Labor supply response to international migration and remittances in the Republic of Haiti

The Republic of Haiti is the prime international remittances recipient country in the Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) region relative to its gross domestic product (GDP). The downside of this observation may be that this country is also the first exporter of skilled workers in the world by population size. The present research uses a zero-altered negative binomial (with logit inflation) to model households' international migration decision process, and endogenous regressors' Amemiya Generalized Least Squares method (instrumental variable Tobit, IV-Tobit) to account for selectivity and endogeneity issues in assessing the impact of remittances on labor market outcomes. Results are in line with what has been found so far in this literature in terms of a decline of labor supply in the presence of remittances. However, the impact of international remittances does not seem to be important in determining recipient households' labor participation behavior, particularly for women.

The Electoral Determinants of Collective Remittances: The Mexican 3x1 Program for Migrants

The 3x1 Program for Migrants is a matching grant scheme that seeks to direct the money sent by migrant organizations abroad to the provision of public and social infrastructure, and to productive projects in migrants’ communities of origin. To do so, the municipal, state, and federal administrations match the amount sent by hometown associations by 3 to 1. This opens the door to the political manipulation of the program. We explore the impact of a particular facet of Mexican political life on the operation of the 3x1: its recent democratization and the increasing political competition at the municipal level. Relying on the literature on redistributive politics, we posit that an increasing number of effective parties in elections may have two different effects. On the one hand, the need to cater to more heterogeneous constituencies may increase the provision of public projects. On the other hand, since smaller coalitions are needed to win elections under tighter competition, fewer public and more private (clientelistic) projects could be awarded. Using a unique dataset on the 3x1 Program for Migrants for over 2,400 municipalities in the period 2002 through 2007, we find a lower provision of public goods in electorally competitive jurisdictions. Thus, we remain sceptical about the program success in promoting public goods in politically competitive locations with high migration levels.

Significados sociales y culturales del envio de remesas de la migracion ecuatoriana en España

Proyecto realizado a partir de una estancia en la Facultad Latinoaméricana de Ciencias Sociales de Quito, Ecuador, entre julio y octubre del 2006. La estancia de investigación está enmarcada en la realización de una tesis doctoral sobre las connotaciones sociales y culturales que las remesas tienen para la migración ecuatoriana en España. Se pretende aportar conocimiento sobre las remesas partiendo de los posibles significados sociales y culturales que éstas guardan para los migrantes y sus familiares. En la mayor parte de los estudios sobre remesas han abundado una visión economicista y centrada únicamente en aspectos cuantitativos dejando a un margen aspectos como el papel que las remesas juegan en el mantenimiento del espacio social transnacional, su relación con el proyecto migratorio, o el uso y finalidad que se hace de estas remesas dentro del grupo doméstico. En este sentido, la estancia ha permitido realizar parte del trabajo de campo de la investigación (observación participante, realización de entrevistas semiestructuradas a familiares de migrantes, migrantes retornados, y migrantes que estaban de vacaciones, realización de grupos focales), así como contrastar y discutir algunas de las primeras conclusiones obtenidas en el trabajo con investigadores de este tema en Ecuador y realizar un vaciado de bibliografía publicada en Ecuador relacionada con el tema.

The short arm of the law: judicial institutions and local governance in Brazil

This paper estimates the effect of judicial institutions on governance at the local level in Brazil. Our estimation strategy exploits a unique institutional feature of state judiciary branches which assigns prosecutors and judges to the most populous among contiguous counties forming a judiciary district. As a result of this assignment mechanism there are counties with nearly identical populations, some with and some without local judicial presence, which we exploit to impute counterfactual outcomes. Conditional on observable county characteristics, offenses per civil servant are about 35% lower in counties that have a local seat of the state judiciary. The lower incidence of infractions stems mostly from fewer violations of financial management regulations by local administrators, fewer instances of problems in project execution and project managment, fewer cases of non-existent or ineffective civil society oversight and fewer cases of improper handling of remittances to local residents.

A global view of cross-border migration

This paper evaluates the global welfare impact of observed levels of migration using a quantitativemulti-sector model of the world economy calibrated to aggregate and firm-level data.Our framework features cross-country labor productivity differences, international trade, remittances,and a heterogeneous workforce. We compare welfare under the observed levels ofmigration to a no-migration counterfactual. In the long run, natives in countries that receiveda lot of migration -such as Canada or Australia- are better o due to greater product varietyavailable in consumption and as intermediate inputs. In the short run the impact of migrationon average welfare in these countries is close to zero, while the skilled and unskilled nativestend to experience welfare changes of opposite signs. The remaining natives in countries withlarge emigration flows -such as Jamaica or El Salvador- are also better off due to migration,but for a different reason: remittances. The welfare impact of observed levels of migration issubstantial, at about 5 to 10% for the main receiving countries and about 10% in countries withlarge incoming remittances. Our results are robust to accounting for imperfect transferabilityof skills, selection into migration, and imperfect substitution between natives and immigrants.