How effective are policies to reduce gasoline consumption? evaluating a quasi-natural experiment in Spain

Using a panel of 48 provinces for four years we empirically analyze a series of temporary policies aimed at curbing fuel consumption implemented in Spain between March and June 2011. The first policy was a reduction in the speed limit in highways. The second policy was an increase in the biofuel content of fuels used in the transport sector. The third measure was a reduction of 5% in commuting and regional train fares that resulted in two major metropolitan areas reducing their overall fare for public transit. The results indicate that the speed limit reduction in highways reduced gasoline consumption by between 2% and 3%, while an increase in the biofuel content of gasoline increased this consumption. This last result is consistent with experimental evidence that indicates that mileage per liter falls with an increase in the biofuel content in gasolines. As for the reduction in transit fares, we do not find a significant effect for this policy. However, in specifications including the urban transit fare for the major cities in each province the estimated cross-price elasticity of the demand for gasoline -used as a proxy for car use- with respect to the price of transit is within the range reported in the literature. This is important since one of the main eficiency justification for subsidizing public transit rests on the positive value of this parameter and most of the estimates reported in the literature are quite dated.

Financial Repression in a Natural Experiment: Loan Allocation and the Change in the Usury Laws in 1714

If financial deepening aids economic growth, then financial repression should be harmful. We use a natural experiment – the change in the English usury laws in 1714 – to analyze the effects of interest rate restrictions. We use a sample of individual loan transactions to demonstrate how the reduction of the legal maximum rate of interest affected the supply and demand for credit. Average loan size and minimum loan size increased strongly, and access to credit worsened for those with little ‘social capital.’ While we have no direct evidence that loans were misallocated, the discontinuity in loan receipts makes this highly likely. We conclude that financial repression can undermine the positive effects of financial deepening.

The importance of relative performance feedback information: Evidence from a natural experiment using high school students

We study the effect of providing relative performance feedback information onperformance, when individuals are rewarded according to their absolute performance. Anatural experiment that took place in a high school offers an unusual opportunity to testthis effect in a real-effort setting. For one year only, students received information thatallowed them to know whether they were performing above (below) the class average aswell as the distance from this average. We exploit a rich panel data set and find that theprovision of this information led to an increase of 5% in students grades. Moreover, theeffect was significant for the whole distribution. However, once the information wasremoved, the effect disappeared. To rule out the concern that the effect may beartificially driven by teachers within the school, we verify our results using nationallevel exams (externally graded) for the same students, and the effect remains.

Psychological pressure in competitive environments: Evidence from a randomized natural experiment

Much like cognitive abilities, emotional skills can have major effects on performance and economic outcomes. This paper studies the behavior of professionalsubjects involved in a dynamic competition in their own natural environment. Thesetting is a penalty shoot-out in soccer where two teams compete in a tournamentframework taking turns in a sequence of five penalty kicks each. As the kicking order is determined by the random outcome of a coin flip, the treatment and control groups are determined via explicit randomization. Therefore, absent any psychological effects, both teams should have the same probability of winning regardless of the kicking order. Yet, we find a systematic first-kicker advantage. Using data on 2,731 penalty kicks from 262 shoot-outs for a three decade period, we find that teams kicking first win the penalty shoot-out 60.5% of the time. A dynamic panel data analysis shows that the psychological mechanism underlying this result arises from the asymmetry in the partial score. As most kicks are scored, kicking first typically means having the opportunity to lead in the partial score, whereas kicking second typically means lagging in the score and having the opportunity to, at most, get even. Having a worse prospect than the opponent hinders subjects' performance.Further, we also find that professionals are self-aware of their own psychological effects. When a recent change in regulations gives winners of the coin toss the chance to choose the kicking order, they rationally react to it by systematically choosing to kick first. A survey of professional players reveals that when asked to explain why they prefer to kick first, they precisely identify the psychological mechanism for which we find empirical support in the data: they want to lead in the score inorder to put pressure on the opponent.

Interest rate restrictions in a natural experiment: loan allocation and the change in the usury laws in 1714

This article studies the effects of interest rate restrictions on loan allocation. The British governmenttightened the usury laws in 1714, reducing the maximum permissible interest rate from 6% to5%. A sample of individual loan transactions reveals that average loan size and minimum loan sizeincreased strongly, while access to credit worsened for those with little social capital. Collateralisedcredits, which had accounted for a declining share of total lending, returned to their former role ofprominence. Our results suggest that the usury laws distorted credit markets significantly; we findno evidence that they offered a form of Pareto-improving social insurance.

