When does universal peace prevail? Secession and group formation in rent seeking contests and policy conflicts

This paper analyzes secession and group formation in a general model of contest inspired by Esteban and Ray (1999). This model encompasses as special cases rent seeking contests and policy conflicts, where agents lobby over the choice of a policy in a one-dimensional policy space. We show that in both models the grand coalition is the efficient coalition structure and agents are always better off in the grand coalition than in a symmetric coalition structure. Individual agents (in the rent seeking contest) and extremists (in the policy conflict) only have an incentive to secede when they anticipate that their secession will not be followed by additional secessions. Incentives to secede are lower when agents cooperate inside groups. The grand coalition emerges as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of a sequential game of coalition formation in rent seeking contests.

Secession and liberal democracy. The case of the Basque country

The academic debate about the secession of a territory which is part of a liberal democracy state displays an initial contrast. On the one hand, practical secessionist movements usually legitimize their position using nationalist arguments linked to the principle of national self- determination. On the other hand, we find in academia few defenders of a normative principle of national self-determination. Philosophers, political scientists and jurists usually defend the status quo. And even when they do not defend it, most of them tend to leave the question of that question and secession unresolved or confused. Regarding this issue, liberal-democratic theories show a tendency to be “conservative” in relation to the political borders, regardless the historical and empirical processes of creation of current States. Probably, this feature is not far away to the fact that, since its beginning, political liberalism has not been a theory of the nation, but a theory of the state.

Recognition and political accommodation: from regionalism to secessionism. The Catalan case

Having lived through a bloody civil war in the 1930s followed by four decades of General Franco’s dictatorship, the Spanish state carried out a transition to a democratic system at the end of the 1970s. The 1978 Constitution was the legal outcome of this transition process. Among other things, it established a territorial model – the so-called “Estado de las Autonomías” (State of Autonomous Communities) – which was designed to satisfy the historical demands for recognition and self-government of, above all, the citizens and institutions of Catalonia and the Basque Country .In recent years support for independence has increased in Catalonia. Different indicators show that pro-independence demands are endorsed by a majority of its citizens, as well as by most of the political parties and organizations that represent its civil society. This is a new phenomenon. Those in favour of independence had been in the minority throughout the 20th century. Nowadays, however, demands of a pro-autonomy and pro-federalist nature, which until recently had been dominant, have gradually lost public support in favour of demands for self-determination and secession. This paper analyses the massive increase in support for secession in Catalonia during the early years of the 21st century. After describing the different theories of secession in plurinational liberal democracies (section 1), we analyse Catalonia’s political evolution over the past decade focusing on the shortcomings with regard to constitutional recognition and accommodation displayed by the Spanish political system. The latter have been exacerbated by the reform process of Catalonia’s Statute of Autonomy (2006) and the subsequent judgement of Spain’s Constitutional Court regarding the aforementioned Statute (2010) (section 2). Finally, we present our conclusions by linking the Catalan case with theories of secession applied to plurinational contexts

National Identity and the Preference for State Opting-Out in the Basque Country

We argue that preferences for secession are the expression of a common unobserved mechanisms determining national identity. This paper examines the hypothesis of independence of both preferences for secession (independent Euskadi) and Basque national identity in the light of Akerloff and Kranton (2000). We deal with psychological determinants of individuals' national identity formation as well as those that influence the propensity of individuals to support the secession of their perceived ¿imagined community¿ or nation.. We undertake econometric survey analysis for the Basque Country using a bivariate probit model and publicly available data from the Spanish Centre for Sociological Research. Our results provide robust evidence of a common determination of national identity and political preferences for the secession of the Basque Country consistently with Akerloff and Kranton model.

National Identity and the Preference for State Opting-Out in the Basque Country

We argue that preferences for secession are the expression of a common unobserved mechanisms determining national identity. This paper examines the hypothesis of independence of both preferences for secession (independent Euskadi) and Basque national identity in the light of Akerloff and Kranton (2000). We deal with psychological determinants of individuals' national identity formation as well as those that influence the propensity of individuals to support the secession of their perceived ¿imagined community¿ or nation.. We undertake econometric survey analysis for the Basque Country using a bivariate probit model and publicly available data from the Spanish Centre for Sociological Research. Our results provide robust evidence of a common determination of national identity and political preferences for the secession of the Basque Country consistently with Akerloff and Kranton model.

Política i empresa, companyes de viatge La qüestió catalana Reportatge digital sobre l’empresariat català i l’encaix Catalunya- Espanya. Valoracions entorn el debat sobiranista

El debat sobiranista català està a l‟ordre del dia i actualment no passa desapercebut en cap mitjà de comunicació ni tampoc en el món polític, econòmic i empresarial. El fet d‟estar tan viva una temàtica així de delicada està ocasionant controvèrsies dins l‟empresariat català o que té la seva empresa ubicada a Catalunya perquè tot plegat provoca moltes incerteses, que són el pitjor enemic dels empresaris i dels negocis. Tanmateix, però, les informacions publicades o emeses venen marcades per les opinions polítiques i periodístiques, que es troben censurades en certa mesura perquè segueixen una determinada línia política i/o editorial. Per això s‟ha elaborat un reportatge digital focalitzat en l‟empresariat català i l‟encaix Catalunya-Espanya que pretén aportar noves valoracions entorn a aquest debat donant veu a empresaris i professionals, entre altres. La part teòrica de la memòria defineix els conceptes bàsics que són de forçat coneixement per realitzar una part pràctica que ha de ser entesa per qualsevol persona i que s‟ha de tractar amb la major objectivitat possible. Per això, el web http://laquestiocatalana.cat aporta un llenguatge planer i les eines bàsiques per donar a conèixer una matèria molt criticada per alguns sectors. A través d‟entrevistes a personatges rellevants, el web introdueix nous punts de vista sobre una qüestió marcada, a simple vista, per la preocupació d‟un possible boicot per part d‟Espanya. Però aquesta no sembla ser la principal inquietud dels entesos, i és que hi ha altres aspectes encara més alarmants que poden influir en l‟empresariat i que no són tractats per cap mitjà de comunicació convencional.

If you want me to stay, pay

Devolution of political power is constantly on the political agenda in both Italy and Spain. Fiscal policy in these countries has granted specific privileges to some regions. Valle d’Aosta/Vallée d’Aoste,(VdA) and País Vasco-Euskadi (PV) have an extensive say over spending decisions, and receive nearly all regional tax revenues. Although both VdA and PV are among the richest regions in each country, both are net beneficiaries of the fiscal equalisation system. This preferential treatment is the outcome of a fiscal system with limits on taxing power and debt issuance, and is meant as a compensation for the lack of autonomy. It so prevents calls for more fiscal autonomy, or even outright secession. The economic effects of this asymmetric federalism are negative Although partial equalisation reduces excessive redistribution built in the fiscal equalisation system, more autonomy could pay off with more efficient government. Asymmetric federalism moreover creates a political impasse in the negotiation of a more efficient tax system and financing arrangement.