Public screens

Creació d'un sistema amb terminals repartits per diverses ubicacions. Aquests terminals serviran per mostrar informació en determinats establiments comercials segons les necessitats del client.

Heterogeneous information and trade policy

Protectionism enjoys surprising popular support, in spite of deadweight losses. At thesame time, trade barriers appear to decline with public information about protection.This paper develops an electoral model with heterogeneously informed voters whichexplains both facts and predicts the pattern of trade policy across industries. In themodel, each agent endogenously acquires more information about his sector of employment. As a result, voters support protectionism, because they learn more about thetrade barriers that help them as producers than those that hurt them as consumers.In equilibrium, asymmetric information induces a universal protectionist bias. Thestructure of protection is Pareto inefficient, in contrast to existing models. The modelpredicts a Dracula effect: trade policy for a sector is less protectionist when there ismore public information about it. Using a measure of newspaper coverage across industries, I find that cross-sector evidence from the United States bears out my theoreticalpredictions.

A Folk Theorem for Games when Frequent Monitoring Decreases Noise

This paper studies frequent monitoring in an infinitely repeated game with imperfect public information and discounting, where players observe the state of a continuous time Brownian process at moments in time of length _. It shows that a limit folk theorem can be achieved with imperfect public monitoring when players monitor each other at the highest frequency, i.e., _. The approach assumes that the expected joint output depends exclusively on the action profile simultaneously and privately decided by the players at the beginning of each period of the game, but not on _. The strong decreasing effect on the expected immediate gains from deviation when the interval between actions shrinks, and the associated increase precision of the public signals, make the result possible in the limit. JEL: C72/73, D82, L20. KEYWORDS: Repeated Games, Frequent Monitoring, Public Monitoring, Brownian Motion.

Localitzador Gràfic d' Adreces IP

Aquest projecte estudia el problema de l'extracció i la visualització de manera entenedora de la informació pública més rellevant d'una adreça IP, tot i que no aborda els problemes relacionats amb la informació insuficient perquè pertanyen a un àmbit de recerca diferent.

Vladimir ha dit... Identitat, xarxes socials i ciberperdiodisme en els blocs. Una construcció de la intersubjectivitat dins la nova Internet

DEA (tesina) que analitza quin és el paper que juguen els blocs dintre de la Web 2.0, articulant-se al voltant de tres eixos: la creació de la identitat virtual, les xarxes socials generades a través de la blocosfera i les implicacions econòmiques i socials que se'n deriven. La pregunta central és de quina manera, si ho fan, els blocs contribueixen a modificar fòrmules de lectura i participació tant d'àmbit personal com públic en les agendes informatives. I si aquesta participació genera canvis significatius a nivell econòmic i psicosocial.

Net Neutrality and other challenges for the future of the Internet. Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Internet, Law & Politics. Universitat Oberta de Catalunya, Barcelona, 11-12 July, 2011

Peer-reviewed

Emergency Management in the United States of America

Core capabilities are under the above mission areas as outlined in the National Preparedness Goal. Planning, Public Information and Warning, and Operational Coordination cut across all five mission areas. Without these three cross-cutting capabilities, the other capabilities might not be achieved or could be weakened. Other core capabilities are aligned under a specific mission area, based on where it had the most relevance. Core capabilities alignment: Prevention capabilities focus on things related to preventing an imminent terrorist attack; by imminent, we mean an attack that is about to happen ; Protection capabilities focus on security— making sure things, systems, and people are protected ; Mitigation capabilities focus on risk, resilience and building a culture of preparedness; Response capabilities focus on meeting a community’s immediate needs when disaster strikes and finally, recovery capabilities focus on getting communities back on their feet.

The effects of poor financial information systems on the long term sustainability of local public services. Empirical evidence from the Catalan Municipalities

In this paper we describe the existence of financial illusion in public accountingand we comment on its effects for the future sustainability of local publicservices. We relate these features to the lack of incentives amongst publicmanagers for improving the financial reporting and thus management of publicassets. Financial illusion pays off for politicians and managers since it allowsfor larger public expenditure increases and managerial slack, these beingarguments in their utility functions. This preference is strengthen by the shorttime perspective of politically appointed public managers. Both factors runagainst public accountability. This hypothesis is tested for Spain by using anunique sample. We take data from around forty Catalan local authorities withpopulation above 20,000 for the financial years 1993-98. We build this databasis from the Catalan Auditing Office Reports in a way that it can be linkedto some other local social and economic variables in order to test ourassumptions. The results confirm that there is a statistical relationship between the financialillusion index (FI as constructed in the paper) and higher current expenditure.This reflects on important overruns and increases of the delay in payingsuppliers, as well as on a higher difficulties to face capital finance. Mechanismsfor FI creation have to do among other factors, with delays in paying suppliers(and thereafter higher future financial costs per unit of service), no adequateprovision for bad debts and lack of appropriate capital funding either forreposition or for new equipments. For this, it is crucial to monitor the way inwhich capital transfers are accounted in local public sheet balances. As a result,for most of the Municipalities we analyse, the funds for guaranteeing continuityand sustainability of public services provision are today at risk.Given managerial incentives at present in public institutions, we conclude thatpublic regulation recently enforced for assuring better information systems inlocal public management may not be enough to change the current state of affairs.

