Forecasting the maximum compensation offer in the automobile BI claims negotiation process

Most motor bodily injury (BI) claims are settled by negotiation, with fewer than 5% of cases going to court. A well-defined negotiation strategy is thus very useful for insurance companies. In this paper we assume that the monetary compensation awarded in court is the upper amount to be offered by the insurer in the negotiation process. Using a real database, a log-linear model is implemented to estimate the maximal offer. Non-spherical disturbances are detected. Correlation occurs when various claims are settled in the same judicial verdict. Group wise heteroscedasticity is due to the influence of the forensic valuation on the final compensation amount. An alternative approximation based on generalized inference theory is applied to estimate confidence intervals on variance components, since classical interval estimates may be unreliable for datasets with unbalanced structures.

Individual prediction of automobile bodily injury claims liabilities

[spa] La mayoría de siniestros con daños corporales se liquidan mediante negociación, llegando a juicio menos del 5% de los casos. Una estrategia de negociación bien definida es, por tanto, fundamental para las compañías aseguradoras. En este artículo asumimos que la compensación monetaria concedida en juicio es la máxima cuantía que debería ser ofrecida por el asegurador en el proceso de negociación. Usando una base de datos real, implementamos un modelo log-lineal para estimar la máxima oferta de negociación. Perturbaciones no-esféricas son detectadas. Correlación ocurre cuando más de una siniestro se liquida en la misma sentencia judicial. Heterocedasticidad por grupos se debe a la influencia de la valoración del forense en la indemnización final.

Symmetrically multilateral-bargained allocations in multi-sided assignment markets

[cat] Aquest treball tracta d’extendre la noció d’equilibri simètric de negociació bilateral introduït per Rochford (1983) a jocs d’assignació multilateral. Un pagament corresponent a un equilibri simètric de negociación multilateral (SMB) és una imputación del core que garanteix que qualsevol agent es troba en equilibri respecte a un procés de negociación entre tots els agents basat en allò que cadascun d’ells podria rebre -i fer servir com a amenaça- en un ’matching’ òptim diferent al que s’ha format. Es prova que, en el cas de jocs d’assignació multilaterals, el conjunt de SMB és sempre no buit i que, a diferència del cas bilateral, no sempre coincideix amb el kernel (Davis and Maschler, 1965). Finalment, responem una pregunta oberta per Rochford (1982) tot introduïnt un conjunt basat en la idea de kernel, que, conjuntament amb el core, ens permet caracteritzar el conjunt de SMB.

Individual prediction of automobile bodily injury claims liabilities

[spa] La mayoría de siniestros con daños corporales se liquidan mediante negociación, llegando a juicio menos del 5% de los casos. Una estrategia de negociación bien definida es, por tanto, fundamental para las compañías aseguradoras. En este artículo asumimos que la compensación monetaria concedida en juicio es la máxima cuantía que debería ser ofrecida por el asegurador en el proceso de negociación. Usando una base de datos real, implementamos un modelo log-lineal para estimar la máxima oferta de negociación. Perturbaciones no-esféricas son detectadas. Correlación ocurre cuando más de una siniestro se liquida en la misma sentencia judicial. Heterocedasticidad por grupos se debe a la influencia de la valoración del forense en la indemnización final.

Symmetrically multilateral-bargained allocations in multi-sided assignment markets

[cat] Aquest treball tracta d’extendre la noció d’equilibri simètric de negociació bilateral introduït per Rochford (1983) a jocs d’assignació multilateral. Un pagament corresponent a un equilibri simètric de negociación multilateral (SMB) és una imputación del core que garanteix que qualsevol agent es troba en equilibri respecte a un procés de negociación entre tots els agents basat en allò que cadascun d’ells podria rebre -i fer servir com a amenaça- en un ’matching’ òptim diferent al que s’ha format. Es prova que, en el cas de jocs d’assignació multilaterals, el conjunt de SMB és sempre no buit i que, a diferència del cas bilateral, no sempre coincideix amb el kernel (Davis and Maschler, 1965). Finalment, responem una pregunta oberta per Rochford (1982) tot introduïnt un conjunt basat en la idea de kernel, que, conjuntament amb el core, ens permet caracteritzar el conjunt de SMB.

Análisis mediante ratios financieros de la propiedad bancaria en los nuevos miembros de la UE

El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar como ha evolucionado y los efectos que el tipo de propiedad tiene sobre el desempeño de los bancos en aquellos países de la Europa Central y del Este, que en los últimos años han experimentado con gran intensidad el proceso de integración europea. Con este fin, hemos analizado 242 bancos correspondientes a 12 países (10 nuevos miembros de la UE y 2 en fase de negociación). Para verificar la existencia de un efecto derivado del tipo de propiedad, analizamos las dimensiones de la eficiencia bancaria, rentabilidad, costes, e intermediación, mediante la aplicación de distintas técnicas, tanto paramétricas como no paramétricas. Los resultados muestran la existencia de ciertos efectos derivados del tipo de propiedad. Así, entre los principales resultados, destaca que los bancos privatizados tienden a presentar unos niveles de rentabilidad superiores a los presentados por otros tipos de propiedad, mientras que a su vez, los bancos de origen extranjero son los que de media presentan unos menores niveles de costes, si bien esta diferencia no es estadísticamente significativa. Analizamos también la importancia que supone la presencia de un inversor estratégico en la propiedad de los bancos, obteniendo una mejoría que si bien no es significativa en los ratios de rentabilidad, si lo es en relación a los gastos generales de gestión.

