When does universal peace prevail? Secession and group formation in rent seeking contests and policy conflicts

This paper analyzes secession and group formation in a general model of contest inspired by Esteban and Ray (1999). This model encompasses as special cases rent seeking contests and policy conflicts, where agents lobby over the choice of a policy in a one-dimensional policy space. We show that in both models the grand coalition is the efficient coalition structure and agents are always better off in the grand coalition than in a symmetric coalition structure. Individual agents (in the rent seeking contest) and extremists (in the policy conflict) only have an incentive to secede when they anticipate that their secession will not be followed by additional secessions. Incentives to secede are lower when agents cooperate inside groups. The grand coalition emerges as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of a sequential game of coalition formation in rent seeking contests.

Constrained school choice

Recently, several school districts in the US have adopted or consider adopting the Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism or the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism to assign children to public schools. There is clear evidence that for school districts that employ (variants of) the so-called Boston Mechanism the transition would lead to efficiency gains. The first two mechanisms are strategy-proof, but in practice student assignment procedures impede students to submit a preference list that contains all their acceptable schools. Therefore, any desirable property of the mechanisms is likely toget distorted. We study the non trivial preference revelation game where students can only declare up to a fixed number (quota) of schools to be acceptable. We focus on the stability of the Nash equilibrium outcomes. Our main results identify rather stringent necessary and sufficient conditions on the priorities to guaranteestability. This stands in sharp contrast with the Boston Mechanism which yields stable Nash equilibrium outcomes, independently of the quota. Hence, the transition to any of the two mechanisms is likely to come with a higher risk that students seek legal actionas lower priority students may occupy more preferred schools.

Increasing the scalability and the speedup of a fish school distributed simulator

El present treball fa un anàlisi i desenvolupament sobre les millores en la velocitat i en l’escalabilitat d'un simulador distribuït de grups de peixos. Aquests resultats s’han obtingut fent servir una nova estratègia de comunicació per als processos lògics (LPs) i canvis en l'algoritme de selecció de veïns que s'aplica a cadascun dels peixos en cada pas de simulació. L’idea proposada permet que cada procés lògic anticipi futures necessitats de dades pels seus veïns reduint el temps de comunicació al limitar la quantitat de missatges intercanviats entre els LPs. El nou algoritme de selecció dels veïns es va desenvolupar amb l'objectiu d'evitar treball innecessari permetent la disminució de les instruccions executades en cada pas de simulació i per cadascun del peixos simulats reduint de forma significativa el temps de simulació.

All-pay auction equilibria in contests

We analyze (non-deterministic) contests with anonymous contest success functions. There is no restriction on the number of contestants or on their valuations for the prize. We provide intuitive and easily verifiable conditions for the existence of an equilibrium with properties similar to the one of the (deterministic) all-pay auction. Since these conditions are fulfilled for a wide array of situations, the predictions of this equilibrium are very robust to the specific details of the contest. An application of this result contributes to fill a gap in the analysis of the popular Tullock rent- seeking game because it characterizes properties of an equilibrium for increasing returns to scale larger than two, for any number of contestants and in contests with or without a common value. Keywords: (non-) deterministic contest, all-pay auction, contest success functions. JEL Classification Numbers: C72 (Noncooperative Games), D72 (Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections), D44 (Auctions).

Constrained school choice: an experimental study

The literature on school choice assumes that families can submit a preference list over all the schools they want to be assigned to. However, in many real-life instances families are only allowed to submit a list containing a limited number of schools. Subjects' incentives are drastically affected, as more individuals manipulate their preferences. Including a safety school in the constrained list explains most manipulations. Competitiveness across schools play an important role. Constraining choices increases segregation and affects the stability and efficiency of the final allocation. Remarkably, the constraint reduces significantly the proportion of subjects playing a dominated strategy.

Women at home, at school and in the factory. The particular discourse of domesticity done by the Spanish Escuela Economista (1861-1909)

The texts by the Spanish Economist School (second half of the 19th century) contain an assessment of the role of women in the economy and society that is transgressor in front of the prevailing discourse that defended a unique and exclusive role for all women: being at home and a mother. Most members of that economic trend defended female work in the factories, basing themselves on wage arguments and even asked for a professional training for those who in many cases could not even write and read for the fact of being a woman. The texts of those economists give new ideas about the economic and social role of women in a Spain dominated by a discourse that denied the necessity of female work for the working families.

