Venture capital meets contract theory: risky claims or formal control?

This paper develops a theory of the joint allocation of formal control and cash-flow rights in venture capital deals. We argue that when the need for investor support calls for very high-powered outside claims, entrepreneurs should optimally retain formal control in order to avoid excessive interference. Hence, we predict that risky claims should be be negatively correlated to control rights, both along the life of a start-up and across deals. This challenges the idea that risky claims should a ways be associated to more formal control, and is in line with contractual terms increasingly used in venture capital, in corporate venturing and in partnership deals between biotech start-ups and large drug companies. The paper provides a theoretical explanation to some puzzling evidence documented in Gompers (1997) and Kaplan and Stromberg (2000), namely the inclusion in venture capital contracts of contingencies that trigger both a reduction in VC control and the conversion! of her preferred stocks into common stocks.

The Social contract with endogenous sentiments

Moral values infuence individual behavior and social interactions. A specially signif- cant instance is the case of moral values concerning work e¤ort. Individuals determine what they take to be proper behaviour and judge the others, and themselves, accordingly. They increase their esteem -and self-esteem- for those who perform in excess of the standard and decrease their esteem for those who work less. These changes in self-esteem result from the self-regulatory emotions of guilt or pride extensively studied in Social Psychology. We examine the interactions between sentiments, individual behaviour and the social contract in a model of rational voting over redistribution where individual self-esteem and relative es-teem for others are endogenously determined. Individuals di¤er in their productivities. The desired extent of redistribution depends both on individual income and on individual attitudes toward others. We characterize the politico-economic equilibria in which sentiments, labor supply and redistribution are simultaneously determined. The model has two types of equilibria. In "cohesive" equilibria, all individuals conform to the standard of proper behav- iour, income inequality is low and social esteem is not biased toward any particular type. Under these conditions equilibrium redistribution increases in response to larger inequality. In a "clustered" equilibrium skilled workers work above the mean while unskilled workers work below. In such an equilibrium, income inequality is large and sentiments are biased in favor of the industrious. As inequality increases, this bias may eventually overtake the egoistic demand for greater taxation and equilibrium redistribution decreases. The type of equilibrium that emerges crucially depends on inequality. We contrast the predictions of the model with data on inequality, redistribution, work values and attitudes toward work and toward the poor for a set of OECD countries.

Psychological aspects of the experiences of athletes at the Olympic Villages: issues and challenges

Article providing the athlete perspective on Olympic Villages. This article was published in the book entitled "Olympic Villages: a hundred years of urban planning and shared experiences" compiling the papers given at the 1997 International Symposium on International Chair in Olympism (IOC-UAB).

Let's talk: how communication affects contract design

We study experimentally how the ability to communicate affects the frequency and effectiveness of flexible and inflexible contracts in a bilateral trade context where sellers can adjust trade quality after observing a post-contractual cost shock and a discretionary buyer transfer. In the absence of communication, we find that rigid contracts are more frequent and lead to higher earnings for both buyer and seller. By contrast, in the presence of communication, flexible contracts are much more frequent and considerably more productive, both for buyers and sellers. Also, both buyer and seller earn considerably more from flexible with communication than rigid without communication. Our results show quite strongly that communication, a normal feature in contracting, can remove the potential cost of flexibility (disagreements caused by conflicting perceptions). We offer an explanation based on social norms.

The Generational contract in the family : explaining regime differences in financial transfers from parents to children in Europe

The exchange of social and economic support between the generationsis one of the main pillars of both family life and welfare systems. Thedebate on how to reform the generational contract is still truncated, however, by focusing on its public dimension only, especially on pensions and health care provisions. For a full account, the transfer of resources between adult generations in the family needs to be included as well. In our previous research we have shown that intergenerationalexchange is more likely to take place but less intense in the Nordicwelfare regime than in the Continental and Southern ones. In thepresent paper we analyze the social mechanisms that create and explain this nexus between patterns of intergenerational transfers and welfare regimes. The notion that Southern European family support networksare stronger and more effective than those of Continental and Northern European countries is only partially confirmed. In Southern (and partly in Continental) countries, children are mostly supported by means of co-residence with their parents till their complete economicindependence. However, once they have left the parental home thereare fewer transfers; support tends to be restricted to children who have special needs (such as for the formation of their own family), and depends more on their parents’ resources. In the Nordic countries, in contrast, transfers are less driven by children’s needs and parentalresources.

Aggregate consequences of limited contract enforceability

We study a general equilibrium model in which entrepreneurs finance investment with optimal financial contracts. Because of enforceability problems, contracts are constrained efficient. We show that limited enforceability amplifies the impact of technological innovations on aggregate output. More generally, we show that lower enforceability of contracts will be associated with greater aggregate volatility. A key assumption for this result is that defaulting entrepreneurs are not excluded from the market.

Psychological pressure in competitive environments: Evidence from a randomized natural experiment

Much like cognitive abilities, emotional skills can have major effects on performance and economic outcomes. This paper studies the behavior of professionalsubjects involved in a dynamic competition in their own natural environment. Thesetting is a penalty shoot-out in soccer where two teams compete in a tournamentframework taking turns in a sequence of five penalty kicks each. As the kicking order is determined by the random outcome of a coin flip, the treatment and control groups are determined via explicit randomization. Therefore, absent any psychological effects, both teams should have the same probability of winning regardless of the kicking order. Yet, we find a systematic first-kicker advantage. Using data on 2,731 penalty kicks from 262 shoot-outs for a three decade period, we find that teams kicking first win the penalty shoot-out 60.5% of the time. A dynamic panel data analysis shows that the psychological mechanism underlying this result arises from the asymmetry in the partial score. As most kicks are scored, kicking first typically means having the opportunity to lead in the partial score, whereas kicking second typically means lagging in the score and having the opportunity to, at most, get even. Having a worse prospect than the opponent hinders subjects' performance.Further, we also find that professionals are self-aware of their own psychological effects. When a recent change in regulations gives winners of the coin toss the chance to choose the kicking order, they rationally react to it by systematically choosing to kick first. A survey of professional players reveals that when asked to explain why they prefer to kick first, they precisely identify the psychological mechanism for which we find empirical support in the data: they want to lead in the score inorder to put pressure on the opponent.

