Bundling and competition for slots: Sequential pricing

In this paper we study, as in Jeon-Menicucci (2009), competition between sellerswhen each of them sells a portfolio of distinct products to a buyer having limitedslots. This paper considers sequential pricing and complements our main paper (Jeon-Menicucci, 2009) that considers simultaneous pricing.First, Jeon-Menicucci (2009) find that under simultaneous individual pricing, equilibriumoften does not exist and hence the outcome is often inefficient. By contrast,equilibrium always exists under sequential individual pricing and we characterize it inthis paper. We find that each seller faces a trade-off between the number of slots heoccupies and surplus extraction per product, and there is no particular reason thatthis leads to an efficient allocation of slots.Second, Jeon-Menicucci (2009) find that when bundling is allowed, there alwaysexists an efficient equilibrium but inefficient equilibria can also exist due to purebundling (for physical products) or slotting contracts. Under sequential pricing,we find that all equilibria are efficient regardless of whether firms can use slottingcontracts, and both for digital goods and for physical goods. Therefore, sequentialpricing presents an even stronger case for laissez-faire in the matter of bundling thansimultaneous pricing.

Bundling and competition for slots: On the portfolio effects of bundling

We consider competition among sellers when each of them sells a portfolio ofdistinct products to a buyer having limited slots. We study how bundling affectscompetition for slots. Under independent pricing, equilibrium often does not existand hence the outcome is often inefficient. When bundling is allowed, each sellerhas an incentive to bundle his products and an efficient equilibrium always exists.Furthermore, in the case of digital goods, all equilibria are efficient if slotting contracts are prohibited. We also identify portfolio effects of bundling and analyze theconsequences on horizontal mergers. Finally, we derive clear-cut policy implications.

Hay competencia en el mercado europeo de transporte aéreo?: el caso español

La liberalización del transporte aéreo que se llevó a término en la Unión Europea a principios de los años noventa ha tenido efectos positivos sobre el bienestar del viajero. No obstante, existe un consenso en la literatura académica que estos efectos dependen de la existencia de una competencia efectiva en el nivel de la ruta. En este sentido, se plantea el problema que puede llegar a suponer las ventajas de escalera de las compañías dominantes en cada mercado interior. Además, se pretende capturar la diferenciación de productos como característica esencial de la industria del transporte aéreo. El análisis de estas cuestiones se realiza de la forma siguiente. En primer lugar, se hace referencia a los principales aspectos económicos que condicionan la competencia en el transporte aéreo. Y en segundo lugar, se implementa un modelo empírico basado en un sistema de tres ecuaciones, que se estima mediante la técnica de las variables instrumentales. La muestra utilizada hace referencia al año 2001 para la mayoría de las rutas del mercado interior español de vuelos regulares en dónde hay competencia. Los resultados de la estimación muestran la existencia de unas condiciones de competencia diferentes según el segmento del mercado al cual se dirigen las compañías aéreas. Efectivamente, la competencia en precios (calidad) parece ser predominante en el segmento de viajeros por motivos personales (negocios). Adicionalmente, el dominio que la compañía dominante tiene sobre la mayoría de las rutas parece descansar en las ventajas competitivas, tanto en términos de costes como en términos de demanda, que le proporciona el control de la red aeroportuaria nacional. De todo esto se puede inferir que el mantenimiento y/o aumento de los beneficios de la liberalización de los servicios de transporte aéreo exige extender la liberalización al uso del aeropuertos así como descentralizar su gestión.

Hay competencia en el mercado europeo de transporte aéreo?: el caso español

La liberalización del transporte aéreo que se llevó a término en la Unión Europea a principios de los años noventa ha tenido efectos positivos sobre el bienestar del viajero. No obstante, existe un consenso en la literatura académica que estos efectos dependen de la existencia de una competencia efectiva en el nivel de la ruta. En este sentido, se plantea el problema que puede llegar a suponer las ventajas de escalera de las compañías dominantes en cada mercado interior. Además, se pretende capturar la diferenciación de productos como característica esencial de la industria del transporte aéreo. El análisis de estas cuestiones se realiza de la forma siguiente. En primer lugar, se hace referencia a los principales aspectos económicos que condicionan la competencia en el transporte aéreo. Y en segundo lugar, se implementa un modelo empírico basado en un sistema de tres ecuaciones, que se estima mediante la técnica de las variables instrumentales. La muestra utilizada hace referencia al año 2001 para la mayoría de las rutas del mercado interior español de vuelos regulares en dónde hay competencia. Los resultados de la estimación muestran la existencia de unas condiciones de competencia diferentes según el segmento del mercado al cual se dirigen las compañías aéreas. Efectivamente, la competencia en precios (calidad) parece ser predominante en el segmento de viajeros por motivos personales (negocios). Adicionalmente, el dominio que la compañía dominante tiene sobre la mayoría de las rutas parece descansar en las ventajas competitivas, tanto en términos de costes como en términos de demanda, que le proporciona el control de la red aeroportuaria nacional. De todo esto se puede inferir que el mantenimiento y/o aumento de los beneficios de la liberalización de los servicios de transporte aéreo exige extender la liberalización al uso del aeropuertos así como descentralizar su gestión.

