An ordinal shapley value for economic environments (Revised version)

We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents generating it. The problem is formulated in the preferences-endowments space. The solution is defined recursively, incorporating notions of consistency and fairness and relying on properties satisfied by the Shapley value for Transferable Utility (TU) games. We show a solution exists, and call it the Ordinal Shapley value (OSV). We characterize the OSV using the notion of coalitional dividends, and furthermore show it is monotone and anonymous. Finally, similarly to the weighted Shapely value for TU games, we construct a weighted OSV as well.

An ordinal shapley value for economic environments

We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents generating it. The sharing problem is formulated in the preferences-endowments space. The solution is defined in a recursive manner incorporating notions of consistency and fairness and relying on properties satisfied by the Shapley value for Transferable Utility (TU) games. We show a solution exists, and refer to it as an Ordinal Shapley value (OSV). The OSV associates with each problem an allocation as well as a matrix of concessions ``measuring'' the gains each agent foregoes in favor of the other agents. We analyze the structure of the concessions, and show they are unique and symmetric. Next we characterize the OSV using the notion of coalitional dividends, and furthermore show it is monotone in an agent's initial endowments and satisfies anonymity. Finally, similarly to the weighted Shapley value for TU games, we construct a weighted OSV as well.

Banning Obsolete Weapons or Reshaping Perceptions of Military Utility: Discursive Dynamics in Weapons Prohibitions

The paper focuses on the argumentative process through which new international norms prohibiting the use of weapons causing severe civilian harm emerge. It examines the debate surrounding the use and usefulness of landmines and cluster munitions and traces the process through which NGOs change conceptions of military utility and effectiveness of certain weapons by highlighting their humanitarian problems and questioning their military value. By challenging military thinking on these issues, NGOs redefine the terms of the debate – from a commonplace practice, the use of such weapons becomes controversial and military decisions need to be justified. The argument-counterargument dynamic shifts the burden of proof of the necessity and safety of the weapons to the users. The process witnesses the ability of NGOs to influence debates on military issues despite their disadvantaged position in hard security issue areas. It also challenges realist assumptions that only weapons that are obsolete or low-cost force equalizers for weak actors can be banned. To the contrary, the paper shows that in the case of landmines and cluster munitions, defining the military (in)effectiveness of the weapons is part and parcel of the struggle for their prohibition.

The value of useless information

There are many situations in which individuals have a choice of whether or notto observe eventual outcomes. In these instances, individuals often prefer to remainignorant. These contexts are outside the scope of analysis of the standard vonNeumann-Morgenstern (vNM) expected utility model, which does not distinguishbetween lotteries for which the agent sees the final outcome and those for which hedoes not. I develop a simple model that admits preferences for making an observationor for remaining in doubt. I then use this model to analyze the connectionbetween preferences of this nature and risk-attitude. This framework accommodatesa wide array of behavioral patterns that violate the vNM model, and thatmay not seem related, prima facie. For instance, it admits self-handicapping, inwhich an agent chooses to impair his own performance. It also accommodatesa status quo bias without having recourse to framing effects, or to an explicitdefinition of reference points. In a political economy context, voters have strictincentives to shield themselves from information. In settings with other-regardingpreferences, this model predicts observed behavior that seems inconsistent witheither altruism or self-interested behavior.

A Methodology to measure shareholder value orientation and shareholder value creation aimed at providing a research basis to investigate the link between both magnitudes

Does shareholder value orientation lead to shareholder value creation? This article proposes methods to quantify both, shareholder value orientation and shareholder value creation. Through the application of these models it is possible to quantify both dimensions and examine statistically in how far shareholder value orientation explains shareholder value creation. The scoring model developed in this paper allows quantifying the orientation of managers towards the objective to maximize wealth of shareholders. The method evaluates information that comes from the companies and scores the value orientation in a scale from 0 to 10 points. Analytically the variable value orientation is operationalized expressing it as the general attitude of managers toward the objective of value creation, investment policy and behavior, flexibility and further eight value drivers. The value creation model works with market data such as stock prices and dividend payments. Both methods where applied to a sample of 38 blue chip companies: 32 firms belonged to the share index IBEX 35 on July 1st, 1999, one company represents the “new economy” listed in the Spanish New Market as per July 1st, 2001, and 5 European multinational groups formed part of the EuroStoxx 50 index also on July 1st, 2001. The research period comprised the financial years 1998, 1999, and 2000. A regression analysis showed that between 15.9% and 23.4% of shareholder value creation can be explained by shareholder value orientation.

