33 resultados para Regulatory Frameworks
em Consorci de Serveis Universitaris de Catalunya (CSUC), Spain
Resumo:
This paper examines the role that existing Latin American policy institutions and regulatory coordination mechanisms (otherwise referred to as “regional regulatory spaces”) play in innovation and development of the ICT sector. In doing so, it recognizes that sector regulation does not currently match regional development, thereby limiting its potential progress. In order to shed light on the role that the “regional regulatory space” could potentially play, the author addresses three main questions: · Is there a hierarchy of policies by which it is presumed easy to “coordinate within well-defined technical subjects” but extremely challenging to “agree in matters of public policy?” · What would happen if policy divergence became more important than convergence? Is it reasonable to consider creating “regional regulatory spaces?” or should we focus solely on technological coordination? · Do institutions capable of serving as effective regional regulatory spaces already exist in Latin America or should we consider modifying existing institutions or creating new institutions? After analyzing these three overarching areas of concern, this paper then discusses the need to create a regional space in order to harmonize ICT regulatory frameworks and public policies. Ultimately, this work aims to advance the institutional formulation beyond pre-existing efforts.
Resumo:
We study the optimal public intervention in setting minimum standards of formation for specialized medical care. The abilities the physicians obtain by means of their training allow them to improve their performance as providers of cure and earn some monopoly rents.. Our aim is to characterize the most efficient regulation in this field taking into account different regulatory frameworks. We find that the existing situation in some countries, in which the amount of specialization is controlled, and the costs of this process of specialization are publicly financed, can be supported as the best possible intervention.
Resumo:
Conservatism, through the timelier recognition of losses in the income statement, is expected to increase firm investment efficiency through three main channels: (1) by decreasing the adverse effect of information asymmetries between outside equity holders and managers, facilitating the monitoring of managerial investment decisions; (2) by increasing managerial incentives to abandon poorly performing projects earlier and to undertake fewer negative net present-value investments; and (3) by facilitating the access to external financing at lower cost. Using a large US sample for the period 1990-2007 we find a negative association between conservatism and measures of over- and under- investment, and a positive association between conservatism and future profitability. This is consistent with firms reporting more conservative numbers investing more efficiently and in more profitable projects. Our results add to a growing stream of literature suggesting that eliminating conservatism from accounting regulatory frameworks may lead to undesirable economic consequences.
Resumo:
One of the most notable characteristics of the change in governance of the past two decades has been the restructuring of the state, most notably the delegation of authority from politicians and ministries to technocrats and regulatory agencies. Our unique dataset on the extent of these reforms in seven sectors in 36 countries reveals the widespread diffusion of these reforms in recent decades. In 1986 there were only 23 agencies across these sectors and countries (less than one agency per country); by 2002 this number had increased more than seven-fold, to 169. On average these 36 countries each have more than four agencies in the seven sectors studied. Yet the widespread diffusion of these reforms is characterized by cross-regional and cross-sectoral variations. Our data reveal two major variations: first, reforms are more widespread in economic regulation that in social spheres; second, regulatory agencies in the social spheres are more widespread in Europe than in Latin America. Why these variations in the spread of the reforms? In this paper we present for the first time the regulatory gaps across regions and sectors and then move on to offer some explanations for these gaps in a way that sheds some light on the nature of these reforms and on their limits. Our explanatory framework combines diffusion and structural explanations and in doing so sheds new light on the global diffusion of public policy ideas.
Resumo:
Measuring productive efficiency provides information on the likely effects of regulatory reform. We present a Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) of a sample of 38 vehicle inspection units under a concession regime, between the years 2000 and 2004. The differences in efficiency scores show the potential technical efficiency benefit of introducing some form of incentive regulation or of progressing towards liberalization. We also compute scale efficiency scores, showing that only units in territories with very low population density operate at a sub-optimal scale. Among those that operate at an optimal scale, there are significant differences in size; the largest ones operate in territories with the highest population density. This suggests that the introduction of new units in the most densely populated territories (a likely effect of some form of liberalization) would not be detrimental in terms of scale efficiency. We also find that inspection units belonging to a large, diversified firm show higher technical efficiency, reflecting economies of scale or scope at the firm level. Finally, we show that between 2002 and 2004, a period of high regulatory uncertainty in the sample’s region, technical change was almost zero. Regulatory reform should take due account of scale and diversification effects, while at the same time avoiding regulatory uncertainty.