Solving Large Location-Allocation problems by Clustering and Simulated Annealing

Globalization involves several facility location problems that need to be handled at large scale. Location Allocation (LA) is a combinatorial problem in which the distance among points in the data space matter. Precisely, taking advantage of the distance property of the domain we exploit the capability of clustering techniques to partition the data space in order to convert an initial large LA problem into several simpler LA problems. Particularly, our motivation problem involves a huge geographical area that can be partitioned under overall conditions. We present different types of clustering techniques and then we perform a cluster analysis over our dataset in order to partition it. After that, we solve the LA problem applying simulated annealing algorithm to the clustered and non-clustered data in order to work out how profitable is the clustering and which of the presented methods is the most suitable

Contractions in the 2-wasserstein lenght space and thermalization of granular media

An algebraic decay rate is derived which bounds the time required for velocities to equilibrate in a spatially homogeneous flow-through model representing the continuum limit of a gas of particles interacting through slightly inelastic collisions. This rate is obtained by reformulating the dynamical problem as the gradient flow of a convex energy on an infinite-dimensional manifold. An abstract theory is developed for gradient flows in length spaces, which shows how degenerate convexity (or even non-convexity) | if uniformly controlled | will quantify contractivity (limit expansivity) of the flow.

Contractive metrics for a Boltzmann equation for granular gases: diffusive equilibriaThe Patterson-Sullivan embedding and minimal volume entropy for outer space

We quantify the long-time behavior of a system of (partially) inelastic particles in a stochastic thermostat by means of the contractivity of a suitable metric in the set of probability measures. Existence, uniqueness, boundedness of moments and regularity of a steady state are derived from this basic property. The solutions of the kinetic model are proved to converge exponentially as t→ ∞ to this diffusive equilibrium in this distance metrizing the weak convergence of measures. Then, we prove a uniform bound in time on Sobolev norms of the solution, provided the initial data has a finite norm in the corresponding Sobolev space. These results are then combined, using interpolation inequalities, to obtain exponential convergence to the diffusive equilibrium in the strong L¹-norm, as well as various Sobolev norms.

The Patterson-Sullivan embedding and minimal volume entropy for outer space

"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt."

Metrics on diagram groups and uniform embeddings in a Hilbert space

"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt".

A cooperative appproach to queue allocation of indivisible objects

We consider the allocation of a finite number of indivisible objects to the same number of agents according to an exogenously given queue. We assume that the agents collaborate in order to achieve an efficient outcome for society. We allow for side-payments and provide a method for obtaining stable outcomes.

Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems

We study a simple model of assigning indivisible objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We completely describe all rules satisfying efficiency and resource-monotonicity. The characterized rules assign the objects in a sequence of steps such that at each step there is either a dictator or two agents "trade" objects from their hierarchically specified "endowments."

An ordinal shapley value for economic environments

We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents generating it. The sharing problem is formulated in the preferences-endowments space. The solution is defined in a recursive manner incorporating notions of consistency and fairness and relying on properties satisfied by the Shapley value for Transferable Utility (TU) games. We show a solution exists, and refer to it as an Ordinal Shapley value (OSV). The OSV associates with each problem an allocation as well as a matrix of concessions ``measuring'' the gains each agent foregoes in favor of the other agents. We analyze the structure of the concessions, and show they are unique and symmetric. Next we characterize the OSV using the notion of coalitional dividends, and furthermore show it is monotone in an agent's initial endowments and satisfies anonymity. Finally, similarly to the weighted Shapley value for TU games, we construct a weighted OSV as well.

Personal redistribution and the regional allocation of public investment

How should an equity-motivated policy-marker allocate public capital (infrastructure) across regions. Should it aim at reducing interregional differences in per capita output, or at maximizing total output? Such a normative question is examined in a model where the policy-marker is exclusively concerned about personal inequality and has access to two policy instruments. (i) a personal tax-transfer system (taxation is distortionary), and (ii) the regional allocation of public investment. I show that the case for public investment as a significant instrument for interpersonal redistribution is rather weak. In the most favorable case, when the tax code is constrained to be uniform across regions, it is optimal to distort the allocation of public investment in favor of the poor regions, but only to a limited extent. The reason is that poor individuals are relatively more sensitive to public trans fers, which are maximized by allocating public investment efficiently. If! the tax code can vary across regions then the optimal policy may involve an allocation of public investment distorted in favor of the rich regions.