63 resultados para Missing trader
em Consorci de Serveis Universitaris de Catalunya (CSUC), Spain
Resumo:
In general terms key sectors analysis aims at identifying the role, or impact, that the existence of a productive sector has in the economy. Quite a few measures, indicators and methodologies of varied complexity have been proposed in the literature, from multiplier sums to extraction methods, but not without debate about their properties and their information content. All of them, to our knowledge, focus exclusively on the interdependence effects that result from the input-output structure of the economy. By so doing the simple input-output approach misses critical links beyond the interindustry ones. A productive sector’s role is that of producing but also that of generating and distributing income among primary factors as a result of production. Thus when measuring a sector’s role, the income generating process cannot and should not be omitted if we want to better elucidate the sector’ economic role. A simple way to make the missing income link explicit is to use the SAM (Soci
Resumo:
We develop a model of insider trading where agents have private information either about liquidation value or about supply and behave strategically to maximize their profits. The supply informed trader plays a dual role in market making and in information revelation. This trader not only reveals a part of the information he owns, but he also induces the other traders to reveal more of their private information. The presence of different types of information decreases market liquidity and induces non-monotonicity of the market indicators with respect to the variance of liquidation value. Replacing the noise introduced by liquidity traders with a random supply also allows us to study the effect the shocks on different components of supply have on prices and quantities.
Resumo:
Identifying key sectors or key locations in an interconnected economy is of paramount importance for improving policy planning and directing economic strategy. Hence the relevance of categorizing them and hence the corresponding need of evaluating their potential synergies in terms of their global economic thrust. We explain in this paper that standard measures based on gross outputs do not and cannot capture the relevant impact due to self- imposed modeling limitations. In fact, common gross output measures will be systematically downward biased. We argue that an economy wide Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) approach provides a modeling platform that overcomes these limitations since it provides (i) a more comprehensive measure of linkages and (ii) an alternate way of accounting for links' relevance that is in consonance with standard macromagnitudes in the National Income and Product Accounts.
Resumo:
We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our envi- ronment, entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need to borrow from banks. As is generally the case in economies with adverse selection, the competitive equilibrium of our economy is shown to be ine¢ cient. Under adverse selection, the choices made by one type of agents limit what can be o¤ered to other types in an incentive-compatible manner. This gives rise to an externality, which cannot be internalized in a competitive equilibrium. We show that, in this type of environment, the ine¢ ciency associated to adverse selection is the consequence of one implicit assumption: entrepreneurs can only borrow from banks. If an additional market is added (say, a .security market.), in which entrepreneurs can obtain funds beyond those o¤ered by banks, we show that the e¢ cient allocation is an equilibrium of the economy. In such an equilibrium, all entrepreneurs borrow at a pooling rate in the security market. When they apply to bank loans, though, only entrepreneurs with good projects pledge these additional funds as collateral. This equilibrium thus simultaneously entails cross- subsidization and separation between di¤erent types of entrepreneurs.
Resumo:
We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our environment, entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need to borrow in order to invest. Conventional wisdom says that, in this class of economies, the competitive equilibrium is typically inefficient. We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: entrepreneurs can only access monitored lending. If a new set of markets is added to provide entrepreneurs with additional funds, efficiency can be attained in equilibrium. An important characteristic of these additional markets is that lending in them must be unmonitored, in the sense that it does not condition total borrowing or investment by entrepreneurs. This makes it possible to attain efficiency by pooling all entrepreneurs in the new markets while separating them in the markets for monitored loans.
Resumo:
We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our environment,entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need toborrow from banks. Conventional wisdom says that, in this class of economies, the competitiveequilibrium is typically inefficient.We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: entrepreneurscan only borrow from banks. If an additional market is added to provide entrepreneurs withadditional funds, efficiency can be attained in equilibrium. An important characteristic of thisadditional market is that it must be non-exclusive, in the sense that entrepreneurs must be ableto simultaneously borrow from many different lenders operating in it. This makes it possible toattain efficiency by pooling all entrepreneurs in the new market while separating them in themarket for bank loans.
Resumo:
We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our environment,entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects needto borrow in order to invest. Conventional wisdom says that, in this class of economies, thecompetitive equilibrium is typically inefficient.We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: entrepreneurscan only access monitored lending. If a new set of markets is added to provide entrepreneurswith additional funds, efficiency can be attained in equilibrium. An important characteristic ofthese additional markets is that lending in them must be unmonitored, in the sense that it doesnot condition total borrowing or investment by entrepreneurs. This makes it possible to attainefficiency by pooling all entrepreneurs in the new markets while separating them in the marketsfor monitored loans.
Resumo:
This paper presents a comparative analysis of linear and mixed modelsfor short term forecasting of a real data series with a high percentage of missing data. Data are the series of significant wave heights registered at regular periods of three hours by a buoy placed in the Bay of Biscay.The series is interpolated with a linear predictor which minimizes theforecast mean square error. The linear models are seasonal ARIMA models and themixed models have a linear component and a non linear seasonal component.The non linear component is estimated by a non parametric regression of dataversus time. Short term forecasts, no more than two days ahead, are of interestbecause they can be used by the port authorities to notice the fleet.Several models are fitted and compared by their forecasting behavior.
