42 resultados para Structure-directing agents
em Consorci de Serveis Universitaris de Catalunya (CSUC), Spain
Resumo:
Consider a voting procedure where countries, states, or districts comprising a union each elect representatives who then participate in later votes at the union level on their behalf. The countries, provinces, and states may vary in their populations and composition. If we wish to maximize the total expected utility of all agents in the union, how to weight the votes of the representatives of the different countries, states or districts at the union level? We provide a simple characterization of the efficient voting rule in terms of the weights assigned to different districts and the voting threshold (how large a qualified majority is needed to induce change versus the status quo). Next, in the context of a model of the correlation structure of agents preferences, we analyze how voting weights relate to the population size of a country. We then analyze the voting weights in Council of the European Union under the Nice Treaty and the recently proposed constitution, and contrast them under different versions of our model.
Resumo:
This paper analyzes secession and group formation in a general model of contest inspired by Esteban and Ray (1999). This model encompasses as special cases rent seeking contests and policy conflicts, where agents lobby over the choice of a policy in a one-dimensional policy space. We show that in both models the grand coalition is the efficient coalition structure and agents are always better off in the grand coalition than in a symmetric coalition structure. Individual agents (in the rent seeking contest) and extremists (in the policy conflict) only have an incentive to secede when they anticipate that their secession will not be followed by additional secessions. Incentives to secede are lower when agents cooperate inside groups. The grand coalition emerges as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of a sequential game of coalition formation in rent seeking contests.
Resumo:
[spa] En este artículo, analizamos la volatilidad agregada de una economía estilizada donde los agentes estann conectados en redes. Si hay relaciones estratégicas entre las acciones de los agentes, choques idiosincráticos pueden generar fluctuaciones agregadas. Demonstramos que la volatilidad agregada depende de la estructura de redes de la economía de dos maneras. Por un lado, si hay más conexiones en la economía en su conjunto, la volatilidad agregada es más baja. Por otro lado, si las conexiones están más concentradas, la volatilidad agregada es más alta. Presentamos una aplicación de nuestras predicciones teóricas que utiliza datos de EEUU de conexiones intrasectoriales y de diversificación de las empresas.
Resumo:
[spa] En este artículo, analizamos la volatilidad agregada de una economía estilizada donde los agentes estann conectados en redes. Si hay relaciones estratégicas entre las acciones de los agentes, choques idiosincráticos pueden generar fluctuaciones agregadas. Demonstramos que la volatilidad agregada depende de la estructura de redes de la economía de dos maneras. Por un lado, si hay más conexiones en la economía en su conjunto, la volatilidad agregada es más baja. Por otro lado, si las conexiones están más concentradas, la volatilidad agregada es más alta. Presentamos una aplicación de nuestras predicciones teóricas que utiliza datos de EEUU de conexiones intrasectoriales y de diversificación de las empresas.
Resumo:
The marine alkaloid, Lamellarin D (Lam-D), has shown potent cytotoxicity in numerous cancer cell lines, and was recently identified as a potent topoisomerase I inhibitor. A library of open lactone analogs of Lam-D was prepared from a methyl 5,6-dihydropyrrolo[2,1-a]isoquinoline-3- carboxylate scaffold (1) by introducing various aryl groups through sequential and regioselective bromination, followed by Pd(0)-catalyzed Suzuki cross-coupling chemistry. The compounds were obtained in a 24-44% overall yield, and tested in a panel of three human tumor cell lines, MDA-MB- 231 (breast), A-549 (lung), and HT-29 (colon), to evaluate their cytotoxic potential. From these data the SAR study concluded that more than 75% of the open-chain Lam-D analogs tested showed cytotoxicity in a low micromolar GI50 range.
Resumo:
The marine alkaloid, Lamellarin D (Lam-D), has shown potent cytotoxicity in numerous cancer cell lines, and was recently identified as a potent topoisomerase I inhibitor. A library of open lactone analogs of Lam-D was prepared from a methyl 5,6-dihydropyrrolo[2,1-a]isoquinoline-3- carboxylate scaffold (1) by introducing various aryl groups through sequential and regioselective bromination, followed by Pd(0)-catalyzed Suzuki cross-coupling chemistry. The compounds were obtained in a 24-44% overall yield, and tested in a panel of three human tumor cell lines, MDA-MB- 231 (breast), A-549 (lung), and HT-29 (colon), to evaluate their cytotoxic potential. From these data the SAR study concluded that more than 75% of the open-chain Lam-D analogs tested showed cytotoxicity in a low micromolar GI50 range.
Resumo:
The purpose of this article is to introduce a Cartesian product structure into the social choice theoretical framework and to examine if new possibility results to Gibbard's and Sen's paradoxes can be developed thanks to it. We believe that a Cartesian product structure is a pertinent way to describe individual rights in the social choice theory since it discriminates the personal features comprised in each social state. First we define some conceptual and formal tools related to the Cartesian product structure. We then apply these notions to Gibbard's paradox and to Sen's impossibility of a Paretian liberal. Finally we compare the advantages of our approach to other solutions proposed in the literature for both impossibility theorems.
