On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model

For the many-to-one matching model in which firms have substitutable and quota q-separable preferences over subsets of workers we show that the workers-optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof for the workers. In order to prove this result, we also show that under this domain of preferences (which contains the domain of responsive preferences of the college admissions problem) the workers-optimal stable matching is weakly Pareto optimal for the workers and the Blocking Lemma holds as well. We exhibit an example showing that none of these three results remain true if the preferences of firms are substitutable but not quota q-separable.

Bribe-proof rules in the division problem

The division problem consists of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents with single-peaked preferences. A rule maps preference profiles into n shares of the amount to be allocated. A rule is bribe-proof if no group of agents can compensate another agent to misrepresent his preference and, after an appropriate redistribution of their shares, each obtain a strictly preferred share. We characterize all bribe-proof rules as the class of efficient, strategy-proof, and weak replacement monotonic rules. In addition, we identify the functional form of all bribe-proof and tops-only rules.

A topological proof that surface relators are test words

Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt.

A proof that all Seifert 3-manifold groups and all virtual surface groups are conjugacy separable

We prove that the fundamental group of any Seifert 3-manifold is conjugacy separable. That is, conjugates may be distinguished infinite quotients or, equivalently, conjugacy classes are closed in the pro-finite topology.

A maximal domain of preferences for tops-only rules in the division problem

The division problem consists of allocating an amount M of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents. Sprumont (1991) showed that if agents have single-peaked preferences over their shares, the uniform rule is the unique strategy-proof, efficient, and anonymous rule. Ching and Serizawa (1998) extended this result by showing that the set of single-plateaued preferences is the largest domain, for all possible values of M, admitting a rule (the extended uniform rule) satisfying strategy-proofness, efficiency and symmetry. We identify, for each M and n, a maximal domain of preferences under which the extended uniform rule also satisfies the properties of strategy-proofness, efficiency, continuity, and "tops-onlyness". These domains (called weakly single-plateaued) are strictly larger than the set of single-plateaued preferences. However, their intersection, when M varies from zero to infinity, coincides with the set of single-plateaued preferences.

Voting by committees with exit

We study the problem of a society choosing a subset of new members from a finite set of candidates (as in Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou, 1991). However, we explicitly consider the possibility that initial members of the society (founders) may want to leave it if they do not like the resulting new society. We show that, if founders have separable (or additive) preferences, the unique strategy-proof and stable social choice function satisfying voters' sovereignty (on the set of candidates) is the one where candidates are chosen unanimously and no founder leaves the society.

Voting by committees under constraints

We consider social choice problems where a society must choose a subset from a set of objects. Specifically, we characterize the families of strategy-proof voting procedures when not all possible subsets of objects are feasible, and voters' preferences are separable or additively representable.

The Rise of democracy in Europe and the fight against mass poverty in Latin America: the implications for marxist thought of some recent mainstream papers

Recently a number of mainstream papers have treated the rise of democracy in 19th century Europe and its instability in Latin America in an eminently Marxist fashion. This paper sets out their implications for Marxist thought. With respect to Europe, Marx's emphasis on political action backed by the threat of violence is vindicated but his justification for socialism is not. With respect to Latin America, the unequal distribution of wealth is the cause of political instability that is, in turn, the root cause of mass poverty. In addition it is possible to explain some of the paradoxical characteristics of neo-liberalism and to make a weak argument for socialism in spite of its rejection in Europe.

Convergence of the mass-transport steepest descent scheme for the sub-critical Patlak-Keller-Segel model

Variational steepest descent approximation schemes for the modified Patlak-Keller-Segel equation with a logarithmic interaction kernel in any dimension are considered. We prove the convergence of the suitably interpolated in time implicit Euler scheme, defined in terms of the Euclidean Wasserstein distance, associated to this equation for sub-critical masses. As a consequence, we recover the recent result about the global in time existence of weak-solutions to the modified Patlak-Keller-Segel equation for the logarithmic interaction kernel in any dimension in the sub-critical case. Moreover, we show how this method performs numerically in one dimension. In this particular case, this numerical scheme corresponds to a standard implicit Euler method for the pseudo-inverse of the cumulative distribution function. We demonstrate its capabilities to reproduce easily without the need of mesh-refinement the blow-up of solutions for super-critical masses.

Enabling dCache to use preexistent mass storage systems

A mesura que la investigació depèn cada vegada més dels computadors, l'emmagatzematge de dades comença a convertir-se en un recurs escàs per als projectes, i suposa una gran part del cost total. Alguns projectes intenten resoldre aquest problema emprant emmagatzament distribuït. És doncs necessari que alguns centres proveeixin de grans quantitats d'emmagatzematge massiu de baix cost basat en cintes magnètiques. L'inconvenient d'aquesta solució és que el rendiment disminueix, particularment a l'hora de tractar-se de grans quantitats d'arxius petits. El nostre objectiu és crear un híbrid entre un sistema d'alt cost i rendiment basat en discs, i un de baix cost i rendiment basat en cintes. Per això, unirem dCache, un sistema d'emmagatzematge distribuït, amb Castor, un sistema d'emmagatzematge jeràrquic, creant sistemes de fitxers virtuals que contindran grans quantitats d'arxius petits per millorar el rendiment global del sistema.

Critical mass for a Patlak-Keller-Segel model with degenerate diffusion in higher dimensions

"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt."

The new role of the mass media in the construction of sport and Olympic values

This paper was presented in the International Symposium on Toward the Creation of New-Sport Cultures, undertaken in Osaka, Japan, in January 28, 1996. The main purpose is to make an interpretation of the cultural values of sport and Olympism in contemporary society, considering the enormous influence that the media have on them.