Productive efficiency and regulatory reform: The case of vehicle inspection services

Measuring productive efficiency provides information on the likely effects of regulatory reform. We present a Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) of a sample of 38 vehicle inspection units under a concession regime, between the years 2000 and 2004. The differences in efficiency scores show the potential technical efficiency benefit of introducing some form of incentive regulation or of progressing towards liberalization. We also compute scale efficiency scores, showing that only units in territories with very low population density operate at a sub-optimal scale. Among those that operate at an optimal scale, there are significant differences in size; the largest ones operate in territories with the highest population density. This suggests that the introduction of new units in the most densely populated territories (a likely effect of some form of liberalization) would not be detrimental in terms of scale efficiency. We also find that inspection units belonging to a large, diversified firm show higher technical efficiency, reflecting economies of scale or scope at the firm level. Finally, we show that between 2002 and 2004, a period of high regulatory uncertainty in the sample’s region, technical change was almost zero. Regulatory reform should take due account of scale and diversification effects, while at the same time avoiding regulatory uncertainty.

Does privatization spur regulation? Evidence from the regulatory reform of European airports

This paper conducts an empirical analysis of the relationship between privatization and regulation drawing on data from a wide sample of European airports. We find that privatization promotes a shift from basic regulation to a situation of more detailed or non-regulation, depending on the specific characteristics of the privatization process and on the type of airport being privatized. Moreover, we report a significant association between high traffic volumes and more detailed regulation. By contrast, airports where slot allocation is noncoordinated are significantly associated with non-regulation.

When ESDP confronts ENP: security sector reform as a bridge in the EU’s foreign policy

The European Neighbourhood Policy’s birth has taken place in parallel with the renewed momentum of the European Security and Defence Policy, which has launched 14 operations since 2003. Both policies’ instruments have converged in the neighbouring area covered by ENP: Georgia, in the East and the Palestinian Territories in the South. In both cases, the Security Sector Reform strategies have been the main focus for ESDP and an important objective for ENP. In this paper, two objectives are pursued: first, to assess the EU’s involvement in both cases in SSR terms; and second, to analyse whether the convergence of ESDP operations with a broader EU neighbourhood policy implies that the former has become an instrument for the a EU external action.

Regulation in the Age of Globalization: The Difussion of Regulatory Agencies across Europe and Latin America

One of the most notable characteristics of the change in governance of the past two decades has been the restructuring of the state, most notably the delegation of authority from politicians and ministries to technocrats and regulatory agencies. Our unique dataset on the extent of these reforms in seven sectors in 36 countries reveals the widespread diffusion of these reforms in recent decades. In 1986 there were only 23 agencies across these sectors and countries (less than one agency per country); by 2002 this number had increased more than seven-fold, to 169. On average these 36 countries each have more than four agencies in the seven sectors studied. Yet the widespread diffusion of these reforms is characterized by cross-regional and cross-sectoral variations. Our data reveal two major variations: first, reforms are more widespread in economic regulation that in social spheres; second, regulatory agencies in the social spheres are more widespread in Europe than in Latin America. Why these variations in the spread of the reforms? In this paper we present for the first time the regulatory gaps across regions and sectors and then move on to offer some explanations for these gaps in a way that sheds some light on the nature of these reforms and on their limits. Our explanatory framework combines diffusion and structural explanations and in doing so sheds new light on the global diffusion of public policy ideas.

Explaining Variation in Organizational Change: The Reform of Human Resource Management in the European Commission and the OECD

In this article we investigate the reforms of human resource management in the European Commission and the OECD by analyzing comparatively to what extent both organizations have adjusted their respective structures towards the ideal type of the so-called New Public Management (NPM). The empirical findings show that reforms towards NPM are more pronounced in the Commission than in the OECD. These findings are surprising for two reasons: First, it seems rather paradoxical that the OECD as central promoter of NPM at the international level lags behind the global trend when it comes to reforming its own structures. Second, this result is in contradiction with theoretical expectations, as they can be derived from theories of institutional isomorphism. To nevertheless account for the surprising results, it is necessary to modify and complement existing theories especially with regard to the scope conditions of their causal mechanisms.