Automated monitoring of medical protocols: a secure and distributed architecture

The control of the right application of medical protocols is a key issue in hospital environments. For the automated monitoring of medical protocols, we need a domain-independent language for their representation and a fully, or semi, autonomous system that understands the protocols and supervises their application. In this paper we describe a specification language and a multi-agent system architecture for monitoring medical protocols. We model medical services in hospital environments as specialized domain agents and interpret a medical protocol as a negotiation process between agents. A medical service can be involved in multiple medical protocols, and so specialized domain agents are independent of negotiation processes and autonomous system agents perform monitoring tasks. We present the detailed architecture of the system agents and of an important domain agent, the database broker agent, that is responsible of obtaining relevant information about the clinical history of patients. We also describe how we tackle the problems of privacy, integrity and authentication during the process of exchanging information between agents.

Does bounded rationality lead to individual heterogeneity? The impact of the experimentation process and of memory constraints

In this paper we explore the effect of bounded rationality on the convergence of individual behavior toward equilibrium. In the context of a Cournot game with a unique and symmetric Nash equilibrium, firms are modeled as adaptive economic agents through a genetic algorithm. Computational experiments show that (1) there is remarkable heterogeneity across identical but boundedly rational agents; (2) such individual heterogeneity is not simply a consequence of the random elements contained in the genetic algorithm; (3) the more rational agents are in terms of memory abilities and pre-play evaluation of strategies, the less heterogeneous they are in their actions. At the limit case of full rationality, the outcome converges to the standard result of uniform individual behavior.

Selecting negotiation processes with Health Care

We address the question of how a third-party payer (e.g. an insurer) decides what providers to contract with. Three different mechanisms are studied and their properties compared. A first mechanism consists in the third-party payer setting up a bargaining procedure with both providers jointly and simultaneously. A second mechanism envisages the outcome of the same simultaneous bargaining but independently with every provider. Finally, the last mechanism is of different nature. It is the so-called "any willing provider" where the third-party payer announces a contract and every provider freely decides to sign it or not. The main finding is that the decision of the third-party payer depends on the surplus to be shared. When it is relatively high the third-party payer prefers the any willing provider system. When, on the contrary, the surplus is relatively low, the third-party payer will select one of the other two systems accor ing to how bargaining power is distributed.

Negotiation advantages of professional associations in health care

In several instances, third-party payers negotiate prices of health care services with providers. We show that a third-party payer may prefer to deal with a professional association than with the sub-set constituted by the more efficient providers, and then apply the same price to all providers. The reason for it is the increase in the bargaining position of providers. The more efficient providers are also the ones with higher profits in the event of negotiation failure. This allows them to ext act a higher surplus from the third-party payer.

Cooperative vs. non-cooperative mechanisms in the EU decision making process

According to the account of the European Union (EU) decision making proposed in this paper, this is a bargaining process during which actors shift their policy positions with a view to reaching agreements on controversial issues.

From creative ideas to new emerging ventures: the process of identification and exploitation among finnish design entrepreneurs

This study focuses on identification and exploitation processes among Finnish design entrepreneurs (i.e. selfemployed industrial designers). More specifically, this study strives to find out what design entrepreneurs do when they create new ventures, how venture ideas are identified and how entrepreneurial processes are organized to identify and exploit such venture ideas in the given industrial context. Indeed, what does educated and creative individuals do when they decide to create new ventures, where do the venture ideas originally come from, and moreover, how are venture ideas identified and developed into viable business concepts that are introduced on the markets? From an academic perspective: there is a need to increase our understanding of the interaction between the identification and exploitation of emerging ventures, in this and other empirical contexts. Rather than assuming that venture ideas are constant in time, this study examines how emerging ideas are adjusted to enable exploitation in dynamic market settings. It builds on the insights from previous entrepreneurship process research. The interpretations from the theoretical discussion build on the assumption that the subprocesses of identification and exploitation interact, and moreover, they are closely entwined with each other (e.g. McKelvie & Wiklund, 2004, Davidsson, 2005). This explanation challenges the common assumption that entrepreneurs would first identify venture ideas and then exploit them (e.g. Shane, 2003). The assumption is that exploitation influences identification, just as identification influences exploitation. Based on interviews with design entrepreneurs and external actors (e.g. potential customers, suppliers and collaborators), it appears as identification and exploitation of venture ideas are carried out in close interaction between a number of actors, rather than alone by entrepreneurs. Due to their available resources, design entrepreneurs have a desire to focus on identification related activities and to find external actors that take care of exploitation related activities. The involvement of external actors may have a direct impact on decisionmaking and various activities along the processes of identification and exploitation, which is something that previous research does not particularly emphasize. For instance, Bhave (1994) suggests both operative and strategic feedback from the market, but does not explain how external parties are actually involved in the decisionmaking, and in carrying out various activities along the entrepreneurial process.

The Monetary policy rules and the inflation process in open emerging

This paper has three objectives. First, it aims at revealing the logic of interest rate setting pursued by monetary authorities of 12 new EU members. Using estimation of an augmented Taylor rule, we find that this setting was not always consistent with the official monetary policy. Second, we seek to shed light on the inflation process of these countries. To this end, we carry out an estimation of an open economy Philips curve (PC). Our main finding is that inflation rates were not only driven by backward persistency but also held a forward-looking component. Finally, we assess the viability of existing monetary arrangements for price stability. The analysis of the conditional inflation variance obtained from GARCH estimation of PC is used for this purpose. We conclude that inflation targeting is preferable to an exchange rate peg because it allowed decreasing the inflation rate and anchored its volatility.