In a second stage, the extracted parameters are mapped to a sound synthesizer, the so-called digital musical instruments. In order achieve it, several tests with music students of the Faculty of Music, McGill University have been developed. These experiments have contributed to evaluate the system and to derive new control strategies to integrate: clarinet synthesis, bass guitar, visual representation of voice signals.
Resumo:
We prove the non-emptiness of the core of an NTU game satisfying a condition of payoff-dependent balancedness, based on transfer rate mappings. We also define a new equilibrium condition on transfer rates and we prove the existence of core payoff vectors satisfying this condition. The additional requirement of transfer rate equilibrium refines the core concept and allows the selection of specific core payoff vectors. Lastly, the class of parametrized cooperative games is introduced. This new setting and its associated equilibrium-core solution extend the usual cooperative game framework and core solution to situations depending on an exogenous environment. A non-emptiness result for the equilibrium-core is also provided in the context of a parametrized cooperative game. Our proofs borrow mathematical tools and geometric constructions from general equilibrium theory with non convexities. Applications to extant results taken from game theory and economic theory are given.
Resumo:
We study optimal contracts in a simple model where employees are averse to inequity as modelled by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). A "selfish" employer can profitably exploit such preferences among its employees by offering contracts which create inequity off-equilibrium and thus, they would leave employees feeling envy or guilt when they do not meet the employer's demands. Such contracts resemble team and relative performance contracts, and thus we derive conditions under which it may be beneficial to form work teams of employees with distributional concerns who were previously working individually. Similar results are obtained for status-seeking and efficiency concerns preferences.
Resumo:
As interactions between individuals are introduced into the freedom of choice literature by the mean of game forms, new issues appear. In particular, in this paper it is argued that individuals face uncertainty with respect to outcomes as they lose the control they implicitely exert over options in the opportunity set framework. A criterion is proposed as to compare alternative game forms in terms of the control they offer to individuals. The CardMin criterion suggests that any game form should be judged on the basis of the strategy offering the lowest number of pairwise different outcomes. An axiomatic characterization is provided in the case of two individuals.