The Electoral Determinants of Collective Remittances: The Mexican 3x1 Program for Migrants

The 3x1 Program for Migrants is a matching grant scheme that seeks to direct the money sent by migrant organizations abroad to the provision of public and social infrastructure, and to productive projects in migrants’ communities of origin. To do so, the municipal, state, and federal administrations match the amount sent by hometown associations by 3 to 1. This opens the door to the political manipulation of the program. We explore the impact of a particular facet of Mexican political life on the operation of the 3x1: its recent democratization and the increasing political competition at the municipal level. Relying on the literature on redistributive politics, we posit that an increasing number of effective parties in elections may have two different effects. On the one hand, the need to cater to more heterogeneous constituencies may increase the provision of public projects. On the other hand, since smaller coalitions are needed to win elections under tighter competition, fewer public and more private (clientelistic) projects could be awarded. Using a unique dataset on the 3x1 Program for Migrants for over 2,400 municipalities in the period 2002 through 2007, we find a lower provision of public goods in electorally competitive jurisdictions. Thus, we remain sceptical about the program success in promoting public goods in politically competitive locations with high migration levels.

La Inversión francesa en la canalización del Ebro: de la navegación al riego (1848-1904)

La Real Compañía de Canalización del Ebro, sociedad anónima constituida en 1852 con un capital nominal de 31,5 millones de pesetas, que tenía como objetivo fundamental abrir el Ebro a la navegación a vapor en base a un proyecto técnico elaborado por ingenieros franceses, tuvo que recurrir a inversores europeos para levantar su capital. Se trataría, pues, de una empresa equiparable en muchos aspectos –inversión en comunicaciones, elevado capital, dependencia de técnicos e inversores europeos– a las grandes compañías ferroviarias constituidas en España a mediados del siglo XIX. El fracaso en la navegación reorientó su actividad hacia el riego, siendo la empresa encargada de construir y explotar hasta 1966 estas infraestructuras en el Delta del Ebro. En este texto, después de referirnos a los diferentes intentos de canalización del Ebro relacionados con la navegación hasta mediados de siglo XIX, analizaremos los motivos de su evolución y la diferente actitud mantenida ante las oportunidades de negocio por los dos grandes sectores de accionistas, el capital catalán y el capital francés, hasta la salida de este último ocurrida entre 1878 y 1904. Asimismo, intentaremos mostrar como el ritmo de la inversión en la canalización se ajusta al de la inversión francesa en España, que iniciada en el siglo XVIII, se paraliza con la crisis del Antiguo Régimen, se intensifica a partir de la década de 1840 orientándose mayoritariamente hacia los sectores ferroviario y minero, e inicia un cierto repliegue a partir de la última década del siglo XIX.

Civil war and foreign influence

We study a symmetric information bargaining model of civil war where a third (foreign) party can affect the probabilities of winning the conflict and the size of the post conflict spoils. We show that the possible alliance with a third party makes peaceful agreements difficult to reach and might lead to new commitment problems that trigger war. Also, we argue that the foreign party is likely to induce persistent informational asymmetries which might explain long lasting civil wars. We explore both political and economic incentives for a third party to intervene. The explicit consideration of political incentives leads to two predictions that allow for identifying the influence of foreign intervention on civil war incidence. Both predictions are confirmed for the case of the U.S. as a potential intervening nation: (i) civil wars around the world are more likely under Republican governments and (ii) the probability of civil wars decreases with U.S. presidential approval rates.

Violence and displacement. Evidence from the Spanish civil war (1936-1939)

This paper explores the relationship between violence and displacement during civil war focusing on two different forms of population movements (i.e. incoming and outgoing), and two different forms of violence (i.e. direct and indirect). The paper explores the relationship between displacement and violence at the local level in the context of a civil war fought conventionally using fine-grained data from 1,062 municipalities of the region of Catalonia during the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). First, the paper suggests that exogenous and endogenous to the war factors combine to generate patterns of resettlement. Second, the evidence indicates that, in acivil war context, refugee flows and violence are interrelated in multiple ways: the arrival of internal refugees in a locality promotes the perpetration of direct violence against civilians; this, in turn, triggers the departure of people from the locality when the other group approaches. Third, indirect violence (i.e. bombings) shows to be the most significant factor accounting for external displacement at the local level, suggesting that bombing can serve as a strong signal for civilians of the type of armed group they are facing. Finally, the Spanish case suggests that the demographic changes provoked by displacement, combined with the lethality of the conflict, are likely to have long-term political consequences.

