Coalition formation in a contest game with three heterogeneous players

We analyze the incentives for cooperation of three players differing in their efficiency of effort in a contest game. We concentrate on the non-cooperative bargaining foundation of coalition formation, and therefore, we adopt a two-stage model. In the first stage, individuals form coalitions following a bargaining protocol similar to the one proposed by Gul (1989). Afterwards, coalitions play the contest game of Esteban and Ray (1999) within the resulting coalition structure of the first stage. We find that the grand coalition forms whenever the distribution of the bargaining power in the coalition formation game is equal to the distribution of the relative efficiency of effort. Finally, we use the case of equal bargaining power for all individuals to show that other types of coalition structures may be observed as well.

When does universal peace prevail? Secession and group formation in rent seeking contests and policy conflicts

This paper analyzes secession and group formation in a general model of contest inspired by Esteban and Ray (1999). This model encompasses as special cases rent seeking contests and policy conflicts, where agents lobby over the choice of a policy in a one-dimensional policy space. We show that in both models the grand coalition is the efficient coalition structure and agents are always better off in the grand coalition than in a symmetric coalition structure. Individual agents (in the rent seeking contest) and extremists (in the policy conflict) only have an incentive to secede when they anticipate that their secession will not be followed by additional secessions. Incentives to secede are lower when agents cooperate inside groups. The grand coalition emerges as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of a sequential game of coalition formation in rent seeking contests.

Sequential formation of coalitions through bilateral agreements

We study a sequential protocol of endogenous coalition formation based on a process of bilateral agreements among the players. We apply the game to a Cournot environment with linear demand and constant average costs. We show that the final outcome of any Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of the game is the grand coalition, provided the initial number of firms is high enough and they are sufficiently patient.

Unemployment and wage formation in a growth model with public capital

We study the relation between public capital, employment and growth under different assumptions concerning wage formation. We show that public capital increases economic growth, and that, if there is wage inertia, employment positively depends on both economic growth and public capital.

Consumption externalities, habit formation, and equilibrium efficiency

We analyze the welfare properties of the competitive equilibrium in a capital accumulation model where individual preferences are subjected to both habit formation and consumption spillovers. We also discuss how consumption externalities and habits interact to generate an inefficient dynamic equilibrium. Finally, we characterize optimal tax policies aimed to restore efficient decentralized paths.

Growth, habit formation, and catching-up\ with the Joneses

When habits are introduced multiplicatively in a capital accumulation model, the consumers' objective function might fail to be concave. In this paper we provide conditions aimed at guaranteeing the existence of interior solutions to the consumers' problem. We also characterize the equilibrium path of two growth models with multiplicative habits: the internal habit formation model, where individual habits coincide with own past consumption, and the external habit formation (or catching-up with the Joneses) model, where habits arise from the average past consumption in the economy. We show that the introduction of external habits makes the equilibrium path inefficient during the transition towards the balanced growth path. We characterize in this context the optimal tax policy.

Income taxation with habit formation and consumption externalities

We analyze the dynamic behavior and the welfare properties of the equilibrium path of a growth model where both habits and consumption externalities affect the utility of consumers. We discuss the effects of flat rate income taxes and characterize the optimal income taxation policy. We show that, when consumption externalities and habit adjusted consumption are not perfect substitutes, a counter-cyclical income tax rate allows the competitive equilibrium to replicate the efficient path. Our analysis highlights the crucial role played by complementarities between externalities and habits in order to generate an inefficient dynamic equilibrium.

On the regional impact of public capital formation in Spain

The objective of this paper is to investigate, in a methodologically consistent manner, the regional effects of public capital formation and the possible existence of regional spillover effects in Spain. The empirical results are based on VAR estimates at both the aggregate and regional levels using output, employment, and private capital, as well as different measures of public capital. Empirical results suggest that public capital affects output positively at the aggregate level as well as in all but one region. For most regions, the effects of public capital installed in the region itself are important but the spillover effects induced from public capital installed elsewhere are also very important. In fact, the spillover effects account for over half of the total effects of public capital formation in Spain. Furthermore, these spillover effects have a clear geographical pattern in that they tend to be more important in the peripheral regions of the country. We also find that relative to their share of the Spanish output, the biggest beneficiaries of public capital formation are the largest regions in the country. This suggests that public capital formation has contributed to concentration of output in these regions. Finally, in terms of the effects of public capital formation on the private inputs we find that both private capital and employment are affected positively at the aggregate level as well as for most of the regions. Nevertheless, the effects on private capital seem to be larger. Also, the spillover effects are very important for private capital but not for employment. This reflects a great degree of dynamism and mobility in the capital markets as opposed to the labor markets.

