Stock market volatility and learning

Introducing bounded rationality in a standard consumption-based asset pricing model with time separable preferences strongly improves empirical performance. Learning causes momentum and mean reversion of returns and thereby excess volatility, persistence of price-dividend ratios, long-horizon return predictability and a risk premium, as in the habit model of Campbell and Cochrane (1999), but for lower risk aversion. This is obtained, even though our learning scheme introduces just one free parameter and we only consider learning schemes that imply small deviations from full rationality. The findings are robust to the learning rule used and other model features. What is key is that agents forecast future stock prices using past information on prices.

Stock market integration between new EU member states and the Euro-zone

This paper measures the degree in stock market integration between five Eastern European countries and the Euro-zone. A potentially gradual transition in correlations is accommodated by smooth transition conditional correlation models. We find that the correlation between stock markets has increased from 2001 to 2007. In particular, the Czech and Polish markets show a higher correlation to the Euro-zone. However, this is not a broad-based phenomenon across Eastern Europe. We also find that the increase in correlations is not a reflection of a world-wide phenomenon of financial integration but appears to be specific to the European market. JEL classifications: C32; C51; F36; G15 Keywords: Multivariate GARCH; Smooth Transition Conditional Correlation; Stock Return Comovement; New EU Members.

Free Flows, Limited Diversification: Explaining the Fall and Rise of Stock Market Correlations, 1890-2001

Using a new dataset on capital account openness, we investigate why equity return correlations changed over the last century. Based on a new, long-run dataset on capital account regulations in a group of 16 countries over the period 1890-2001, we show that correlations increase as financial markets are liberalized. These findings are robust to controlling for both the Forbes-Rigobon bias and global averages in equity return correlations. We test the robustness of our conclusions, and show that greater synchronization of fundamentals is not the main cause of increasing correlations. These results imply that the home bias puzzle may be smaller than traditionally claimed.

A comparison of stock market mechanisms

This paper studies the relationship between the amount of publicinformation that stock market prices incorporate and the equilibriumbehavior of market participants. The analysis is framed in a static, NREEsetup where traders exchange vectors of assets accessing multidimensionalinformation under two alternative market structures. In the first(the unrestricted system), both informed and uninformed speculators cancondition their demands for each traded asset on all equilibrium prices;in the second (the restricted system), they are restricted to conditiontheir demand on the price of the asset they want to trade. I show thatinformed traders incentives to exploit multidimensional privateinformation depend on the number of prices they can condition upon whensubmitting their demand schedules, and on the specific price formationprocess one considers. Building on this insight, I then give conditionsunder which the restricted system is more efficient than the unrestrictedsystem.

With a bang, not a whimper: Pricking Germany's "stock market bubble" in 1927 and the slide into depression

In May 1927, the German central bank intervenedindirectly to reduce lending to equity investors.The crash that followed ended the only stockmarket boom during Germany s relative stabilization 1924-28. This paper examines thefactors that lead to the intervention as well asits consequences. We argue that genuine concernabout the exuberant level of the stock market,in addition to worries about an inflow offoreign funds, tipped the scales in favour ofintervention. The evidence strongly suggeststhat the German central bank under HjalmarSchacht was wrong to be concerned aboutstockprices-there was no bubble. Also, theReichsbank was mistaken in its belief thata fall in the market would reduce theimportance of short-term foreign borrowing,and help to ease conditions in the money market.The misguided intervention had important realeffects. Investment suffered, helping to tipGermany into depression.

Pension plan funding and stock market efficiency

The paper argues that the market signifficantly overvalues firms with severely underfunded pension plans. These companies earn lower stock returns than firms with healthier pension plans for at least five years after the first emergence of the underfunding. The low returns are not explained by risk, price momentum, earnings momentum, or accruals. Further, the evidence suggests that investors do not anticipate the impact of the pension liability on future earnings, and they are surprised when the negative implications of underfunding ultimately materialize. Finally, underfunded firms have poor operating performance, and they earn low returns, although they are value companies.