Addressing the net balances problem as a prerequisite for EU budget reform: a proposal

Conflict among member states regarding the distribution of net financial burdens has been allowed to contaminate the entire design of the EU budget with very negative consequences in terms of equity, efficiency and transparency. To get around this problem and pave the way for a substantive budget reform, we propose to decouple distributional negotiations from the rest of the budget process by linking member state net balances in a rigid manner to relative prosperity. This would be achieved through the introduction of a system of compensating horizontal transfers that would take to its logical conclusion the Commission's proposal for a generalized compensation mechanism. We discuss the impact of the proposed scheme on member states? incentives and illustrate its financial implications using revenue and expenditure projections for 2013 that are based on the current Financial Perspectives and Own Resources Decision.

Política de la competència de la Unió Europea en el sector audiovisual. El cas dels operadors públics estatals de televisió a Espanya i el Regne Unit: RTVE i BBC

Estudi elaborat a partir d’una estada al Center for Socio-Legal Studies de la Universitat d’Oxford, Gran Bretanya, entre setembre del 2006 i gener del 2007. L'objectiu d'aquesta recerca ha estat determinar i avaluar com la política de la competència de la Unió Europea ha contribuït a la configuració del sector públic televisiu espanyol i britànic. El marc teòric està basat en el concepte d’ “europeització”, desenvolupat per Harcourt (2002) en el sector de mitjans, i que implica una progressiva referencialitat de les polítiques estatals amb les europees mitjançant dos mecanismes: la redistribució de recursos i els efectes en la socialització de la política europea. Per tal de verificar aquest impacte en el sector televisiu, la recerca ha desenvolupat una aproximació en dues etapes. En primer lloc, a banda de fer un inicial repàs bibliogràfic s'han estudiat les accions de la Comissió Europea en aquest terreny, sobre tot la Comunicació sobre aplicació de la reglamentació d'ajudes públiques al sector de la radiodifusió de 2001. En una segona etapa, s'han desenvolupat un seguit d'entrevistes personals a directius i polítics del sector a Brussel•les, Londres i Madrid. Els resultats de la recerca mostren que el procés d’Europeïtzació es un fenomen creixent en el sector audiovisual públic a Espanya i el Regne Unit, però que encara les peculiaritats estatals juguen un factor preponderant en regular aquesta influència de la UE. L'anàlisi de les entrevistes qualitatives mostren també que hi ha una relació inversament proporcional entre la tradició democràtica i el grau d’influència i de referència que suposa la UE en el sector audiovisual. Mentre que el Regne Unit, l'acció de la política de la competència de la UE es percep com a element suplementari, a Espanya la seva referencialitat ha estat clau, tot i que no decisiva, per la reforma dels mitjans públics estatals.  

Private Governance of Financial Markets: the US Regulatory Regime on Hedge Funds

The article investigates the private governance of financial markets by looking at the evolution of the regulatory debate on hedge funds in the US market. It starts from the premise that the privatization of regulation is always the result of a political decision and analyzes how this decision came about and was implemented in the case of hedge funds. The starting point is the failure of two initiatives on hedge funds that US regulators launched between 1999 an 2004, which the analysis explains by elaborating the concept of self-capture. Facing a trade off between the need to tackle publicly demonized issues and the difficulty of monitoring increasingly sophisticated and powerful private markets, regulators purposefully designed initiatives that were not meant to succeed, that is, they “self-captured” their own activity. By formulating initiatives that were inherently flawed, regulators saved their public role and at the same time paved the way for the privatization of hedge fund regulation. This explanation identifies a link between the failure of public initiatives and the success of private ones. It illustrates a specific case of formation of private authority in financial markets that points to a more general practice emerging in the regulation of finance.