Spillover effects of public capital formation: evidence from the spanish regions

Maybe because of the inconclusive nature of the results on the impact of public capital on output at the regional level, the issue of the possible existence of the regional spillovers from public capital formation has received little attention. The objective of this paper is to provide evidence on the possible existence of such spillovers. We consider the case of Spain and its seventeen regions. Our methodological approach consists in estimating an aggregate VAR model for Spain as well as seventeen region-specific VAR models in which both capital installed in the region and capital installed outside the region are allowed to play a role in enhancing regional output. The estimation results can be summarized as follows. The aggregate effects of public capital formation in Spain are important. They cannot, however, be captured in their entirety by the direct effects in each region from public capital installed in the region itself. When for each region both the capital installed in the region and the capital installed outside the region are considered the total disaggregated effect from the seventeen regional models are very much in line with the aggregate results. Furthermore, the aggregate effect seems to be due in almost equal parts to the direct and spillover effects of public capital formation. Ultimately, this paper establishes the relevance of both capital installed in each region and spillover effects in the understanding of the regional decomposition of the aggregate effects of public capital formation. In doing so it opens the door to some tantalizing and potentially highly charged research issues in terms of the determination of the optimal location of public investment projects.

New business formation and employment growth: some evidence for the Spanish manufacturing industry

This paper explores the effects of new business formation on employment growth in Spanish manufacturing industries. New firms are believed to make an important contribution to economic growth but the extent of this contribution is unclear. We consider time lags of new firm formation as explanatory variables of employment change and identify how long the effect of new firm entries on employment lasts. Our main results show that the effects of new business formation are positive in the short term, negative in the medium term and positive in the long term, thus confirming the existence of indirect supply-side effects found in similar studies for other countries. Key words: regional growth, firm entry, time lags and Spanish economy. JEL classifications: L00, L60, R11, R12

Métodos de extracción de parámetros de un circuito equivalente de pequeña señal para transistores LDMOS de potencia para aplicaciones de RF

En la actualidad, la gran cantidad de aplicaciones que surgen dentro del ámbito de la radiofrecuencia hacen que el desarrollo de dispositivos dentro de este campo sea constante. Estos dispositivos cada vez requieren mayor potencia para frecuencias de trabajo elevadas, lo que sugiere abrir vías de investigación sobre dispositivos de potencia que ofrezcan los resultados deseados para altas frecuencias de operación (GHz). Dentro de este ámbito, el objetivo principal de este proyecto es el de realizar un estudio sobre este tipo de dispositivos, siendo el transistor LDMOS el candidato elegido para tal efecto, debido a su buen comportamiento en frecuencia para tensiones elevadas de funcionamiento.

Tratamiento del señal por computador: detección de fallos mecánicos mediante análisis espectral

En aquest projecte s'ha investigat i desenvolupat una eina per a la detecció de falles mecàniques en entorns controlats. Aquest programa analitza l'espectre dels senyals acústics aconseguits mitjançant el micròfon del PC i n'estudia estadísticament les propietats –mitjana i desviació estàndard- per tal de poder diferenciar els nous senyals que capturi. S'ha experimentat amb el cas real d'un motor de corrent continu i s'han obtingut resultats de més del 90% d'encert a l'hora de detectar el seu estat.

Agency cost of government ownership: a study of voluntary audit comitte formation in China

In this paper, we investigate the agency costs of government ownership and their impact on corporate governance and firm value. China is used as a laboratory because of the prevalent state shareholdings in exchange-listed firms. In this context, we specifically consider the trade-offs involved in the voluntary formation of an audit committee when the controlling shareholder is the state. The decision to improve corporate governance (in this case, introduce an audit committee) is shown to be value relevant and a function of existing agency relationships and non-trivial implementation costs. Our findings are robust to the level of pyramid groups, the ownership-control wedge, and financial leverage. The research adds to the debate regarding the effect of government shareholdings on corporate culture and performance - a topic that hastaken on renewed importance in recent times.