The role of title insurance under recording and registration

This article outlines a transaction cost theory of title insurance andanalyses the role it plays in countries with recording and registrationof land titles. Title insurance indemnifies real estate right holdersfor losses caused by pre-existing title defects that are unknown whenthe policy is issued. It emerged to complement the errors and omissions insurance of professionals examining title quality. Poor organizationof public records led title insurers in the USA to integrate titleexamination and settlement services. Their residual claimant statusmotivates insurers to screen, cure and avoid title defects. Firmsintroducing title insurance abroad produce little information on titlequality, however. Their policies are instead issued on a casualty basis,complementing and enforcing the professional liability of conveyancers.Future development in markets with land registration is uncertainbecause of adverse selection, competitive reactions from establishedconveyancers and the ability of larger banks to self-insure title risks.

Property enforcement as organized consent

This article develops and tests a theory of the institutions that makeproperty rights viable, ensuring their enforcement, mobilizing thecollateral value of assets and promoting growth. In contrast tocontractual rights, property rights are enforced in rem, being affectedonly with the consent of the right holder. This ensures enforcement butis costly when multiple, potentially colliding rights are held in thesame asset. Different institutions reduce the cost of gathering consentsto overcome this trade-off of enforcement benefits for consent costs:recording of deeds with title insurance, registration of rights and evena regimen of purely private transactions. All three provide functionallysimilar services, but their relative performance varies with the numberof transactions, the risk of political opportunism and regulatoryconsistency. The analysis also shows the rationality of allowingcompetition in the preparation and support of private contractswhile requiring territorial monopoly in recording and registrationactivities, this to ensure independence and protect third parties.

La Crema: A case study of mutual fire insurance

We analyze a mutual fire insurance mechanism usedin Andorra, which is called La Crema in the locallanguage. This mechanism relies on households'announced property values to determine how much ahousehold is reimbursed in the case of a fire andhow payments are apportioned among other households.The only Pareto eficient allocation reachablethrough the mechanism requires that all householdshonestly report the true value of their property.However, such honest reporting is not an equilibriumexcept in the extreme case where the property valuesare identical for all households. Nevertheless, as the size of the society becomes large, thebenefits from deviating from truthful reportingvanish, and all of the non-degenerate equilibriaof the mechanism are nearly truthful andapproximately Pareto efficient.

Evaluación de fondos de inversión garantizados por medio de portfolio insurance

La elaboración de un índice de performance para la evaluación de carteras de inversión tiene como base la correcta definición de la medida de riesgo a emplear. Este trabajo tiene como objetivo proponer una medida de performance adecuada a la evaluación de carteras de fondos de inversión garantizados. Las particularidades de este tipo de fondos hacen necesario definir una medida explicativa de las características especificas de riesgo de este tipo de carteras. Partiendo de la estrategia de porfolio insurance se define una nueva medida de riesgo basada en el downside risk. Proponemos como medida de downside risk aquella parte del riesgo total de una cartera de títulos que se elimina con la estrategia de portfolio insurance. Por contraposición, proponemos como medida de upside risk aquella otra parte del riesgo total de la cartera que no desaparece con la estrategia de portfolio insurance. De este modo, la suma del upside risk y del downside risk es el riesgo total. Partiendo de la medida de riesgo upside risk y del modelo de valoración de activos C.A.P.M. se propone una medida de performance específica para evaluar los fondos de inversión garantizados.

Can genetic algorithms explain experimental anomalies? An application to common property resources

It is common to find in experimental data persistent oscillations in the aggregate outcomes and high levels of heterogeneity in individual behavior. Furthermore, it is not unusual to find significant deviations from aggregate Nash equilibrium predictions. In this paper, we employ an evolutionary model with boundedly rational agents to explain these findings. We use data from common property resource experiments (Casari and Plott, 2003). Instead of positing individual-specific utility functions, we model decision makers as selfish and identical. Agent interaction is simulated using an individual learning genetic algorithm, where agents have constraints in their working memory, a limited ability to maximize, and experiment with new strategies. We show that the model replicates most of the patterns that can be found in common property resource experiments.

Generalized property R and the Schoenflies Conjecture

There is a relation between the generalized Property R Conjecture and the Schoenflies Conjecture that suggests a new line of attack on the latter. The new approach gives a quick proof of the genus 2 Schoenflies Conjecture and suffices to prove the genus 3 case, even in the absence of new progress on the generalized Property R Conjecture.

Real rank zero algebras have the corona factorization property

The purpose of this short note is to prove that a stable separable C*-algebra with real rank zero has the so-called corona factorization property, that is, all the full multiplier projections are properly in finite. Enroute to our result, we consider conditions under which a real rank zero C*-algebra admits an injection of the compact operators (a question already considered in [21]).

