Are two-part tariffs efficient when consumers plan ahead?: An empirical study

During the last two decades there has been an increase in using dynamic tariffs for billing household electricity consumption. This has questioned the suitability of traditional pricing schemes, such as two-part tariffs, since they contribute to create marked peak and offpeak demands. The aim of this paper is to assess if two-part tariffs are an efficient pricing scheme using Spanish household electricity microdata. An ordered probit model with instrumental variables on the determinants of power level choice and non-paramentric spline regressions on the electricity price distribution will allow us to distinguish between the tariff structure choice and the simultaneous demand decisions. We conclude that electricity consumption and dwellings’ and individuals’ characteristics are key determinants of the fixed charge paid by Spanish households Finally, the results point to the inefficiency of the two-part tariff as those consumers who consume more electricity pay a lower price than the others.

Origins and efficiency of the electric industry regulation in Spain, 1910-1936

The aim of this paper is to discover the origins of utility regulation in Spain, and to analyse, from a microeconomic perspective, its characteristics and the impact of regulation on consumers and utilities. Madrid and the Madrilenian utilities are taken as a case study. The electric industry in the period studied was a natural monopoly2. Each of the three phases of production, generation, transmission and distribution, had natural monopoly characteristics. Therefore, the most efficient form to generate, transmit and distribute electricity was the monopoly because one firm can produce a quantity at a lower cost than the sum of costs incurred by two or more firms. A problem arises because when a firm is the single provider it can charge prices above the marginal cost, at monopoly prices. When a monopolist reduces the quantity produced, price increases, causing the consumer to demand less than the economic efficiency level, incurring a loss of consumer surplus. The loss of the consumer surplus is not completely gained by the monopolist, causing a loss of social surplus, a deadweight loss. The main objective of regulation is going to be to reduce to a minimum the deadweight loss. Regulation is also needed because when the monopolist fixes prices at marginal cost equal marginal revenue there would be an incentive for firms to enter the market creating inefficiency. The Madrilenian industry has been chosen because of the availability of statistical information on costs and production. The complex industry structure and the atomised demand add interest to the analysis. This study will also provide some light on the tariff regulation of the period which has been poorly studied and will complement the literature on the US electric utilities regulation where a different type of regulation was implemented.

Calling vs receiving party pays: market penetration and the importance of the call externality

In this paper we study how the access price affects the choice of the tariff regime taken by the network operators. We show that for high values of the access price, that is taken as a parameter by the firms, networks decide to charge only the callers. Otherwise, for low values of the access charge, networks charge also the receivers. Moreover, we compare market penetration and total welfare between the two price regimes. Our model suggests that, for high values of call externality, market penetration and total welfare are larger in Receiving Party Pays regime when the access charge is close to zero.

China’s Strategy in North Africa: New economic challenges for the Mediterranean region

El WP té com a objectiu examinar per què els països del nord d'Àfrica estan augmentant les seves importacions de Xina i per què la Xina està augmentant les seves inversions estrangeres directes a la zona. la avantatges per als països del nord d'Àfrica es troben en els actuals acords de lliure comerç, el absència de barreres aranzelàries i la seva ubicació geogràfica summament beneficiosa com Hub de la Mediterrània. El paper de la Unió per la Mediterrània és clau per identificar aspectes de la política regional, tenint en compte la participació xinesa a la zona. com conseqüència, concloem que els actors polítics han de trobar un equilibri entre sostenible desenvolupament i els interessos econòmics de la regió.

Asymmetric information and trade policy

Economists understand protectionism as a costly mechanism to redistribute from the average citizen to special-interest groups; yet political platforms that deviate from free trade have surprising popular appeal. I present an explanation based on heterogeneous information across citizens whose voting decision has an intensive margin. For each politician and each sector, the optimal trade-policy choice caters to the preferences of those voters who are more likely to be informed of that proposal. An overall protectionist bias emerges because in every industry producers are better informed than consumers. This asymmetry emerges in equilibrium because co-workers share industry-specific knwoledge, and because producers have greater incentives to engage in costly learning about their sector. My model implies that more widespread information about trade policy for an industry is associated with lower protection. Cross-sectoral evidence on U.S. non-tariff barriers and newspaper coverage is consistent with this prediction.