Management information systems: The balanced scorecard in Spanish public universities

Organisations are becoming increasingly aware of the need for management information systems, due largely to the changing environment and a continuous process of globalisation. All of this means that managers need to adapt the structures of their organisations to the changes and, therefore, to plan, control and manage better. The Spanish public university cannot avoid this changing (demographic, economic and social changes) and globalising (among them the convergence of European qualifications) environment, to which we must add the complex organisation structure, characterised by a high dispersion of authority for decision making in different collegiate and unipersonal organs. It seems obvious that these changes must have repercussions on the direction, organisation and management structures of those public higher education institutions, and it seems natural that, given this environment, the universities must adapt their present management systems to the demand by society for the quality and suitability of the services they provide.

Barriers to innovation and public policy in Catalonia

The present paper analyses the link between firms’ decisions to innovate and the barriers that prevent them from being innovative. The aim is twofold. First, it analyses three groups of barriers to innovation: the cost of innovation projects, lack of knowledge and market conditions. Second, it presents the main steps taken by Catalan Government to promote the creation of new firms and to reduce barriers to innovation. The data set used is based on the 2004 official innovation survey of Catalonia which was taken from the Spanish CIS-4 sample. This sample includes individual information on 2,954 Catalan firms in manufacturing industries and knowledge-intensive services (KIS). The empirical analysis reveals pronounced differences regarding a firm’s propensity to innovate and its perception of barriers. Moreover, the results show that cost and knowledge barriers seem to be the most important and that there are substantial sectoral differences in the way that firms react to barriers. The results of this paper have important implications for the design of future public policy to promote entrepreneurship and innovation together.

Public policy for entrepreneurship and innovation: impact in managed and entrepreneurial economies

Many of the most advanced economies of the world have undergone significant transformation in the last few decades. Globalization and technological changes, especially developments in information technologies, have helped to stimulate this transformation. These have contributed to changing institutional frameworks in many respects within the economies including adjustments to economic policies. The results of these transformations take many different forms and are manifested in different areas of an economy. At the heart of these changes however, has been the increasingly important role of entrepreneurship in the economy. The transformed ("new") economy stimulates and supports activities in innovation and entrepreneurship and is labelled the entrepreneurial economy. The "old" economy on the other hand restricts such activities and is referred to as the managed economy (Audretsch & Thurik, 2001).

Public and private learning from prices, strategic substitutability and complementarity, and equilibrium multiplicity

We study a general static noisy rational expectations model where investors have private information about asset payoffs, with common and private components, and about their own exposure to an aggregate risk factor, and derive conditions for existence and uniqueness (or multiplicity) of equilibria. We find that a main driver of the characterization of equilibria is whether the actions of investors are strategic substitutes or complements. This latter property in turn is driven by the strength of a private learning channel from prices, arising from the multidimensional sources of asymmetric information, in relation to the usual public learning channel. When the private learning channel is strong (weak) in relation to the public we have strong (weak) strategic complementarity in actions and potentially multiple (unique) equilibria. The results enable a precise characterization of whether information acquisition decisions are strategic substitutes or complements. We find that the strategic substitutability in information acquisition result obtained in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) is robust. JEL Classification: D82, D83, G14 Keywords: Rational expectations equilibrium, asymmetric information, risk exposure, hedging, supply information, information acquisition.

Public Monitoring with Uncertainty in the Time Repetitions

This paper study repeated games where the time repetitions of the stage game are not known or controlled by the players. We call this feature random monitoring. Kawamori's (2004) shows that perfect random monitoring is always better than the canonical case. Surprisingly, when the monitoring is public, the result is less clear-cut and does not generalize in a straightforward way. Unless the public signals are sufficiently informative about player's actions and/or players are patient enough. In addition to a discount effect, that tends to consistently favor the provision of incentives, we found an information effect, associated with the time uncertainty on the distribution of public signals. Whether payoff improvements are or not possible, depends crucially on the direction and strength of these effects. JEL: C73, D82, D86. KEYWORDS: Repeated Games, Frequent Monitoring, Random Public Monitoring, Moral Hazard, Stochastic Processes.

Creació d'un sistema de gestió d'averies en un Sistema d'Informació Geográfica de distribució d'aigües creat amb Geomedia Public Works

L'objectiu d'aquest document serà el de desenvolupar, progressivament des dels aspectes genèrics fins el detall, la realització pràctica requerida a l'elaboració del SIG.

Creació d'un sistema de gestió d'avaries en un sistema d'informació geogràfica de distribució d'aigües creat amb GEOMEDIA PUBLIC WORKS

Aquesta memòria representa la documentacó d'un treball de recerca i desenvolupament sobre un sistema d'informació geogràfica (SIG)