Resumo:
History tells that institutions evolve gradually over time, pushing new ideas across borders and cultures. Globalisation is argued to accelerate this process. We examine the spatial links of different political institutions across borders. Applying various tests for spatial proximity, we do not find evidence of contemporaneous spatial links. This result is robust to various measures of distance and of cultural proximity across countries. Instead, when we analyse long run dynamics diffusion of institutions seems to occur only gradually.
Resumo:
We consider exchange markets with heterogeneous indivisible goods. We are interested in exchange rules that are efficient and immune to manipulations via endowments (either with respect to hiding or destroying part of the endowment or transferring part of the endowment to another trader). We consider three manipulability axioms: hiding-proofness, destruction-proofness, and transfer-proofness. We prove that no rule satisfying efficiency and hiding-proofness (which implies individual rationality) exists. For two-agent exchange markets with separable and responsive preferences, we show that efficient, individually rational, and destruction-proof rules exist. However, for separable preferences, no rule satisfies efficiency, individual rationality, and destruction-proofness. In the case of transfer-proofness the compatibility with efficiency and individual rationality for the two-agent case extends to the unrestricted domain. For exchange markets with separable preferences and more than two agents no rule satisfies efficiency, individual rationality, and transfer-proofness.
Resumo:
We give a 5-approximation algorithm to the rooted Subtree-Prune-and-Regraft (rSPR) distance between two phylogenies, which was recently shown to be NP-complete by Bordewich and Semple [5]. This paper presents the first approximation result for this important tree distance. The algorithm follows a standard format for tree distances such as Rodrigues et al. [24] and Hein et al. [13]. The novel ideas are in the analysis. In the analysis, the cost of the algorithm uses a \cascading" scheme that accounts for possible wrong moves. This accounting is missing from previous analysis of tree distance approximation algorithms. Further, we show how all algorithms of this type can be implemented in linear time and give experimental results.
Resumo:
Various methodologies in economic literature have been used to analyse the international hydrocarbon retail sector. Nevertheless at a Spanish level these studies are much more recent and most conclude that generally there is no effective competition present in this market, regardless of the approach used. In this paper, in order to analyse the price levels in the Spanish petrol market, our starting hypothesis is that in uncompetitive markets the prices are higher and the standard deviation is lower. We use weekly retail petrol price data from the ten biggest Spanish cities, and apply Markov chains to fill the missing values for petrol 95 and diesel, and we also employ a variance filter. We conclude that this market demonstrates reduced price dispersion, regardless of brand or city.
Resumo:
The objective of this study is the empirical identification of the monetary policy rules pursued in individual countries of EU before and after the launch of European Monetary Union. In particular, we have employed an estimation of the augmented version of the Taylor rule (TR) for 25 countries of the EU in two periods (1992-1998, 1999-2006). While uniequational estimation methods have been used to identify the policy rules of individual central banks, for the rule of the European Central Bank has been employed a dynamic panel setting. We have found that most central banks really followed some interest rate rule but its form was usually different from the original TR (proposing that domestic interest rate responds only to domestic inflation rate and output gap). Crucial features of policy rules in many countries have been the presence of interest rate smoothing as well as response to foreign interest rate. Any response to domestic macroeconomic variables have been missing in the rules of countries with inflexible exchange rate regimes and the rules consisted in mimicking of the foreign interest rates. While we have found response to long-term interest rates and exchange rate in rules of some countries, the importance of monetary growth and asset prices has been generally negligible. The Taylor principle (the response of interest rates to domestic inflation rate must be more than unity as a necessary condition for achieving the price stability) has been confirmed only in large economies and economies troubled with unsustainable inflation rates. Finally, the deviation of the actual interest rate from the rule-implied target rate can be interpreted as policy shocks (these deviation often coincided with actual turbulent periods).
Resumo:
It has been recently emphasized that, if individuals have heterogeneous dynamics, estimates of shock persistence based on aggregate data are significatively higher than those derived from its disaggregate counterpart. However, a careful examination of the implications of this statement on the various tools routinely employed to measure persistence is missing in the literature. This paper formally examines this issue. We consider a disaggregate linear model with heterogeneous dynamics and compare the values of several measures of persistence across aggregation levels. Interestingly, we show that the average persistence of aggregate shocks, as measured by the impulse response function (IRF) of the aggregate model or by the average of the individual IRFs, is identical on all horizons. This result remains true even in situations where the units are (short-memory) stationary but the aggregate process is long-memory or even nonstationary. In contrast, other popular persistence measures, such as the sum of the autoregressive coefficients or the largest autoregressive root, tend to be higher the higher the aggregation level. We argue, however, that this should be seen more as an undesirable property of these measures than as evidence of different average persistence across aggregation levels. The results are illustrated in an application using U.S. inflation data.