Seeking theta's desperately: Estimating the distribution of consumers under increasing block rates

This paper shows that the distribution of observed consumption is not a good proxy for the distribution of heterogeneous consumers when the current tariff is an increasing block tariff. We use a two step method to recover the "true" distribution of consumers. First, we estimate the demand function induced by the current tariff. Second, using the demand system, we specify the distribution of consumers as a function of observed consumption to recover the true distribution. Finally, we design a new two-part tariff which allows us to evaluate the equity of the existence of an increasing block tariff.

Lobbying, innovation and protectionist cycles

This paper explains why trade liberalizations occur in developing countries,and why they are often reversed. It does so by focusing on the use oflobbying for protection by import competing firms as a means to postponecostly product quality upgrades to keep up with foreign competitors. Giventhe availability of a political market for import tariffs, domestic firmswill lobby for a sequence of tariffs that insulate domestic profits from awidening quality gap, thereby allowing adjustment to be postponed. But asthe contributions required by the government grow with the size of thequality gap, it will be optimal to adjust quality and to decrease thelobbying effort at some time, leading to liberalization and technologicalcatch-up. But then the equilibrium tariff will again be small and "cheap",and it will pay to start lobbying anew, until the next quality adjustment.Therefore, cycles in protection will occur as a result of the use oflobbying as a substitute for innovation. The model thus sheds new light onthe impact of the costs of protection on the effectiveness of the lobbyingeffort over time, and on their implications for the timing and the timehorizon of trade reforms in developing countries.

Herramientas estadísticas para el estudio de perfiles de riesgo

En este documento se ilustra de un modo práctico, el empleo de tres instrumentos que permiten al actuario definir grupos arancelarios y estimar premios de riesgo en el proceso que tasa la clase para el seguro de no vida. El primero es el análisis de segmentación (CHAID y XAID) usado en primer lugar en 1997 por UNESPA en su cartera común de coches. El segundo es un proceso de selección gradual con el modelo de regresión a base de distancia. Y el tercero es un proceso con el modelo conocido y generalizado de regresión linear, que representa la técnica más moderna en la bibliografía actuarial. De estos últimos, si combinamos funciones de eslabón diferentes y distribuciones de error, podemos obtener el aditivo clásico y modelos multiplicativos

Herramientas estadísticas para el estudio de perfiles de riesgo

En este documento se ilustra de un modo práctico, el empleo de tres instrumentos que permiten al actuario definir grupos arancelarios y estimar premios de riesgo en el proceso que tasa la clase para el seguro de no vida. El primero es el análisis de segmentación (CHAID y XAID) usado en primer lugar en 1997 por UNESPA en su cartera común de coches. El segundo es un proceso de selección gradual con el modelo de regresión a base de distancia. Y el tercero es un proceso con el modelo conocido y generalizado de regresión linear, que representa la técnica más moderna en la bibliografía actuarial. De estos últimos, si combinamos funciones de eslabón diferentes y distribuciones de error, podemos obtener el aditivo clásico y modelos multiplicativos

Pasado, presente y futuro: el GATT, las áreas de libre comercio y ¿la Organización Mundial del Comercio?

Para la mayoría de los economistas, la firma del acuerdo final de la Ronda Uruguay en abril de 1994 en Marrakech (Marruecos) comporta una sustancial mejora en las perspectivas referentes a las relaciones comerciales entre los distintos países. Esta mejora tiene como base la liberalización comercial que suponen los acuerdos alcanzados y, en especial, la creación de una nueva institución: la Organización Mundial de Comercio (OMC). La OMC tiene como objetivo recoger el testigo del Acuerdo General sobre Aranceles y Comercio (GATT) en la defensa de un sistema de comercio más libre, transparente y multilateral (Sutherland, 1994). Su creación significa la adecuación al siglo XXI de los acuerdos de Bretton Woods1 concernientes al ámbito comercial que, durante los últimos 50 años, con mayor o menor éxito han regido las relaciones comerciales de carácter multilateral entre las diferentes naciones. Además, en un mundo donde el declive del GATT, desde principios de la década de los ochenta, ha conllevado la proliferación de áreas regionales de comercio, la OMC constituye un elemento imprescindible para hacer frente tanto a actitudes unilaterales que pretenden la realización de un comercio administrado como al incremento del proteccionismo en las transacciones interregionales.