One kind of lawlessness: estimating the welfare cost of Somali piracy

This paper estimates the effect of piracy attacks on shipping costs using a unique data set on shipping contracts in the dry bulk market. We look at shipping routes whose shortest path exposes them to piracy attacks and find that the increase in attacks in 2008 lead to around a ten percent increase in shipping costs. We use this estimate to get a sense of the welfare loss imposed by piracy. Our intermediate estimate suggests that the creation of $120 million of revenue for pirates in the Somalia area led to a welfare loss of over $1.5 billion.

Empresas militares y de seguridad y el derecho internacional humanitario

Este es el objeto de la presente investigación: analizar de qué manera y hasta qué punto el fenómeno EMSP queda cubierto y le son aplicables las normas de derecho internacional humanitario. Para ello, dividimos el trabajo en tres grandes partes. La primera, de carácter introductorio, hace un repaso sobre el fenómeno clásico del mercenarismo y cómo la respuesta que le ha dado el derecho internacional no solo ha sido tardía, sino que no resulta de excesiva utilidad para los modernos contratistas privados. En la segunda parte abordamos el origen, proliferación y funciones de las empresas militares y de seguridad privadas, así como las diferencias que las caracterizan en comparación con el mercenarismo clásico. Asimismo, tratamos de dilucidar cuál debería ser el estatuto jurídico de estas personas en el contexto de su participación en conflictos armados, cuestión que no tiene una respuesta clara y que seguramente se encuentra entre los más claros argumentos a favor de una regulación ad hoc del fenómeno. Finalmente, el segundo capítulo se cierra con un breve análisis de las distintas iniciativas de regulación a las que hemos hecho referencia en el párrafo anterior. La tercera parte del estudio analiza de forma pormenorizada los principios y normas de derecho internacional humanitario que se ven afectadas por la presencia y participación de EMSP en conflictos armados. Tomando como base normativa el derecho humanitario consuetudinario que ha sido identificado por el CICR (Henckaerts y Doswald Beck 2007), y teniendo en cuenta tanto la práctica conocida como las propuestas regulatorias mencionadas, este capítulo identifica los grados de exigibilidad de las principales normas de derecho humanitario a las EMSP. Terminamos con las pertinentes conclusiones, de las que se va a desprender un deber genérico de respeto del derecho internacional humanitario tanto por la empresa como por sus empleados; un principio que solo se exceptúa en aquellas normas de derecho humanitario que solo corresponde aplicar al estado soberano en tanto que tal y que cabe matizar en algunas otras. Observaremos sin embargo que la inmensa mayoría de los principios y normas de derecho internacional humanitario son perfectamente aplicables y deberían ser exigibles a las EMSP y sus empleados.

Las empresas militares y de seguridad privadas ante el derecho internacional de los derechos humanos: su actuación en el conflicto iraquí

La externalización mediante actores privados del uso de la fuerza en conflictos internos e internacionales es un fenómeno creciente que el artículo analiza desde la perspectiva de sus repercusiones en el respeto de las normas internacionales de protección de los derechos humanos y tomando como caso de estudio en conflicto en Irak.

The private and fiscal returns to schooling and the effect of public policies on private incentives to invest in education: a general framework and some results for the EU

This paper develops a comprehensive framework for the quantitative analysis of the private and fiscal returns to schooling and of the effect of public policies on private incentives to invest in education. This framework is applied to 14 member states of the European Union. For each of these countries, we construct estimates of the private return to an additional year of schooling for an individual of average attainment, taking into account the effects of education on wages and employment probabilities after allowing for academic failure rates, the direct and opportunity costs of schooling, and the impact of personal taxes, social security contributions and unemployment and pension benefits on net incomes. We also construct a set of effective tax and subsidy rates that measure the effects of different public policies on the private returns to education, and measures of the fiscal returns to schooling that capture the long-term effects of a marginal increase in attainment on public finances under c

