30 resultados para Power-to-Gas (P2G)
em Consorci de Serveis Universitaris de Catalunya (CSUC), Spain
Resumo:
Abstract.
Resumo:
This paper studies the duration pattern of xed-term contracts and the determinantsof their conversion into permanent ones in Spain, where the share of xed-termemployment is the highest in Europe. We estimate a duration model for temporaryemployment, with competing risks of terminating into permanent employment versusalternative states, and exible duration dependence. We nd that conversion rates aregenerally below 10%. Our estimated conversion rates roughly increase with tenure,with a pronounced spike at the legal limit, when there is no legal way to retain theworker on a temporary contract. We argue that estimated di¤erences in conversionrates across categories of workers can stem from di¤erences in worker outside optionsand thus the power to credibly threat to quit temporary jobs.
Resumo:
A mathematical model of the voltage drop which arises in on-chip power distribution networks is used to compare the maximum voltage drop in the case of different geometric arrangements of the pads supplying power to the chip. These include the square or Manhattan power pad arrangement, which currently predominates, as well as equilateral triangular and hexagonal arrangements. In agreement with the findings in the literature and with physical and SPICE models, the equilateral triangular power pad arrangement is found to minimize the maximum voltage drop. This headline finding is a consequence of relatively simple formulas for the voltage drop, with explicit error bounds, which are established using complex analysis techniques, and elliptic functions in particular.
Resumo:
A mathematical model of the voltage drop which arises in on-chip power distribution networks is used to compare the maximum voltage drop in the case of different geometric arrangements of the pads supplying power to the chip. These include the square or Manhattan power pad arrangement, which currently predominates, as well as equilateral triangular and hexagonal arrangements. In agreement with the findings in the literature and with physical and SPICE models, the equilateral triangular power pad arrangement is found to minimize the maximum voltage drop. This headline finding is a consequence of relatively simple formulas for the voltage drop, with explicit error bounds, which are established using complex analysis techniques, and elliptic functions in particular.
Resumo:
Shrimps are produced in two different ways. They are fished in the sea (sometimes at the cost of turtle destruction) or they are "farmed" in ponds in coastal areas. Such aquaculture is increasing around the world as shrimps become a valuable item of world trade. Mangrove forests are sacrificed for commercial shrimp farming. This paper considers the conflict between mangrove conservation and shrimp exports in different countries.Who has title to the mangroves, who wins and who loses in this tragedy of enclosures? Which languages of valuation are used by different actors in order to compare the increase in shrimp exports and the losses in livelihoods and in environmental services? The economic valuation of damages is only one of the possible languages of valuation which are relevant in practice. Who has the power to impose a particular language of valuation?
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In this article some historical and contemporary environmental conflicts are described. The international environmental liability of mining corporations is discussed. Comparisons are made with conflicts in the United States and in South Africa which fall under the rubric of the Environmental Justice movement. Such conflicts are fought out in many languages, and the economic valuation of damages is only one of such languages. Who has the power to impose particular languages of valuation? Who rules over the ways and means of simplifying complexity, deciding that some points of view are out of order? Who has power to determine which is the bottom-line in an environmental discussion?
Resumo:
We study how personal relations affect performance in organizations. In the experimental game we use a manager has to assign different degrees of decision power to two employees. These two employees then have to make distributive decisions which affect themselves and the manager. Our focus is on the effects on managers' assignment of decision power and on employees' distributive decisions of one of the employees and the manager knowing each other personally. Our evidence shows that managers tend to favor employees that they personally know and that these employees tend, more than other employees, to favor the manager in their distributive decisions. However, this behavior does not affect the performance of the employees that do not know the manager. All these effects are independent of whether the employees that know the manager are more or less productive than those who do not know the manager. The results shed light on discrimination and nepotism and its consequences for the performance of family firms and other organizations.
Resumo:
This paper studies price determination in pharmaceutical markets using data for 25 countries, six years and a comprehensive list of products from the MIDAS IMS database. We show that market power and the quality of the product has a significantly positive impact of prices. The nationality of the producer appears to have a small and often insignificant impact on prices, which suggests that countries which regulates prices have relatively little power to do it in a way that advances narrow national interest. We produce a theoretical explanation for this phenomenon based on the fact that low negotiated prices in a country would have a knock-on effect in other markets, and is thus strongly resisted by producers. Another key finding is that the U.S. has prices that are not significantly higher than those of countries with similar income levels. This, together with the former observation on the effect of the nationality of producers casts doubt on the ability of countries to purs
Resumo:
This paper analyzes the delegation of contracting capacity in a moral hazard environment with sequential production in a project which involves a principal and two agents. The agent in charge of the nal production can obtain soft information about the other agent's effort choice by investing in monitoring. I investigate the circumstances under which it is optimal for the principal to use a centralized organization in which she designs the contracts with both agents or to use a decentralized organization in which she contracts only one agent, and delegates the power to contract the other agent. It is shown that in this setting a decentralized organization can be superior to a centralized organization. This is because the principal is better off under monitoring and the incentives for an agent to invest in monitoring can be higher in a decentralized organization. The circumstances under which this is true are related to the monitoring costs and the importance of each agent for production. The results explain the recent application of the design-build method in public procurement. Journal of Economic Literature Classi cation Numbers: D23, D82, L14, L22. Keywords: Decentralization of Contracting, Monitoring, Moral Hazard.