Signatures of CP violation in the presence of multiple b-pair production at hadron colliders

We calculate the production of two b-quark pairs in hadron collisions. Sources of multiple pairs are multiple interactions and higher order perturbative QCD mechanisms. We subsequently investigate the competing effects of multiple b-pair production on measurements of CP violation: (i) the increase in event rate with multiple b-pair cross sections which may reach values of the order of 1 b in the presence of multiple interactions and (ii) the dilution of b versus b tagging efficiency because of the presence of events with four B mesons. The impact of multiple B-meson production is small unless the cross section for producing a single pair exceeds 1 mb. We show that even for larger values of the cross section the competing effects (i) and (ii) roughly compensate so that there is no loss in the precision with which CP-violating CKM angles can be determined.

New CP violation in neutrino oscillations

Measurements of CP-violating observables in neutrino oscillation experiments have been studied in the literature as a way to determine the CP-violating phase in the mixing matrix for leptons. Here we show that such observables also probe new neutrino interactions in the production or detection processes. Genuine CP violation and fake CP violation due to matter effects are sensitive to the imaginary and real parts of new couplings. The dependence of the CP asymmetry on the source-detector distance is different from the standard one and, in particular, enhanced at short distances. We estimate that future neutrino factories will be able to probe in this way new interactions that are up to four orders of magnitude weaker than the weak interactions. We discuss the possible implications for models of new physics.

Parity violation in Aharonov-Bohm systems: The spontaneous Hall effect

We show how macroscopic manifestations of P (and T) symmetry breaking can arise in a simple system subject to Aharonov-Bohm interactions. Specifically, we study the conductivity of a gas of charged particles moving through a dilute array of flux tubes. The interaction of the electrons with the flux tubes is taken to be of a purely Aharonov-Bohm type. We find that the system exhibits a nonzero transverse conductivity, i.e., a spontaneous Hall effect. This is in contrast to the fact that the cross sections for both scattering and bremsstrahlung (soft-photon emission) of a single electron from a flux tube are invariant under reflections. We argue that the asymmetry in the conductivity coefficients arises from many-body effects. On the other hand, the transverse conductivity has the same dependence on universal constants that appears in the quantum Hall effect, a result that we relate to the validity of the mean-field approximation.

A measure of group dissimilarity for psychological attributes

El funcionamiento y el rendimiento de los grupos en contextos diferentes están relacionados con el grado en que las características de los miembros son complementarias o suplementarias. El presente artículo describe un procedimiento para cuantificar el grado de disimilitud a nivel de grupo. A diferencia de la mayoría de técnicas existentes, el procedimiento que aquí se describe está normalizado y es invariante a los cambios de localización y escala. Por lo tanto, es posible comparar la disimilitud en escalas con diferente métrica y en grupos de distinto tamaño. La disimilitud está medida en términos relativos, independientemente de la posición que ocupan los individuos en la dimensión que mide la escala. Cuando no existe una justificación teórica para combinar las diversas propiedades medidas, se puede cuantificar la disimilitud para cada escala por separado. También es posible obtener las contribuciones diádicas e individuales respecto a la diversidad global y la asignada a cada escala. Las medidas descriptivas pueden ser complementadas con la significación estadística para, así, comparar los resultados obtenidos con distribuciones discretas de referencia, ya sean simétricas o asimétricas. Se ha elaborado un paquete en R que permite obtener los índices descriptivos y los valores p, además de contener las expresiones desarrolladas para simular una amplia variedad de distribuciones discretas de probabilidad.

Public-private sector wage differentials by type of contract: evidence from Spain

The article examines public-private sector wage differentials in Spain using microdata from the Structure of Earnings Survey (Encuesta de Estructura Salarial). When applying various decomposition techniques, we find that it is important to distinguish by gender and type of contract. Our results also highlight the presence of a positive wage premium for public sector workers that can be partially explained by their better endowment of characteristics, in particular by the characteristics of the establishment where they work. The wage premium is greater for female and fixed-term employees and falls across the wage distribution, being negative for more highly skilled workers.

Public-private sector wage differentials by type of contract: evidence from Spain

The article examines public-private sector wage differentials in Spain using microdata from the Structure of Earnings Survey (Encuesta de Estructura Salarial). When applying various decomposition techniques, we find that it is important to distinguish by gender and type of contract. Our results also highlight the presence of a positive wage premium for public sector workers that can be partially explained by their better endowment of characteristics, in particular by the characteristics of the establishment where they work. The wage premium is greater for female and fixed-term employees and falls across the wage distribution, being negative for more highly skilled workers.

És possible l'espai europeu d'educació superior?: l'ensenyament de la psicologia al Institute of Psychological Sciences de la Universitat de Leeds

L'Espai Europeu d'Educació Superior s'ha convertit en un repte, un desafiament que implica assolir una convergència de titulacions universitàries equivalents. Per això es requereix una modificació del tradicional ensenyament, en el nostre cas, de la psicologia. En aquest article s'examina l'ensenyament de la psicologia al Institute of Psychological Sciences de la Universitat de Leeds (metodologia docent; avaluació i contingut curricular)