The Private and fiscal returns to schooling and the effect of public policies on private incentives to invest in education: a general framework and some results for the EU

This paper develops a comprehensive framework for the quantitative analysis of the private and fiscal returns to schooling and of the effect of public policies on private incentives to invest in education. This framework is applied to 14 member states of the European Union. For each of these countries, we construct estimates of the private return to an additional year of schooling for an individual of average attainment, taking into account the effects of education on wages and employment probabilities after allowing for academic failure rates, the direct and opportunity costs of schooling, and the impact of personal taxes, social security contributions and unemployment and pension benefits on net incomes. We also construct a set of effective tax and subsidy rates that measure the effects of different public policies on the private returns to education, and measures of the fiscal returns to schooling that capture the long-term effects of a marginal increase in attainment on public finances under conditions that approximate general equilibrium.

Food security, food safety and small farmers

Some of the elements that characterize the globalization of food and agriculture are industrialization and intensification of agriculture and liberalization of agricultural markets, that favours elongation of the food chain and homogenization of food habits (nutrition transition), among other impacts. As a result, the probability of food contamination has increased with the distance and the number of “hands" that may contact the food (critical points); the nutritional quality of food has been reduced because of increased transport and longer periods of time from collection to consumption; and the number of food-related diseases due to changes in eating patterns has increased. In this context, there exist different agencies and regulations intended to ensure food safety at different levels, e.g. at the international level, Codex Alimentarius develops standards and regulations for the marketing of food in a global market. Although governments determine the legal framework, the food industry manages the safety of their products, and thus, develops its own standards for their marketing, such as the Good Agricultural Practices (GAP) programs. The participation of the private sector in the creation of regulatory standards strengthens the free trade of food products, favouring mostly large agribusiness companies. These standards are in most cases unattainable for small producers and food safety regulations are favouring removal of the peasantry and increase concentration and control in the food system by industrial actors. Particularly women, who traditionally have been in charge of the artisanal transformation process, can be more affected by these norms than men. In this project I am analysing the impcact of food safety norms over small farms, based on the case of artisanal production made by women in Spain.

Social Security in Theory and Practice (II): Efficiency Theories, Narrative Theories, and Implications for Reform

166 countries have some kind of public old age pension. What economic forces create and sustain old age Social Security as a public program? Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999b) document several of the internationally and historically common features of social security programs, and explore "political" theories of Social Security. This paper discusses the "efficiency theories", which view creation of the SS program as a full of partial solution to some market failure. Efficiency explanations of social security include the "SS as welfare for the elderly" the "retirement increases productivity to optimally manage human capital externalities", "optimal retirement insurance", the "prodigal father problem", the "misguided Keynesian", the "optimal longevity insurance", the "government economizing transaction costs", and the "return on human capital investment". We also analyze four "narrative" theories of social security: the "chain letter theory", the "lump of labor theory", the "monopoly capitalism theory", and the "Sub-but-Nearly-Optimal policy response to private pensions theory". The political and efficiency explanations are compared with the international and historical facts and used to derive implications for replacing the typical pay-as-you-go system with a forced savings plan. Most of the explanations suggest that forced savings does not increase welfare, and may decrease it.

Market versus limit orders in an imperfectly competitive security

This paper analyzes the choice between limit and market orders in animperfectly competitive noisy rational expectations economy. There is a uniqueinsider, who takes into account the effect their trading has on prices. If theinsider behaves as a price taker, she will choose market orders if her privateinformation is very precise and she will choose limit orders otherwise. On thecontrary, if the insider recognizes and exploits her ability to affect themarket price, her optimal choice is to place limit orders whatever the precisionof her private information.