Is bank debt special for the transmission of monetary policy? Evidence from the stock market

We combine existing balance sheet and stock market data with two new datasets to studywhether, how much, and why bank lending to firms matters for the transmission of monetarypolicy. The first new dataset enables us to quantify the bank dependence of firms precisely,as the ratio of bank debt to total assets. We show that a two standard deviation increase inthe bank dependence of a firm makes its stock price about 25% more responsive to monetarypolicy shocks. We explore the channels through which this effect occurs, and find that thestock prices of bank-dependent firms that borrow from financially weaker banks display astronger sensitivity to monetary policy shocks. This finding is consistent with the banklending channel, a theory according to which the strength of bank balance sheets mattersfor monetary policy transmission. We construct a new database of hedging activities andshow that the stock prices of bank-dependent firms that hedge against interest rate riskdisplay a lower sensitivity to monetary policy shocks. This finding is consistent with aninterest rate pass-through channel that operates via the direct transmission of policy ratesto lending rates associated with the widespread use of floating-rates in bank loans and creditline agreements.

Testing the bivariate distribution of daily equity returns using copulas: an application to the Spanish stock market

In this paper we deal with the identification of dependencies between time series of equity returns. Marginal distribution functions are assumed to be known, and a bivariate chi-square test of fit is applied in a fully parametric copula approach. Several families of copulas are fitted and compared with Spanish stock market data. The results show that the t-copula generally outperforms other dependence structures, and highlight the difficulty in adjusting a significant number of bivariate data series

Testing the bivariate distribution of daily equity returns using copulas: an application to the Spanish stock market

In this paper we deal with the identification of dependencies between time series of equity returns. Marginal distribution functions are assumed to be known, and a bivariate chi-square test of fit is applied in a fully parametric copula approach. Several families of copulas are fitted and compared with Spanish stock market data. The results show that the t-copula generally outperforms other dependence structures, and highlight the difficulty in adjusting a significant number of bivariate data series

The effects of monetary policy on stock market bubbles: Some evidence

We estimate the response of stock prices to exogenous monetary policy shocks usinga vector-autoregressive model with time-varying parameters. Our evidence points toprotracted episodes in which, after a a short-run decline, stock prices increase persistently in response to an exogenous tightening of monetary policy. That responseis clearly at odds with the "conventional" view on the effects of monetary policy onbubbles, as well as with the predictions of bubbleless models. We also argue that it isunlikely that such evidence be accounted for by an endogenous response of the equitypremium to the monetary policy shocks.

Contagion or Interdependence in the recent Global Financial Crisis? An application to the stock markets using unconditional cross-market correlations

We consider stock market contagion as a significant increase in cross-market linkages after a shock to one country or group of countries. Under this definition we study if contagion occurred from the U.S. Financial Crisis to the rest of the major stock markets in the world by using the adjusted (unconditional) correlation coefficient approach (Forbes and Rigobon, 2002) which consists of testing if average crossmarket correlations increase significantly during the relevant period of turmoil. We would not reject the null hypothesis of interdependence in favour of contagion if the increase in correlation only suggests a continuation of high linkages in all state of the world. Moreover, if contagion occurs, this would justify the intervention of the IMF and the suddenly portfolio restructuring during the period under study.

A century of global equity market correlations

In this paper, we use a unique long-run dataset of regulatory constraints on capital account openness to explain stock market correlations. Since stock returns themselves are highly volatile, any examination of what drives correlations needs to focus on long runs of data. This is particularly true since some of the short-term changes in co-movements appear to reverse themselves (Delroy Hunter 2005). We argue that changes in the co-movement of indices have not been random. Rather, they are mainly driven by greater freedom to move funds from one country to another. In related work, Geert Bekaert and Campbell Harvey (2000) show that equity correlations increase after liberalization of capital markets, using a number of case studies from emerging countries. We examine this pattern systematically for the last century, and find it to be most pronounced in the recent past. We compare the importance of capital account openness with one main alternative explanation, the growing synchronization of economic fundamentals. We conclude that greater openness has been the single most important cause of growing correlations during the last quarter of a century, though increasingly correlated economic fundamentals also matter. In the conclusion, we offer some thoughts on why the effects of greater openness appear to be so much stronger today than they were during the last era of globalization before 1914.