The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Agencies: Channels of Transfer and Stages of Diffusion

The autonomous regulatory agency has recently become the ‘appropriate model’ of governance across countries and sectors. The dynamics of this process is captured in our data set, which covers the creation of agencies in 48 countries and 16 sectors since the 1920s. Adopting a diffusion approach to explain this broad process of institutional change, we explore the role of countries and sectors as sources of institutional transfer at different stages of the diffusion process. We demonstrate how the restructuring of national bureaucracies unfolds via four different channels of institutional transfer. Our results challenge theoretical approaches that overemphasize the national dimension in global diffusion and are insensitive to the stages of the diffusion process. Further advance in study of diffusion depends, we assert, on the ability to apply both cross-sectoral and cross-national analysis to the same research design and to incorporate channels of transfer with different causal mechanisms for different stages of the diffusion process.

Some Considerations Concerning Regulation and Competition in the Port Sector

The aim of this paper is to discuss the circumstances in which the process of competition between ports takes place in Spain − circumstances arising from the way the port system is currently set up and from the regulations governing it. The importance of this matter lies both in the fact that intensified competition between ports is the way to set about boosting the efficiency of the Spanish port sector and in the relevance of this business to the economies of the regions in which the ports are located. It is precisely for this reason that the reform instituted in 1992 aimed to combine balanced development of the national port system with the defence of the interests of autonomous regions. To this end the current regulatory framework provides for the possibility of port authorities drawing up their own competitive strategies, but makes their implementation conditional upon approval of their business plan by the Spanish state port authority. The latter body coordinates the national port system to ensure the guidelines set by the central government authorities are followed in the field of transport. However, the scale of the differences which exist among both the size of facilities and their relevant markets on the one hand, and the financial and economic circumstances of each of them on the other, suggest that each port authority's needs must be very different. Consequently, their competitive strategies must also be very different. It is therefore valid to ask whether coping with this diversity calls for different guidelines to regulate their freedom of action. Key words: Competition, regulation, port sector JEL classification numbers: L1, L5, L9

Nanomaterials in the European Union [the quest for a regulatory regime]

Mentre que les nanotecnologies s'espera que porti beneficis importants en molts sectors i contribuir a la competitivitat, hi ha un creixent cos de dades científiques que indiquin que hi ha motius raonables per témer que els nanomaterials en particular pot donar lloc a els possibles riscos i efectes nocius per a la salut i el medi ambient. El meu objectiu és examinar com la Unió Europea està donant forma a un règim regulatori per nanomaterials: l'opció regulatòria escollida, la legislació vigent aplicable i la seva eficàcia (amb especial atenció sobre REACH buits normatius), la posició adoptada per la els diferents actors en aquest procés i l'evolució prevista legal en el curt termini.

Regulatory federalism in network industries

Report for the scientific sojourn at the UC Berkeley, USA, from march until july 2008. This document starts by surveying the literature on economic federalism and relating it to network industries. The insights and some new developments (which focus on the role of interjurisdictional externalities, multiple objectives and investment incentives) are used to analyze regulatory arrangements in telecommunications and energy in the EU and the US. In the long history of vertically integrated monopolies in telecommunications and energy, there was a historical trend to move regulation up in the vertical structure of government, at least form the local level to the state or nation-state level. This move alleviated the pressure on regulators to renege on the commitment not to expropriate sunk investments, although it did not eliminate the practice of taxation by regulation that was the result of multiple interest group action. Although central or federal policy making is more focused and especialized and makes it difficult for more interest groups to organize, it is not clear that under all conditions central powers will not be associated with underinvestment. When technology makes the introduction of competition in some segments possible, the possibilities for organizing the institutional architechture of regulation expand. The central level may focus on structural regulation and the location of behavioral regulation of the remaining monopolists may be resolved in a cooperative way or concentrated at the level where the relevant spillovers are internalized.