Social security in theory and practice (II): Efficiency theories, narrative theories and implications for reform

166 countries have some kind of public old age pension. What economic forcescreate and sustain old age Social Security as a public program? Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999b) document several of the internationally and historically common features of social security programs, and explore "political" theories of Social Security. This paper discusses the "efficiency theories", which view creation of the SS program as a full of partial solution to some market failure. Efficiency explanations of social security include the "SS as welfare for the elderly" the "retirement increases productivity to optimally manage human capital externalities", "optimal retirement insurance", the "prodigal father problem", the "misguided Keynesian", the "optimal longevity insurance", the "governmenteconomizing transaction costs", and the "return on human capital investment". We also analyze four "narrative" theories of social security: the "chain letter theory", the "lump of labor theory", the "monopoly capitalism theory", and the "Sub-but-Nearly-Optimal policy response to private pensions theory".The political and efficiency explanations are compared with the international and historical facts and used to derive implications for replacing the typical pay-as-you-go system with a forced savings plan. Most of the explanations suggest that forced savings does not increase welfare, and may decrease it.

What social security: Beveridgean or Bismarckian?

Why are Bismarckian social security systems associated with largerpublic pension expenditures, a smaller fraction of private pension andlower income in-equality than Beveridgean systems? These facts arepuzzling for political economy theories of social security whichpredict that Beveridgean systems, involving intra-generationalredistribution, should enjoy larger support among low-income people andthus be larger. This paper explains these features in a bidimensionalpolitical economy model. In an economy with three income groups,low-income support a large, redistributive system; middle-income favoran earning-related system, while high-income oppose any public system,since they have access to a superior saving technology, a privatesystem. We show that, if income inequality is large, the voting majorityof high-income and low-income supports a (small) Beveridgean system,and a large private pillar arises; the opposite occurs with lowinequality. Additionally, when the capital market provides higherreturns, a Beveridgean system is more likely to emerge.

Pay-as-you-go social security and the distribution of bequests

This paper studies the impact of an unfunded social security system on the distribution of bequests in a framework where savings are due both by life cycle and by random altruistic motivations. We show that the impact of social security on the distribution of bequests depends crucially on the importance of the bequest motive in explaining savings behavior. If the bequest motive is strong, then an increase in the social security tax raises the bequests left by altruistic parents. On the other hand, when the importance of bequests in motivating savings is sufficiently low, theincrease in the social security tax could result in a reduction of the bequests left by altruistic parents under some conditions on the attitude of individuals toward risk and on the relative returns associated with private saving and social security. Some implications concerning the transitional effects of introducing an unfunded social security scheme are also discussed.

Security prices and market transparency: the role of prior information

This paper analyzes the role of traders' priors (proper versus improper) on the implications of market transparency by comparing a pre-trade transparent market with an opaque market in a set-up based on Madhavan (1996). We show that prices may be more informative in the opaque market, regardless of how priors are modelled. In contrast, the comparison of market liquidity and volatility in the two market structures are affected by prior specification. Key words: Market microstructure, Transparency, Prior information

Spatial competition between two candidates of different quality: the effects of candidate ideology and private information

This paper examines competition in a spatial model of two-candidate elections, where one candidate enjoys a quality advantage over the other candidate. The candidates care about winning and also have policy preferences. There is two-dimensional private information. Candidate ideal points as well as their tradeoffs between policy preferences and winning are private information. The distribution of this two-dimensional type is common knowledge. The location of the median voter's ideal point is uncertain, with a distribution that is commonly known by both candidates. Pure strategy equilibria always exist in this model. We characterize the effects of increased uncertainty about the median voter, the effect of candidate policy preferences, and the effects of changes in the distribution of private information. We prove that the distribution of candidate policies approaches the mixed equilibrium of Aragones and Palfrey (2002a), when both candidates' weights on policy preferences go to zero.

Not all university degrees yield the same return: private and social returns to higher education for males in Spain

In this paper we use micro data from the Spanish Family Expenditure Survey for 1990 to estimate, for the first time, the private and social rates of return of different university degrees in Spain. We compute internal rates of return and include investment on higher education financed by the public purse to estimate social rates of return. Our main finding is that, as presumed, there is large heterogeneity in rates of return amongst different university