Resumo:
We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents generating it. The sharing problem is formulated in the preferences-endowments space. The solution is defined in a recursive manner incorporating notions of consistency and fairness and relying on properties satisfied by the Shapley value for Transferable Utility (TU) games. We show a solution exists, and refer to it as an Ordinal Shapley value (OSV). The OSV associates with each problem an allocation as well as a matrix of concessions ``measuring'' the gains each agent foregoes in favor of the other agents. We analyze the structure of the concessions, and show they are unique and symmetric. Next we characterize the OSV using the notion of coalitional dividends, and furthermore show it is monotone in an agent's initial endowments and satisfies anonymity. Finally, similarly to the weighted Shapley value for TU games, we construct a weighted OSV as well.
Resumo:
We study the assignment of indivisible objects with quotas (houses, jobs, or offices) to a set of agents (students, job applicants, or professors). Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We characterize efficient priority rules by efficiency, strategy-proofness, and renegotiation-proofness. Such a rule respects an acyclical priority structure and the allocations can be determined using the deferred acceptance algorithm.
Resumo:
We present a model in which an individual's sentiments towards others are determined endogenously on the basis of how they perform relative to the societal average. This, in turn, affects the individual's own behavior and hence other agents' sentiments toward her. We focus on stationary patterns of utility interdependence. To demonstrate the effects of such endogeneity, we consider an example of a production economy with redistributive taxation. There are two types of stationary equilibria: one in which all agents conform to the societal norm, into two or three groups. The main conclusion is that the tax structure, in that it affects behavior which in turn affects sentiments, plays a crucial role in determining which type of equilibrium occurs and its characteristics as well as the extent of altruism and social cohesion in society.
Resumo:
The metropolitan spatial structure displays various patterns, sometimes monocentricity and sometimes multicentricity, which seems much more complicated than the exponential density function used in classic works such as Clark (1961), Muth (1969) or Mills (1973) among others, can effectively represent. It seems that a more flexible density function,such as cubic spline function (Anderson (1982), Zheng (1991), etc.) to describe the density-accessibility relationship is needed. Also, accessibility, the fundamental determinant of density variations, is only partly captured by the inclusion of distance to the city centre as an explanatory variable. Steen (1986) has proposed to correct that miss-especification by including an additional gradient for distance to the nearest transportation axis. In identifying the determinants of urban spatial structure in the context of inter-urban systems, some of the variables proposed by Muth (1969), Mills (1973) and Alperovich (1983) such as city age or population, make no sense in the case of a single urban system. All three criticism to the exponential density function and its determinants apply for the Barcelona Metropolitan Region, a polycentric conurbation structured on well defined transportation axes.
Resumo:
This paper characterizes the equilibria in airline networks and their welfare implications in an unregulated environment. Competing airlines may adopt either fully-connected (FC) or hub-and-spoke (HS) network structures; and passengers exhibiting low brand loyalty to their preferred carrier choose an outside option to travel so that markets are partially served by airlines. In this context, carriers adopt hubbing strategies when costs are sufficiently low, and asymmetric equilibria where one carrier chooses a FC strategy and the other chooses a HS strategy may arise. Quite interestingly, flight frequency can become excessive under HS network configurations.
Resumo:
This paper investigates experimentally how organisational decision processes affect the moral motivations of actors inside a firm that must forego profits to reduce harming a third party. In a "vertical" treatment, one insider unilaterally sets the harm-reduction strategy; the other can only accept or quit. In a "horizontal" treatment, the insiders decide by consensus. Our 2-by-2 design also controls for communication effects. In our data, communication makes vertical firms more ethical; voice appears to mitigate "responsibility-alleviation" in that subordinates with voice feel responsible for what their firms do. Vertical firms are then more ethical than the horizontal firms for which our bargaining data reveal a dynamic form of responsibility-alleviation and our chat data indicate a strong "insider-outsider" effect.
Resumo:
We analyse the implications of optimal taxation for the stochastic behaviour of debt. We show that when a government pursues an optimal fiscal policy under complete markets, the value of debt has the same or less persistence than other variables in the economy and it declines in response to shocks that cause the deficit to increase. By contrast, under incomplete markets debt shows more persistence than other variables and it increases in response to shocks that cause a higher deficit. Data for US government debt reveals diametrically opposite results from those of complete markets and is much more supportive of bond market incompleteness.
Resumo:
En aquest projecte s'ha realitzat l'anàlisi, disseny i implementació d'un protocol de migració d'agents software basat en l'enviament del codi dels agents fragmentat en múltiples missatges. Aquest protocol es troba dins d'una arquitectura de migració multi-protocol per a la mobilitat d'agents entre plataformes JADE. Finalment, s'ha realitzat un estudi que compara el rendiment assolit pel protocol i les prestacions que aporta.