Asymptotic analysis of stock price densities and implied volatilities in mixed stochastic models

In this paper, we obtain sharp asymptotic formulas with error estimates for the Mellin con- volution of functions de ned on (0;1), and use these formulas to characterize the asymptotic behavior of marginal distribution densities of stock price processes in mixed stochastic models. Special examples of mixed models are jump-di usion models and stochastic volatility models with jumps. We apply our general results to the Heston model with double exponential jumps, and make a detailed analysis of the asymptotic behavior of the stock price density, the call option pricing function, and the implied volatility in this model. We also obtain similar results for the Heston model with jumps distributed according to the NIG law.

Co-movements between US and UK stock prices: the roles of macroeconomic information and time-series varying conditional correlations

This paper provides evidence on the sources of co-movement in monthly US and UK stock price movements by investigating the role of macroeconomic and financial variables in a bivariate system with time-varying conditional correlations. Crosscountry communality in response is uncovered, with changes in the US Federal Funds rate, UK bond yields and oil prices having similar negative effects in both markets. Other variables also play a role, especially for the UK market. These effects do not, however, explain the marked increase in cross-market correlations observed from around 2000, which we attribute to time variation in the correlations of shocks to these markets. A regime-switching smooth transition model captures this time variation well and shows the correlations increase dramatically around 1999-2000. JEL classifications: C32, C51, G15 Keywords: international stock returns, DCC-GARCH model, smooth transition conditional correlation GARCH model, model evaluation.

Why do convertible issuers simultaneously repurchase stock? An arbitrage-based explanation

We examine why firms combine convertible debt offerings with stock repurchases. In 2006, 33% of the convertible issuers in the US simultaneously repurchased stock. These combined transactions are inconsistent with traditional motivations for convertible issuance. We document that convertible arbitrage drives these stock repurchases. Convertible debt arbitrageurs simultaneously buy convertibles and short sell the issuer’s common stock, resulting in downward pressure on the stock price. To prevent such short-selling activity, firms repurchase their stock directly from arbitrageurs. We show that combined transactions exhibit lower short-selling activity and that convertible arbitrage explains both the size and speed of the stock repurchases.

Is bank debt special for the transmission of monetary policy? Evidence from the stock market

We combine existing balance sheet and stock market data with two new datasets to studywhether, how much, and why bank lending to firms matters for the transmission of monetarypolicy. The first new dataset enables us to quantify the bank dependence of firms precisely,as the ratio of bank debt to total assets. We show that a two standard deviation increase inthe bank dependence of a firm makes its stock price about 25% more responsive to monetarypolicy shocks. We explore the channels through which this effect occurs, and find that thestock prices of bank-dependent firms that borrow from financially weaker banks display astronger sensitivity to monetary policy shocks. This finding is consistent with the banklending channel, a theory according to which the strength of bank balance sheets mattersfor monetary policy transmission. We construct a new database of hedging activities andshow that the stock prices of bank-dependent firms that hedge against interest rate riskdisplay a lower sensitivity to monetary policy shocks. This finding is consistent with aninterest rate pass-through channel that operates via the direct transmission of policy ratesto lending rates associated with the widespread use of floating-rates in bank loans and creditline agreements.

On the impact of leverage constraints on asset prices and trading volume

Researchers have used stylized facts on asset prices and trading volumein stock markets (in particular, the mean reversion of asset returnsand the correlations between trading volume, price changes and pricelevels) to support theories where agents are not rational expected utilitymaximizers. This paper shows that this empirical evidence is in factconsistent with a standard infite horizon perfect information expectedutility economy where some agents face leverage constraints similar tothose found in todays financial markets. In addition, and in sharpcontrast to the theories above, we explain some qualitative differencesthat are observed in the price-volume relation on stock and on futuresmarkets. We consider a continuous-time economy where agents maximize theintegral of their discounted utility from consumption under both budgetand leverage con-straints. Building on the work by Vila and Zariphopoulou(1997), we find a closed form solution, up to a negative constant, for theequilibrium prices and demands in the region of the state space where theconstraint is non-binding. We show that, at the equilibrium, stock holdingsvolatility as well as its ratio to stock price volatility are increasingfunctions of the stock price and interpret this finding in terms of theprice-volume relation.

Australian Asian options

We study European options on the ratio of the stock price to its averageand viceversa. Some of these options are traded in the Australian StockExchange since 1992, thus we call them Australian Asian options. Forgeometric averages, we obtain closed-form expressions for option prices.For arithmetic means, we use dierent approximations that produce verysimilar results.

The dog that did not bark: Insider trading and crashes

This paper documents that at the individual stock level insiders sales peak many months before a large drop in the stock price, while insiders purchases peak only the month before a large jump. We provide a theoretical explanation for this phenomenon based on trading constraints and asymmetric information. We test our hypothesis against competing stories such as patterns of insider trading driven by earnings announcement dates, or insiders timing their trades to evade prosecution. Finally we provide new evidence regarding crashes and the degree of information asymmetry.