Resumo:
The article investigates the private governance of financial markets by looking at the evolution of the regulatory debate on hedge funds in the US market. It starts from the premise that the privatization of regulation is always the result of a political decision and analyzes how this decision came about and was implemented in the case of hedge funds. The starting point is the failure of two initiatives on hedge funds that US regulators launched between 1999 an 2004, which the analysis explains by elaborating the concept of self-capture. Facing a trade off between the need to tackle publicly demonized issues and the difficulty of monitoring increasingly sophisticated and powerful private markets, regulators purposefully designed initiatives that were not meant to succeed, that is, they “self-captured” their own activity. By formulating initiatives that were inherently flawed, regulators saved their public role and at the same time paved the way for the privatization of hedge fund regulation. This explanation identifies a link between the failure of public initiatives and the success of private ones. It illustrates a specific case of formation of private authority in financial markets that points to a more general practice emerging in the regulation of finance.
Resumo:
The autonomous regulatory agency has recently become the ‘appropriate model’ of governance across countries and sectors. The dynamics of this process is captured in our data set, which covers the creation of agencies in 48 countries and 16 sectors since the 1920s. Adopting a diffusion approach to explain this broad process of institutional change, we explore the role of countries and sectors as sources of institutional transfer at different stages of the diffusion process. We demonstrate how the restructuring of national bureaucracies unfolds via four different channels of institutional transfer. Our results challenge theoretical approaches that overemphasize the national dimension in global diffusion and are insensitive to the stages of the diffusion process. Further advance in study of diffusion depends, we assert, on the ability to apply both cross-sectoral and cross-national analysis to the same research design and to incorporate channels of transfer with different causal mechanisms for different stages of the diffusion process.
Resumo:
Mentre que les nanotecnologies s'espera que porti beneficis importants en molts sectors i contribuir a la competitivitat, hi ha un creixent cos de dades científiques que indiquin que hi ha motius raonables per témer que els nanomaterials en particular pot donar lloc a els possibles riscos i efectes nocius per a la salut i el medi ambient. El meu objectiu és examinar com la Unió Europea està donant forma a un règim regulatori per nanomaterials: l'opció regulatòria escollida, la legislació vigent aplicable i la seva eficàcia (amb especial atenció sobre REACH buits normatius), la posició adoptada per la els diferents actors en aquest procés i l'evolució prevista legal en el curt termini.
Resumo:
Report for the scientific sojourn at the UC Berkeley, USA, from march until july 2008. This document starts by surveying the literature on economic federalism and relating it to network industries. The insights and some new developments (which focus on the role of interjurisdictional externalities, multiple objectives and investment incentives) are used to analyze regulatory arrangements in telecommunications and energy in the EU and the US. In the long history of vertically integrated monopolies in telecommunications and energy, there was a historical trend to move regulation up in the vertical structure of government, at least form the local level to the state or nation-state level. This move alleviated the pressure on regulators to renege on the commitment not to expropriate sunk investments, although it did not eliminate the practice of taxation by regulation that was the result of multiple interest group action. Although central or federal policy making is more focused and especialized and makes it difficult for more interest groups to organize, it is not clear that under all conditions central powers will not be associated with underinvestment. When technology makes the introduction of competition in some segments possible, the possibilities for organizing the institutional architechture of regulation expand. The central level may focus on structural regulation and the location of behavioral regulation of the remaining monopolists may be resolved in a cooperative way or concentrated at the level where the relevant spillovers are internalized.
Resumo:
Anàlisi dels frameworks Google, Google Web Toolkit (GWT) i Guice. Desenvolupament d'una eina de gestió de tasques orientat a projectes informàtics (UOCTaskMan). Aquesta aplicació permetrà l'enregistrament de tasques, el seguiment dels diferents estats pels que passai explotació de les dades generades per l'enregistrament i el seguiment.
Resumo:
El projecte és un estudi dels distints productes que es poden trobar per aconseguir la persistència dels objectes entre diferents sessions. Aquest projecte s'engloba dins la tecnologia Java 2 Enterprise Edition (J2EE).
Resumo:
Analitzarem, mitjançant proves de codi que realitzen la mateixa tasca, dels diferentsFramework escollits, la seva eficiència (velocitat i memòria entre d'altres).
Resumo:
Estudi dels marcs de treball Java EE per la capa de presentació d'aplicacions web complexes.
Resumo:
En aquest projecte inicialment es donarà una visió global del J2EE aprofundint especialment en els components que s'acostumen a utilitzar a la capa de presentació, com son els servlets. A més, es descriuran tecnologies i eines de JAVA que semblen no estar relacionades amb aquesta capa, però que es poden aprofitar pel facilitar la feina dels programadors.