43 resultados para Transferable embryo
em Consorci de Serveis Universitaris de Catalunya (CSUC), Spain
Resumo:
We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents generating it. The problem is formulated in the preferences-endowments space. The solution is defined recursively, incorporating notions of consistency and fairness and relying on properties satisfied by the Shapley value for Transferable Utility (TU) games. We show a solution exists, and call it the Ordinal Shapley value (OSV). We characterize the OSV using the notion of coalitional dividends, and furthermore show it is monotone and anonymous. Finally, similarly to the weighted Shapely value for TU games, we construct a weighted OSV as well.
Resumo:
We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents generating it. The sharing problem is formulated in the preferences-endowments space. The solution is defined in a recursive manner incorporating notions of consistency and fairness and relying on properties satisfied by the Shapley value for Transferable Utility (TU) games. We show a solution exists, and refer to it as an Ordinal Shapley value (OSV). The OSV associates with each problem an allocation as well as a matrix of concessions ``measuring'' the gains each agent foregoes in favor of the other agents. We analyze the structure of the concessions, and show they are unique and symmetric. Next we characterize the OSV using the notion of coalitional dividends, and furthermore show it is monotone in an agent's initial endowments and satisfies anonymity. Finally, similarly to the weighted Shapley value for TU games, we construct a weighted OSV as well.
Resumo:
We propose and analyze a new solution concept, the R solution, for three-person, transferable utility, cooperative games. In the spirit of the Nash Bargaining Solution, our concept is founded on the predicted outcomes of simultaneous, two-party negotiations that would be the alternative to the grand coalition. These possibly probabilistic predictions are based on consistent beliefs. We analyze the properties of the R solution and compare it with the Shapley value and other concepts. The R solution exists and is unique. It belongs to the bargaining set and to the core whenever the latter is not empty. In fact, when the grand coalition can simply execute one of the three possible bilateral trades, the R solution is the most egalitarian selection of the bargaining set. Finally, we discuss how the R solution changes important conclusions of several well known Industrial Organization models.
Resumo:
Projecte de recerca elaborat a partir d’una estada a la Charité - Universitätsmedizin Berlin, Alemanya, entre novembre i desembre del 2007. En aquest treball es presenta el protocol a seguir per a dur a terme el cultiu d’embrions sencers in vitro (Whole Embryo Culture, WEC). Amb aquest protocol es pretén implementar la tècnica del WEC en el laboratori de la Unitat de Toxicologia de la Facultat de Farmàca (UB), seguint la metodologia apresa durant l’estada i deixant per escrit tots els passos seguits i el material i la metodologia concreta de cadascun d’ells. En el WEC es cultiven embrions de rata de 9.5 dies durant 48h en ampolles rotatòries en un medi líquid i amb una fase gasosa controlats. Durant el cultiu, tenen lloc dos processos principals: el plegament de l’embrió i l’organogènesi. Els embrions durant els dos dies que dura el cultiu es pleguen en els plans transversal i sagital, passant d’un embrió pla a un altre de cilíndric en forma de “C”. En aquest període, a més, es produeixen importants processos d’organogènesi com la neurulació, la formació de la cresta neural, dels somites, dels vasos sanguinis - el cor inclòs- i de la sang. Es comencen a formar la placoda nasal, la vesícula oftàlmica, la vesícula òtica, les extremitats superiors i inferiors i la cua. En la memòria adjunta es descriuen amb detall els processos d'aparellament dels animals, preparació del material i del medi de cultiu, el procés d'aïllament del embrions en el dia 9.5, les condicions de cultiu i l'avaluació dels embrions en el dia 11.5. Finalment es presenten resultats d'embrions en situació control amb un correcte desenvolupament i es mostra com, al final de l'estada, es va aconseguir el cultiu d’embrions control amb un desenvolupament correcte i estadísticament sense diferències respecte als diferents paràmetres mesurats en comparació amb els embrions control de la Charité-Universitätsmedizin de Berlin.
Resumo:
L'article és una reflexió sobre els requisits de formació dels professionals que demana la societat del coneixement. Un dels objectius més importants que ha de tenir la universitat en la societat del coneixement és la formació de professionals competents que tinguin prou eines intel·lectuals per a enfrontar-se a la incertesa de la informació, a la consciència que aquesta té una data de caducitat a curt termini i a l'ansietat que això provoca. Però, a més, també han de ser capaços de definir i crear les eines de treball amb què donaran sentit i eficàcia a aquest coneixement mudable i mutant. Per això, l'espai europeu d'ensenyament superior prioritza la competència transversal del treball col·laboratiu amb l'objectiu de promoure un aprenentatge autònom, compromès i adaptat a les noves necessitats de l'empresa del segle xxi. En aquest context, es presenta l'entorn teòric que fonamenta el treball desenvolupat a la plataforma informàtica ACME, que uneix el treball col·laboratiu i l'aprenentatge semipresencial o blended learning. Així mateix, es descriuen amb detall alguns exemples de wikis, paradigma del treball col·laboratiu, fets en assignatures impartides per la Universitat de Girona en l'espai virtual ACME
Resumo:
We report here the legislative issues related toembryo research and human embryonic stem cell (hESC)research in Spain and the derivation of nine hESC lines atthe Center of Regenerative Medicine in Barcelona. You canfind the information for obtaining our lines for researchpurposes at blc@cmrb.eu.