Evaluation of subsidies programs to sell green cars: Impact on prices, quantities and efficiency

During the recent period of economic crisis, many countries have introduced scrappage schemes to boost the sale and production of vehicles, particularly of vehicles designed to pollute less. In this paper, we analyze the impact of a particular scheme in Spain (Plan2000E) on vehicle prices and sales figures as well as on the reduction of polluting emissions from vehicles on the road. We considered the introduction of this scheme an exogenous policy change and because we could distinguish a control group (non-subsidized vehicles) and a treatment group (subsidized vehicles), before and after the introduction of the Plan, we were able to carry out our analysis as a quasi-natural experiment. Our study reveals that manufacturers increased vehicle prices by the same amount they were granted through the Plan (1,000 €). In terms of sales, econometric estimations revealed an increase of almost 5% as a result of the implementation of the Plan. With regard to environmental efficiency, we compared the costs (inverted quantity of money) and the benefits of the program (reductions in polluting emissions and additional fiscal revenues) and found that the Plan would only be beneficial if it boosted demand by at least 30%.

Land use regulation and productivity - Land matters: Evidence from a UK Supermarket chain

We use store-specific data for a major UK supermarket chain to estimate the impact of planning on store output. Using the quasi-natural experiment of the variation in policies between England and other UK countries, we isolate the impact of Town Centre First policies. We find that space contributes directly to store productivity; and planning policies in England directly reduce output both by reducing store sizes and forcing stores onto less productive sites. We estimate that since the late 1980s planning policies have imposed a loss of output of at least 18.3 to 24.9% - more than a “lost decade’s” growth. JEL codes: D2, L51, L81, R32.

What do outside experts bring to a committee? Evidence from the Bank of England

We test whether outside experts have information not available to insiders by usingthe voting record of the Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee. Memberswith more private information should vote more often against conventional wisdom,which we measure as the average belief of market economists about future interest rates. We find evidence that external members indeed have information notavailable to internals, but also use a quasi-natural experiment to show they mayexaggerate their expertise to obtain reappointment. This implies that an optimalcommittee, even outside monetary policy, should potentially include outsiders, butneeds to manage career concerns.

The impact of interest-rate subsidies on long-term household debt: Evidence from a large program

The responsiveness of long-term household debt to the interest rate is acrucial parameter for assessing the effectiveness of public policies aimedat promoting specific types of saving. This paper estimates the effect ofa reform of Credito Bonificado, a large program in Portugal that subsidizedmortgage interest rates, on long-term household debt. The reform establisheda ceiling in the price of the house that could be financed through theprogram, and provides plausibly exogenous variation in incentives. Usinga unique dataset of matched household survey data and administrative recordsof debt, we document a large decrease in the probability of signing a newloan after the removal of the subsidy.

Voting after the bombing: Can terrorist attacks change the outcome of democratic elections?

Economists have recently turned their attention to the effects of terrorism. One much debated effect of terrorist attacks is its impact on the results of democratic elections. We use the electoral consequences of the terrorist attacks of the 11-M in Madrid to analyze this issue. We consider this particular experiment since the attack took place only three days before the 2004 Congressional Election, which allows the use of credible identification criteria. In particular, we use the advance voting by Spanish residents abroad, who cast their vote before the terrorist attack, to identify the effect of the bombing. We exploit this macabre natural experiment to run a difference-in-differences estimation using data on three consecutive Congressional elections. Our empirical results indicate that a terrorist attack can have a large impact on the outcome of democratic elections.

Employment consequences of restrictive permanent contracts: Evidence from Spanish labor market reforms

Temporary employment contracts allowing unrestricted dismissals wereintroduced in Spain in 1984 and quickly came to account for most new jobs.As a result, temporary employment increased from around 10% in themid-eighties to more than 30% in the early nineties. In 1997, however,the Spanish government attempted to reduce the incidence of temporaryemployment by reducing payroll taxes and dismissal costs for permanentcontracts. In this paper, we use individual data from the Spanish LaborForce Survey to estimate the effects of reduced payroll taxes anddismissal costs on the distribution of employment and worker flows. Weexploit the fact that recent reforms apply only to certain demographicgroups to set up a natural experiment research design that can be usedto study the effects of contract regulations. Our results show that thereduction of payroll taxes and dismissal costs increased the employmentof young workers on permanent contracts, although the effects for youngwomen are not always significant. Results for older workers showinsignificant effects. The results suggest a moderately elastic responseof permanent employment to non-wage labor costs for young men. We alsofind positive effects on the transitions from unemployment and temporaryemployment into permanent employment for young and older workers, althoughthe effects for older workers are not always significant. On the otherhand, transitions from permanent employment to non-employment increasedonly for older men, suggesting that the reform had little effect ondismissals.

