Government information transparency

This paper studies a model of announcements by a privately informed government about the future state of the economic activity in an economy subject to recurrent shocks and with distortions due to income taxation. Although transparent communication would ex ante be desirable, we find that even a benevolent government may ex-post be non-informative, in an attempt to countervail the tax distortion with a "second best" compensating distortion in information. This result provides a rationale for independent national statistical offices, committed to truthful communication. We also find that whether inequality in income distribution favors or harms government transparency depends on labor supply elasticity.

Analyzing shapes as compositions of distances

We propose to analyze shapes as “compositions” of distances in Aitchison geometry asan alternate and complementary tool to classical shape analysis, especially when sizeis non-informative.Shapes are typically described by the location of user-chosen landmarks. Howeverthe shape – considered as invariant under scaling, translation, mirroring and rotation– does not uniquely define the location of landmarks. A simple approach is to usedistances of landmarks instead of the locations of landmarks them self. Distances arepositive numbers defined up to joint scaling, a mathematical structure quite similar tocompositions. The shape fixes only ratios of distances. Perturbations correspond torelative changes of the size of subshapes and of aspect ratios. The power transformincreases the expression of the shape by increasing distance ratios. In analogy to thesubcompositional consistency, results should not depend too much on the choice ofdistances, because different subsets of the pairwise distances of landmarks uniquelydefine the shape.Various compositional analysis tools can be applied to sets of distances directly or afterminor modifications concerning the singularity of the covariance matrix and yield resultswith direct interpretations in terms of shape changes. The remaining problem isthat not all sets of distances correspond to a valid shape. Nevertheless interpolated orpredicted shapes can be backtransformated by multidimensional scaling (when all pairwisedistances are used) or free geodetic adjustment (when sufficiently many distancesare used)

Approximate knowledge of rationality and correlated equilibria

We extend Aumann's theorem [Aumann 1987], deriving correlated equilibria as a consequence of common priors and common knowledge of rationality, by explicitly allowing for non-rational behavior. Wereplace the assumption of common knowledge of rationality with a substantially weaker one, joint p-belief of rationality, where agents believe the other agents are rational with probability p or more. We show that behavior in this case constitutes a kind of correlated equilibrium satisfying certain p-belief constraints, and that it varies continuously in the parameters p and, for p sufficiently close to one,with high probability is supported on strategies that survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. Finally, we extend the analysis to characterizing rational expectations of interimtypes, to games of incomplete information, as well as to the case of non-common priors.

On the number of limit cycles bifurcating from a non-global degenerated center

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Security prices and market transparency: the role of prior information

This paper analyzes the role of traders' priors (proper versus improper) on the implications of market transparency by comparing a pre-trade transparent market with an opaque market in a set-up based on Madhavan (1996). We show that prices may be more informative in the opaque market, regardless of how priors are modelled. In contrast, the comparison of market liquidity and volatility in the two market structures are affected by prior specification. Key words: Market microstructure, Transparency, Prior information

Creating and using a non-dedicated HPC cluster with ParallelKnoppix

This note describes ParallelKnoppix, a bootable CD that allows econometricians with average knowledge of computers to create and begin using a high performance computing cluster for parallel computing in very little time. The computers used may be heterogeneous machines, and clusters of up to 200 nodes are supported. When the cluster is shut down, all machines are in their original state, so their temporary use in the cluster does not interfere with their normal uses. An example shows how a Monte Carlo study of a bootstrap test procedure may be done in parallel. Using a cluster of 20 nodes, the example runs approximately 20 times faster than it does on a single computer.

ParallelKnoppix - Rapid deployment of a linux cluster for MPI parallel processing using non-dedicated computers

This note describes ParallelKnoppix, a bootable CD that allows creation of a Linux cluster in very little time. An experienced user can create a cluster ready to execute MPI programs in less than 10 minutes. The computers used may be heterogeneous machines, of the IA-32 architecture. When the cluster is shut down, all machines except one are in their original state, and the last can be returned to its original state by deleting a directory. The system thus provides a means of using non-dedicated computers to create a cluster. An example session is documented.

Non compact euclidean cone 3-manifolds with cone angles less than 2∏

We study of noncompact Euclidean cone manifolds with cone angles less than c&2π and singular locus a submanifold. More precisely, we describe its structure outside a compact set. As a corol lary we classify those with cone angles & 2π/3 and those with cone angles = 2π/3.

Tropical varieties for non-archimedean analytic spaces

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Cooperative vs. non-cooperative mechanisms in the EU decision making process

According to the account of the European Union (EU) decision making proposed in this paper, this is a bargaining process during which actors shift their policy positions with a view to reaching agreements on controversial issues.