Implementation of the ordinal shapley value for a three-agent economy

We propose a simple mechanism that implements the Ordinal Shapley Value (Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein [2005]) for economies with three or less agents.

Increasing quasiconcave production and utility functions with diminishing returns to scale

In microeconomic analysis functions with diminishing returns to scale (DRS) have frequently been employed. Various properties of increasing quasiconcave aggregator functions with DRS are derived. Furthermore duality in the classical sense as well as of a new type is studied for such aggregator functions in production and consumer theory. In particular representation theorems for direct and indirect aggregator functions are obtained. These involve only small sets of generator functions. The study is carried out in the contemporary framework of abstract convexity and abstract concavity.

Calibration of CES functions for real-world multisectoral modeling

We show how to calibrate CES production and utility functions when indirect taxation affecting inputs and consumption is present. These calibrated functions can then be used in computable general equilibrium models. Taxation modifies the standard calibration procedures since any taxed good has two associated prices and a choice of reference value units has to be made. We also provide an example of computer code to solve the calibration of CES utilities under two alternate normalizations. To our knowledge, this paper fills a methodological gap in the CGE literature.

El suro com a adsorbent del plom i el poloni

S’ha estudiat la utilització del suro com a adsorbent de metalls i radionúclids, com el plom i el poloni. Aquesta metodologia es pot aplicar en diferents camps, principalment per la separació d’aquests elements tant per a la seva posterior anàlisi com per l’eliminació i descontaminació en medis naturals. El suro és un bon adsorbent del plom, ja que de promig n’adsorbeix un 80%, i existeix dependència amb la relació superfície – volum del suro. La capacitat de càrrega màxima, a partir de les vuit hores, correspon al suro de diàmetre de partícula de 0.5 a 1 mm, amb un valor proper a 6·10-2 mmol Pb/g suro. El poloni presenta una eficiència d’adsorció menor a la del plom, d’un 50% del poloni present en la solució de càrrega inicial. Del present treball es pot concloure que el suro és un bon material adsorbent per a metalls i/o radionúclids, i per tan pot ser emprat com a una tècnica de separació i/o recuperació alternativa a les actualment establertes, sent més econòmica i biodegradable.

Regional value added in Italy over the long run (1891-2001): linking indirect estimates with official figures, and implications

This paper presents value added estimates for the Italian regions, in benchmark years from 1891 until 1951, which are linked to those from official figures available from 1971 in order to offer a long-term picture. Sources and methodology are documented and discussed, whilst regional activity rates and productivity are also presented and compared. Thus some questions are briefly reconsidered: the origins and extent of the north-south divide, the role of migration and regional policy in shaping the pattern of regional inequality, the importance of social capital, and the positioning of Italy in the international debate on regional convergence, where it stands out for the long run persistence of its disparities.

Simultaneous Nash bargaining with consistent beliefs

We propose and analyze a new solution concept, the R solution, for three-person, transferable utility, cooperative games. In the spirit of the Nash Bargaining Solution, our concept is founded on the predicted outcomes of simultaneous, two-party negotiations that would be the alternative to the grand coalition. These possibly probabilistic predictions are based on consistent beliefs. We analyze the properties of the R solution and compare it with the Shapley value and other concepts. The R solution exists and is unique. It belongs to the bargaining set and to the core whenever the latter is not empty. In fact, when the grand coalition can simply execute one of the three possible bilateral trades, the R solution is the most egalitarian selection of the bargaining set. Finally, we discuss how the R solution changes important conclusions of several well known Industrial Organization models.

On the stability of the optimal value and the optimal set in optimization problems

The paper develops a stability theory for the optimal value and the optimal set mapping of optimization problems posed in a Banach space. The problems considered in this paper have an arbitrary number of inequality constraints involving lower semicontinuous (not necessarily convex) functions and one closed abstract constraint set. The considered perturbations lead to problems of the same type as the nominal one (with the same space of variables and the same number of constraints), where the abstract constraint set can also be perturbed. The spaces of functions involved in the problems (objective and constraints) are equipped with the metric of the uniform convergence on the bounded sets, meanwhile in the space of closed sets we consider, coherently, the Attouch-Wets topology. The paper examines, in a unified way, the lower and upper semicontinuity of the optimal value function, and the closedness, lower and upper semicontinuity (in the sense of Berge) of the optimal set mapping. This paper can be seen as a second part of the stability theory presented in [17], where we studied the stability of the feasible set mapping (completed here with the analysis of the Lipschitz-like property).