Resumo:
The aim of the project was to gauge the extent to which the so-called ‘Barcelona Model’ of urban transformation has been ‘exported’ to Britain and whether Barcelona has learned from British cities. We engage with the literature on successive British governments’ strategies for cities, focused on collecting data on contemporary policy initiatives and debates in the UK, did interviews in Manchester, London Barcelona and participated in the official visit of Leeds to Barcelona in March. Our research findings to date suggest that there is a good deal of mobility and interaction between Barcelona and the UK. However, it is by no means certain that this has resulted in definite instances of policy transfer. While the ‘Barcelona model’ has indeed featured in oficial discourse on urban regeneration in the UK, it does not appear to be the preferred best practice ‘model’ – other North American and European cities figure discursively as much, if not more. Where Barcelona does feature in official discourse, it is usually as an example of good design and an appealing urban aesthetic, rather than in terms of economic or social policy best practice. Our research suggests that the Barcelona model is seen as non-transferable to the UK due to the relatively more centralised governance structure therein.In contrast, evidence collected suggests that the Barcelona model is not influenced by UK British cities experiences but there is small evidence of being influenced by UK-based professionals.
Resumo:
In this paper we view bargaining and cooperation as an interaction superimposed on a strategic form game. A multistage bargaining procedure for N players, the proposer commitment procedure, is presented. It is inspired by Nash s two-player variable-threat model; a key feature is the commitment to threats. We establish links to classical cooperative game theory solutions, such as the Shapley value in the transferable utility case. However, we show that even in standard pure exchange economies the traditional coalitional function may not be adequate when utilities are not transferable.
Resumo:
This paper explores the relationships between noncooperative bargaining games and the consistent value for non-transferable utility (NTU) cooperative games. A dynamic approach to the consistent value for NTU games is introduced: the consistent vector field. The main contribution of the paper is to show that the consistent field is intimately related to the concept of subgame perfection for finite horizon noncooperative bargaining games, as the horizon goes to infinity and the cost of delay goes to zero. The solutions of the dynamic system associated to the consistent field characterize the subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs of the noncooperative bargaining games. We show that for transferable utility, hyperplane and pure bargaining games, the dynamics of the consistent fields converge globally to the unique consistent value. However, in the general NTU case, the dynamics of the consistent field can be complex. An example is constructed where the consistent field has cyclic solutions; moreover, the finite horizon subgame perfect equilibria do not approach the consistent value.
Resumo:
Background. Microglia and astrocytes respond to homeostatic disturbances with profound changes of gene expression. This response, known as glial activation or neuroinflammation, can be detrimental to the surrounding tissue. The transcription factor CCAAT/enhancer binding protein ß (C/EBPß) is an important regulator of gene expression in inflammation but little is known about its involvement in glial activation. To explore the functional role of C/EBPß in glial activation we have analyzed pro-inflammatory gene expression and neurotoxicity in murine wild type and C/EBPß-null glial cultures. Methods. Due to fertility and mortality problems associated with the C/EBPß-null genotype we developed a protocol to prepare mixed glial cultures from cerebral cortex of a single mouse embryo with high yield. Wild-type and C/EBPß-null glial cultures were compared in terms of total cell density by Hoechst-33258 staining; microglial content by CD11b immunocytochemistry; astroglial content by GFAP western blot; gene expression by quantitative real-time PCR, western blot, immunocytochemistry and Griess reaction; and microglial neurotoxicity by estimating MAP2 content in neuronal/microglial cocultures. C/EBPß DNA binding activity was evaluated by electrophoretic mobility shift assay and quantitative chromatin immunoprecipitation. Results. C/EBPß mRNA and protein levels, as well as DNA binding, were increased in glial cultures by treatment with lipopolysaccharide (LPS) or LPS + interferon ¿ (IFN¿). Quantitative chromatin immunoprecipitation showed binding of C/EBPß to pro-inflammatory gene promoters in glial activation in a stimulus- and gene-dependent manner. In agreement with these results, LPS and LPS+IFN¿ induced different transcriptional patterns between pro-inflammatory cytokines and NO synthase-2 genes. Furthermore, the expressions of IL-1ß and NO synthase-2, and consequent NO production, were reduced in the absence of C/EBPß. In addition, neurotoxicity elicited by LPS+IFN¿-treated microglia co-cultured with neurons was completely abolished by the absence of C/EBPß in microglia.
Resumo:
El grupo ha analizado las cuestiones referentes a la investigación con embriones, tema de extraordinaria importancia científicaen el momento actual, que suscita reacciones encontradas, de gran carga ideológica, y ante el cual se requiere un debate social informado,que permita establecer el suficiente consenso para que se pueda dar lugar a la correspondiente normativa jurídica, acorde con el sentirsocial.
Resumo:
The monotonic core of a cooperative game with transferable utility (T.U.-game) is the set formed by all its Population Monotonic Allocation Schemes. In this paper we show that this set always coincides with the core of a certain game associated to the initial game.
Resumo:
[cat] En l'article es dona una condició necessària per a que els conjunts de negociació definits per Shimomura (1997) i el nucli d'un joc cooperatiu amb utilitat transferible coincideixin. A tal efecte, s'introdueix el concepte de vectors de màxim pagament. La condició necessària consiteix a verificar que aquests vectors pertanyen al nucli del joc.
Resumo:
[cat] En aquest treball caracteritzem les solucions puntuals de jocs cooperatius d'utilitat transferible que compleixen selecció del core i monotonia agregada. També mostrem que aquestes dues propietats són compatibles amb la individualitat racional, la propietat del jugador fals i la propietat de simetria. Finalment, caracteritzem les solucions puntuals que compleixen les cinc propietats a l'hora.