The effect of tax enforcement on tax elasticities: Evidence from charitable contributions in France

Optimal tax formulas expressed in "sufficient statistics" are usually calibrated under the assumptionthat the relevant tax elasticities are unaffected by other available policy instruments.In practice though, tax authorities have many more instruments than the mere tax rates andtax elasticities are functions of all these policy instruments. In this paper we provide evidencethat tax elasticities are extremely sensitive to a particular policy instrument: the level of taxenforcement. We exploit a natural experiment that took place in France in 1983, when the taxadministration tightened the requirements to claim charitable deductions. The reform led to asubstantial drop in the amount of contributions reported to the administration, which can becredibly attributed to overreporting of charitable contributions before the reform, rather thanto a real change in giving behaviours. We show that the reform was also associated with asubstantial decline in the absolute value of the elasticity of reported contributions. This findingallows us to partially identify the elasticity of overreporting contributions, which is shown tobe large and inferior to -2 in the lax enforcement regime. We further show using bunching oftaxpayers at kink-points of the tax schedule that the elasticity of taxable income also experienceda significant decline after the reform. Our results suggest that optimizing the tax rate fora given tax elasticity when other policy instruments are not optimized can lead to misleadingconclusions when tax authorities have another instrument that could set the tax elasticity itselfat its optimal level as in Kopczuk and Slemrod [2002].

When are layoffs acceptable? Evidence from a quasi-experiment

Many authors have discussed a decline in internal labor markets and an apparent shift to a new employment contract, characterized by less commitment between employer and employee and more portable skills. These discussions occur without much evidence on what employment contract employees currently feel is fair. We perfomed quasi-experimental surveys to study when employees in the U.S. andCanada feel that layoffs are fair.Layoffs were perceived as more fair if they were due to lower product demand than if the result of employee suggestions. This result appears to be solely due to norms of reciprocity (companiesshould not punish employees for their efforts), rather than norms of sharing rents, as new technology was also considered a justification for layoffs.Consistent with theories of distributive and procedural equity, layoffs were perceived as more fair if the CEO voluntarily shared the pain. CEO bonuses due to layoffs lowered their reported fairness only slightly.Respondents in Silicon Valley were not more accepting of layoffsthan were those in Canada on average, although the justificationsconsidered valid differed slightly.

Tree automorphisms and quasi-isometries of Thompson's group F

We prove that automorphisms of the infinite binary rooted tree T2 do not yield quasi-isometries of Thompson's group F, except for the map which reverses orientation on the unit interval, a natural outer automorphism of F. This map, together with the identity map, forms a subgroup of Aut(T2) consisting of 2-adic automorphisms, following standard terminology used in the study of branch groups. However, for more general p, we show that the analgous groups of p-adic tree automorphisms do not give rise to quasiisometries of F(p).

Detection of millimetric deformation using a terrestrial laser scanner: experiment and application to a rockfall event

Terrestrial laser scanning (TLS) is one of the most promising surveying techniques for rockslope characterization and monitoring. Landslide and rockfall movements can be detected by means of comparison of sequential scans. One of the most pressing challenges of natural hazards is combined temporal and spatial prediction of rockfall. An outdoor experiment was performed to ascertain whether the TLS instrumental error is small enough to enable detection of precursory displacements of millimetric magnitude. This consists of a known displacement of three objects relative to a stable surface. Results show that millimetric changes cannot be detected by the analysis of the unprocessed datasets. Displacement measurement are improved considerably by applying Nearest Neighbour (NN) averaging, which reduces the error (1¿) up to a factor of 6. This technique was applied to displacements prior to the April 2007 rockfall event at Castellfollit de la Roca, Spain. The maximum precursory displacement measured was 45 mm, approximately 2.5 times the standard deviation of the model comparison, hampering the distinction between actual displacement and instrumental error using conventional methodologies. Encouragingly, the precursory displacement was clearly detected by applying the NN averaging method. These results show that millimetric displacements prior to failure can be detected using TLS.