Fiscal insurance and debt management in OECD economies

Assuming the role of debt management is to provide hedging against fiscal shocks we consider three questions: i) what indicators can be used to assess the performance of debt management? ii) how well have historical debt management policies performed? and iii) how is that performance affected by variations in debt issuance? We consider these questions using OECD data on the market value of government debt between 1970 and 2000. Motivated by both the optimal taxation literature and broad considerations of debt stability we propose a range of performance indicators for debt management. We evaluate these using Monte Carlo analysis and find that those based on the relative persistence of debt perform best. Calculating these measures for OECD data provides only limited evidence that debt management has helped insulate policy against unexpected fiscal shocks. We also find that the degree of fiscal insurance achieved is not well connected to cross country variations in debt issuance patterns. Given the limited volatility observed in the yield curve the relatively small dispersion of debt management practices across countries makes little difference to the realised degree of fiscal insurance.

Subgroups of small index in Aut(Fn) and Kazhdan's property (T)

We give a series of interesting subgroups of finite index in Aut(Fn). One of them has index 42 in Aut(F3) and infinite abelianization. This implies that Aut(F3) does not have Kazhdan’s property (T) (see [3] and [6] for another proofs). We proved also that every subgroup of finite index in Aut(Fn), n &= 3, which contains the subgroup of IA-automorphisms, has a finite abelianization.

Changes in the demand for private medical insurance following a shift in tax incentives

The 1998 Spanish reform of the Personal Income Tax eliminated the 15% deduction for private medical expenditures including payments on private health insurance (PHI) policies. To avoid an undesirable increase in the demand for publicly funded health care, tax incentives to buy PHI were not completely removed but basically shifted from individual to group employer-paid policies. In a unique fiscal experiment, at the same time that the tax relief for individually purchased policies was abolished, the government provided for tax allowances on policies taken out through employment. Using a bivariate probit model on data from National Health Surveys, we estimate the impact of said reform on the demand for PHI and the changes occurred within it. Our findings suggest that the total probability of buying PHI was not significantly affected. Indeed, the fall in the demand for individual policies (by 10% between 1997 and 2001) was offset by an increase in the demand for group employer-paid ones, so that the overall size of the market remained virtually unchanged. We also briefly discuss the welfare effects on the state budget, the industry and society at large.

An Introduction to parametric and non-parametric models for bivariate positive insurance claim severity distributions

We present a real data set of claims amounts where costs related to damage are recorded separately from those related to medical expenses. Only claims with positive costs are considered here. Two approaches to density estimation are presented: a classical parametric and a semi-parametric method, based on transformation kernel density estimation. We explore the data set with standard univariate methods. We also propose ways to select the bandwidth and transformation parameters in the univariate case based on Bayesian methods. We indicate how to compare the results of alternative methods both looking at the shape of the overall density domain and exploring the density estimates in the right tail.

How much risk is mitigated by LTC Insurance? A case study of the public system in Spain

We present a methodology that allows to calculate the impact of a given Long-Term Care (LTC) insurance protection system on the risk of incurring extremely large individual lifetime costs. Our proposed methodology is illustrated with a case study. According to our risk measure, the current Spanish public LTC system mitigates individual risk by more than 30% compared to the situation where no public protection were available. We show that our method can be used to compare risk reduction of alternative LTC insurance plans.

Loss risk through fraud in car insurance

Our objective is to analyse fraud as an operational risk for the insurance company. We study the effect of a fraud detection policy on the insurer's results account, quantifying the loss risk from the perspective of claims auditing. From the point of view of operational risk, the study aims to analyse the effect of failing to detect fraudulent claims after investigation. We have chosen VAR as the risk measure with a non-parametric estimation of the loss risk involved in the detection or non-detection of fraudulent claims. The most relevant conclusion is that auditing claims reduces loss risk in the insurance company.

Misallocation of capital in a model of endogenous financial intermediation and insurance

In this paper we analyze productivity and welfare losses from capital misallocation in a general equilibrium model of occupational choice and endogenous financial intermediation. We study the effects of borrowing and lending, insurance, and risk sharing on the optimal allocation of resources. We find that financial markets together with general equilibrium effects have large impact on entrepreneurs' entry and firm-size decisions. Efficiency gains are increasing in the quality of financial markets, particularly in their ability to alleviate a financing constraint by providing insurance against idiosyncratic risk.

Mixture of bivariate Poisson regression models with an application to insurance

In a recent paper Bermúdez [2009] used bivariate Poisson regression models for ratemaking in car insurance, and included zero-inflated models to account for the excess of zeros and the overdispersion in the data set. In the present paper, we revisit this model in order to consider alternatives. We propose a 2-finite mixture of bivariate Poisson regression models to demonstrate that the overdispersion in the data requires more structure if it is to be taken into account, and that a simple zero-inflated bivariate Poisson model does not suffice. At the same time, we show that a finite mixture of bivariate Poisson regression models embraces zero-inflated bivariate Poisson regression models as a special case. Additionally, we describe a model in which the mixing proportions are dependent on covariates when modelling the way in which each individual belongs to a separate cluster. Finally, an EM algorithm is provided in order to ensure the models’ ease-of-fit. These models are applied to the same automobile insurance claims data set as used in Bermúdez [2009] and it is shown that the modelling of the data set can be improved considerably.