Preference intensities and risk aversion in school choice: a laboratory experiment

We experimentally investigate in the laboratory two prominent mechanisms that are employed in school choice programs to assign students to public schools. We study how individual behavior is influenced by preference intensities and risk aversion. Our main results show that (a) the Gale-Shapley mechanism is more robust to changes in cardinal preferences than the Boston mechanism independently of whether individuals can submit a complete or only a restricted ranking of the schools and (b) subjects with a higher degree of risk aversion are more likely to play "safer" strategies under the Gale-Shapley but not under the Boston mechanism. Both results have important implications for the efficiency and the stability of the mechanisms.

School composition effects in Spain

Drawing on PISA data of 2006, this study examines the impact of socio-economic school composition on science test score achievement for Spanish students in compulsory secondary schools. We define school composition in terms of the average parental human capital of students in the same school. These contextual peer effects are estimated using a semi-parametric methodology, which enables the spillovers to affect all the parameters of the educational production function. We also deal with the potential problem of self-selection of student into schools, using an artificial sorting that we argue to be independent from unobserved student’s abilities. The results indicate that the association between socio-economic school composition and test score results is clearly positive and significantly higher when computed with the semi-parametric approach. However, we find that the endogenous sorting of students into schools plays a fundamental role, given that the spillovers are significantly reduced when this selection process is ruled out from our measure of school composition effects. Specifically, the estimations suggest that the contextual peer effects are moderately positive only in those schools where the socio-economic composition is considerably elevated. In addition, we find some evidence of asymmetry of how the external effects and the sorting process actually operate, which seem affect in a different way males and females as well as high and low performance students.

The first steps of a secondary school teacher: experiences and studies of a student-teacher

This dissertation aims at fostering the professional development of the EFL teacher. This document compiles two small scale empirical studies carried out during the practicum periods of the TED's course. The first one is based on the role of the teacher's talk in the EFL classroom and the second one focuses on students’ small group talk, analysing the impact of cooperative learning in the EFL classroom by examining students' conversation. The following section gathers the teacher's personal reflections upon the process of professionalization. The paper concludes with a summary of the major findings and further professional improvement proposals

Signaling in Dynamic Contests: Some Impossibility Results

General signaling results in dynamic Tullock contests have been missing for long. The reason is the tractability of the problems. In this paper, an uninformed contestant with valuation vx competes against an informed opponent with valuation, either high vh or low vl. We show that; (i) When the hierarchy of valuations is vh ≥ vx ≥ vl, there is no pooling. Sandbagging is too costly for the high type. (ii) When the order of valuations is vx ≥ vh ≥ vl, there is no separation if vh and vl are close. Sandbagging is cheap due to the proximity of valuations. However, if vh and vx are close, there is no pooling. First period cost of pooling is high. (iii) For valuations satisfying vh ≥ vl ≥ vx, there is no separation if vh and vl are close. Bluffing in the first period is cheap for the low valuation type. Conversely, if vx and vl are close there is no pooling. Bluffing in the first stage is too costly. JEL: C72, C73, D44, D82. KEYWORDS: Signaling, Dynamic Contests, Non-existence, Sandbag Pooling, Bluff Pooling, Separating

Implementing CLIL in a primary school in Spain : the effects of CLIL on L2 English learners' oral production skills

This study presents the results of implementing a CLIL programme in a Catalan primary school three years after the onset of the implementation. The main objective of this investigation was to determine the effects of CLIL on students’ L2 English oral performance in terms of Complexity, Accuracy and Fluency (CAF). The results obtained suggest that CLIL learners outperform non-CLIL learners not only in fluency, but also in syntactic complexity. However, despite the encouraging results, the study concludes that further research which transcends the methodological limitations observed in the study is needed in order to confirm the results

Immigration and the school system

Immigration is an important problem in many societies, and it has wide-ranging effects on the educational systems of host countries. There is a now a large empirical literature, but very little theoretical work on this topic. We introduce a model of family immigration in a framework where school quality and student outcomes are determined endogenously. This allows us to explain the selection of immigrants in terms of parental motivation and the policies which favor a positive selection. Also, we can study the effect of immigration on the school system and how school quality may self-reinforce immigrants' and natives' choices.

Proyecto "Da Vinci School"

Proyecto de migración/implantación de un sistema libre en un centro de educación secundaria.

Da Vinci school

Implantación de una plataforma libre en un centro de educación secundaria.

Disseny i implantació de l'estructura informàtica de DaVinci School

Creació d'una infraestructura informàtica d'un centre educatiu, amb xarxes separades per a aules, secretaria i seminaris. Serveis centralitzats en un servidor amb màquines virtuals.