Resumo:
En aquest projecte s’han unificat les dades de l’empresa Solmania i s’han generat estadístiques i informes a diferents formats mitjançant una aplicació RIA implementada amb Adobe Flex. D’aquesta manera es pot fer un control dels paràmetres clau del negoci per ajudar a la companyia a aconseguir els objectius marcats d’una manera eficient. L’aplicatiu permet analitzar des de diversos punts de vista qualsevol tipus d’informació que genera el negoci i fer-ne comparatives de rendiment.
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This paper addresses the puzzle of why legislation, even highly inefficient legislation, may pass with overwhelming majorities. We model a egislature in which the same agenda setter serves for two periods, showing how he can exploit a legislature (completely) in the first period by romising future benefits to legislators who support him. In equilibrium, large majority of legislators vote for the first-period proposal because a ote in favor maintains the chance for membership in the minimum winning coalition in the future. The model thus generates situations in which egislators approve policies by large majorities, or even unanimously, that enefit few, or even none, of them. The results are robust: some institutional arrangements, such as super-majority rules or sequential voting, imit but do not eliminate the agenda setter's power to exploit the legislature, and other institutions such as secret voting do not limit his power.
Resumo:
Education and health policy are two of the public policies, which in Spain have been assigned to the Autonomous Communities (AC). This transfer of powers could be considered a proof for the strong “self-rule” of the AC, which in turn shows that Spain could be classified as a federal state. In the following analysis the authors in some parts disagree with that conclusion, showing that considering the education area Spain is “heavy at the top”. Due to the state’s exclusive power to regulate the basic conditions guaranteeing the equality of all Spanish citizens, the important and final decisions are taken at the center through the framework legislation. The AC play a minor role in the legislation process, they have to adopt the center decisions. De-centralization and extension of the framework legislation are highly connected: The central state reacted with strong framework legislation to the stages of the educational decentralization process. In addition, the concentration of important framing powers within the central state does not make educational reforms more infrequent. However, such reforms are the results of a competition between the parties, and not between the AC or between the AC and the central state
Resumo:
Aquesta recerca té com a objecte d'estudi la utilització dels mitjans de comunicació per a finalitats polítiques i intenta analitzar la relació que els polítics professionals mantenen amb els mitjans i com aquests poden ser importants dins d'un procés polític-electoral i per a la formació de l'opinió pública. El nostre objectiu general és, entre d’altres, analitzar l'estructura d’aquests mitjans i grups polítics i descriure com estan situats, utilitzant com a exemple l'estat del Rio Grande do Norte (RN), al Nord-est de Brasil. Partint de les preguntes, ¿a qui pertanyen els mitjans de comunicació i qui té el poder d'informar en l'aquest Estat? anem construïm el marc teòric, analitzant el monopoli i oligopoli en la comunicació a Brasil, especialment a la radiodifusió, en la qual hi ha una gran concentració de concessions públiques en propietat dels polítics professionals amb mandats electius i/o de grups partidaris, què pot ser anomenat de ‘coronelismo electrònic’
Resumo:
This paper studies price determination in pharmaceutical markets using data for 25 countries, six years and a comprehensive list of products from the MIDAS IMS database. We show that market power and the quality of the product has a significantly positive impact of prices. The nationality of the producer appears to have a small and often insignificant impact on prices, which suggests that countries which regulates prices have relatively little power to do it in a way that advances narrow national interest. We produce a theoretical explanation for this phenomenon based on the fact that low negotiated prices in a country would have a knock-on effect in other markets, and is thus strongly resisted by producers.Another key finding is that the U.S. has prices that are not significantly higher than those of countries with similar income levels. This, together with the former observation on the effect of the nationality of producers casts doubt on the ability of countries to pursue "free-riding" regulation.
Resumo:
We investigate the impact of 20th--century European colonizationon growth in Africa. We find that in the 1960--88 period growth has beenfaster for dependencies than for colonies; for British and Frenchcolonies than for Portuguese, Belgian and Italian ones; and for countrieswith less economic penetration during the colonial period. On average,African growth accelerates after decolonization. Proxies for colonialheritage add explanatory power to growth regressions and make indicatorsfor human capital, political and ethnic instability lose significance.Colonial variables capture the same effects of a sub--Saharan dummy andreduce its significance when jointly included in a cross sectionalregression with 98 countries.