Recreating the South Sea bubble: Lessons from an experiment in financial history

Major bubble episodes are rare events. In this paper, we examine what factors might cause some asset price bubbles to become very large. We recreate, in a laboratory setting, some of the specific institutional features investors in the South Sea Company faced in 1720. Several factors have been proposed as potentially contributing to one of the greatest periods of asset overvaluation in history: an intricate debt-for-equity swap, deferred payment for these shares, and the possibility of default on the deferred payments. We consider which aspect might have had the most impact in creating the South Sea bubble. The results of the experiment suggest that the company?s attempt to exchange its shares for government debt was the single biggest contributor to the stock price explosion, because of the manner in which the swap affected fundamental value. Issuing new shares with only partial payments required, in conjunction with the debt-equity swap, also had a significant effect on the size of the bubble. Limited contract enforcement, on the other hand, does not appear to have contributed significantly.

Stock market volatility and learning

Introducing bounded rationality in a standard consumption-based asset pricing model with time separable preferences strongly improves empirical performance. Learning causes momentum and mean reversion of returns and thereby excess volatility, persistence of price-dividend ratios, long-horizon return predictability and a risk premium, as in the habit model of Campbell and Cochrane (1999), but for lower risk aversion. This is obtained, even though our learning scheme introduces just one free parameter and we only consider learning schemes that imply small deviations from full rationality. The findings are robust to the learning rule used and other model features. What is key is that agents forecast future stock prices using past information on prices.

A comparison of stock market mechanisms

This paper studies the relationship between the amount of publicinformation that stock market prices incorporate and the equilibriumbehavior of market participants. The analysis is framed in a static, NREEsetup where traders exchange vectors of assets accessing multidimensionalinformation under two alternative market structures. In the first(the unrestricted system), both informed and uninformed speculators cancondition their demands for each traded asset on all equilibrium prices;in the second (the restricted system), they are restricted to conditiontheir demand on the price of the asset they want to trade. I show thatinformed traders incentives to exploit multidimensional privateinformation depend on the number of prices they can condition upon whensubmitting their demand schedules, and on the specific price formationprocess one considers. Building on this insight, I then give conditionsunder which the restricted system is more efficient than the unrestrictedsystem.

Pension plan funding and stock market efficiency

The paper argues that the market signifficantly overvalues firms with severely underfunded pension plans. These companies earn lower stock returns than firms with healthier pension plans for at least five years after the first emergence of the underfunding. The low returns are not explained by risk, price momentum, earnings momentum, or accruals. Further, the evidence suggests that investors do not anticipate the impact of the pension liability on future earnings, and they are surprised when the negative implications of underfunding ultimately materialize. Finally, underfunded firms have poor operating performance, and they earn low returns, although they are value companies.

The effects of monetary policy on stock market bubbles: Some evidence

We estimate the response of stock prices to exogenous monetary policy shocks usinga vector-autoregressive model with time-varying parameters. Our evidence points toprotracted episodes in which, after a a short-run decline, stock prices increase persistently in response to an exogenous tightening of monetary policy. That responseis clearly at odds with the "conventional" view on the effects of monetary policy onbubbles, as well as with the predictions of bubbleless models. We also argue that it isunlikely that such evidence be accounted for by an endogenous response of the equitypremium to the monetary policy shocks.

Trade disclosure and price dispersion

This paper determines the effects of post-trade opaqueness on market performance. We find that the degree of market transparency has important effects on market equilibria. In particular, we show that dealers operating in a transparent structure set regret-free prices at each period making zero expected profits in each of the two trading rounds, whereas in the opaque market dealers invest in acquiring information at the beginning of the trading day. Moreover, we obtain that if there is no trading activity in the first period, then market makers only change their quotes in the opaque market. Additionally, we show that trade disclosure increases the informational efficiency of transaction prices and reduces volatility. Finally, concerning welfare of market participants, we obtain ambiguous results. Keywords: Market microstructure, Post-trade transparency, Price experimentation, Price dispersion.

Tacit collusion and capacity withholding in repeated uniform price auctions

This paper contributes to the study of tacit collusion by analyzing infinitely repeated multiunit uniform price auctions in a symmetric oligopoly with capacity constrained firms. Under both the Market Clearing and Maximum Accepted Price rules of determining the uniform price, we show that when each firm sets a price-quantity pair specifying the firm's minimum acceptable price and the maximum quantity the firm is willing to sell at this price, there exists a range of discount factors for which the monopoly outcome with equal sharing is sustainable in the uniform price auction, but not in the corresponding discriminatory auction. Moreover, capacity withholding may be necessary to sustain this out-come. We extend these results to the case where firms may set bids that are arbitrary step functions of price-quantity pairs with any finite number of price steps. Surprisingly, under the Maximum Accepted Price rule, firms need employ no more than two price steps to minimize the value of the discount factor

Double implementation in a market for indivisible goods with a price constraint

I consider the problem of assigning agents to objects where each agent must pay the price of the object he gets and prices must sum to a given number. The objective is to select an assignment-price pair that is envy-free with respect to the true preferences. I prove that the proposed mechanism will implement both in Nash and strong Nash the set of envy-free allocations. The distinguishing feature of the mechanism is that it treats the announced preferences as the true ones and selects an envy-free allocation with respect to the announced preferences.