Earnings management in Spain. Some evidence from companies quoted in the Spanish stock exchange

After the accounting scandals that have taken place mainly in the UnitedStates during the last years, some Spanish leading authorities havedefended the idea that this kind of accounting problems cannot happen inSpain. They argue that accounting regulation in Europe, and specificallyin Spain, make more difficult the use of creative accounting practices.The objective of this paper is to identify some evidence about thesituacion in Spain. The study tries to demonstrate that some accountingpractices of several of the companies quoted in the Spanish Stock Exchangecould be qualified as earnings management.To carry out this study, the authors have analysed the accounts of the 35companies included in the stock market index IBEX 35. This index iscalculated with the share prices variations of the most importantcompanies quoted in the Spanish Stock Exchange.

A nonlinear threshold model for the dependence of extremes of stationary sequences

One of the main implications of the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) is that expected future returns on financial assets are not predictable if investors are risk neutral. In this paper we argue that financial time series offer more information than that this hypothesis seems to supply. In particular we postulate that runs of very large returns can be predictable for small time periods. In order to prove this we propose a TAR(3,1)-GARCH(1,1) model that is able to describe two different types of extreme events: a first type generated by large uncertainty regimes where runs of extremes are not predictable and a second type where extremes come from isolated dread/joy events. This model is new in the literature in nonlinear processes. Its novelty resides on two features of the model that make it different from previous TAR methodologies. The regimes are motivated by the occurrence of extreme values and the threshold variable is defined by the shock affecting the process in the preceding period. In this way this model is able to uncover dependence and clustering of extremes in high as well as in low volatility periods. This model is tested with data from General Motors stocks prices corresponding to two crises that had a substantial impact in financial markets worldwide; the Black Monday of October 1987 and September 11th, 2001. By analyzing the periods around these crises we find evidence of statistical significance of our model and thereby of predictability of extremes for September 11th but not for Black Monday. These findings support the hypotheses of a big negative event producing runs of negative returns in the first case, and of the burst of a worldwide stock market bubble in the second example. JEL classification: C12; C15; C22; C51 Keywords and Phrases: asymmetries, crises, extreme values, hypothesis testing, leverage effect, nonlinearities, threshold models

La crisi sub-prime i el crack de 1929: Comparació d'episodis d'eufòria financera

Treball de recerca realitzat per un alumne d'ensenyament secundari i guardonat amb un Premi CIRIT per fomentar l'esperit científic del Jovent l'any 2009. La present investigació té per objecte d’estudi la relació, atès el període de turbulències econòmiques que travessa el món globalitzat, entre els episodis d’eufòria financera i les crisi financeres i econòmiques, i la periodicitat amb les que aquestes es produeixen. Aquesta pretén confrontar-se des d’una aproximació històric-econòmica, mitjançant l’anàlisi i la comparació de dos successos -el crack borsari de 1929 i la crisi sub-prime- per tal de demostrar la existència de comuns denominadors, i, a la llum dels resultats, apreciar les conclusions que aporta la Història. Serà, doncs, aquesta periodicitat i les seves implicacions la qual s'ambicionarà contrastar amb la realitat mitjançant l'aplicació i l'anàlisi pràctica de dos episodis rellevants i paradigmàtics, amb el recolzament i l'autoritat del model comparatiu establerts per l'economista John Kenneth Galbraith al seu llibre ''Breve historia de la euforia financiera''.