Sobre la identitat dels Matiners a les comarques del N.E. de Catalunya

This study attempts to throw some light on the identity of the Matiners of the regions of north-eastern Catalonia by analizing a notebook which was a register of rebels. This notebook gives the age, geographical origin and profession of the rebels. The War of the matiners (1846-49) was a Catalan rebellion framed within the context of popular opposition to the regime of the moderates, and in the midst of a general crisis. Themen who formed the groups of ((trabucaires)) were particulary young (the problemof recriting must not be forgotten), and came from the country, the crafts, and industry, and were militarized above all in the interior regions

Origin and genetic differentiation of Three Mexican Native Groups (Purépechas, Triquis and Mayas): contribution of CODIS-STRs to the history of human populations of Mesoamerica

BACKGROUND: CODIS-STRs in Native Mexican groups have rarely been analysed for human identification and anthropological purposes. AIM:To analyse the genetic relationships and population structure among three Native Mexican groups from Mesoamerica.SUBJECTS AND METHODS: 531 unrelated Native individuals from Mexico were PCR-typed for 15 and 9 autosomal STRs (Identifiler™ and Profiler™ kits, respectively), including five population samples: Purépechas (Mountain, Valley and Lake), Triquis and Yucatec Mayas. Previously published STR data were included in the analyses. RESULTS:Allele frequencies and statistical parameters of forensic importance were estimated by population. The majority of Native groups were not differentiated pairwise, excepting Triquis and Purépechas, which was attributable to their relative geographic and cultural isolation. Although Mayas, Triquis and Purépechas-Mountain presented the highest number of private alleles, suggesting recurrent gene flow, the elevated differentiation of Triquis indicates a different origin of this gene flow. Interestingly, Huastecos and Mayas were not differentiated, which is in agreement with the archaeological hypothesis that Huastecos represent an ancestral Maya group. Interpopulation variability was greater in Natives than in Mestizos, both significant.CONCLUSION: Although results suggest that European admixture has increased the similarity between Native Mexican groups, the differentiation and inconsistent clustering by language or geography stresses the importance of serial founder effect and/or genetic drift in showing their present genetic relationships.

Gendered networks and Mexican migration

In this paper, we investigate how the gendered origin of migrant networks (i.e. matrilineal vs. patrilineal) is associated with aspirations to migrate and subsequent migration behavior. Using longitudinal data from the Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS), we follow 3,923 married couples across 139 municipalities over the 2002-2005 period. We find that the networks of both the individual and her/his spouse are associated with aspiring to migrate to the United States. However, one’s own network matters most (i.e. matrilineal networks for women and patrilineal networks for men). On the other hand, in terms of behavior, only matrilineal networks predict a subsequent move to the U.S. for men and women/couples, who are assessed jointly. These findings suggest that our understanding of the role of migrant networks in perpetuating male-centered, labor migration does not necessarily translate once a union has formed. We make the case that future work would do well to account for not only the presence and composition of networks, but also their origin, which in certain circumstances may be the most relevant factor.

Predictors of political orientation among US-born Mexican Americans: cultural identification, acculturation attitudes and socioeconomic status

With each passing election, U.S. political campaigns have renewed their efforts in courting the “Latino vote,” yet the Latino population is not a culturally homogenous voting bloc. This study examined how cultural identifications and acculturation attitudes in U.S. born Mexican Americans interacted with socioeconomic status (SES) to predict political orientation. Individuals who held stronger Mexican identity and supported biculturalism as an acculturation strategy had a more liberal orientation, while belonging to a higher SES group and holding stronger assimilation attitudes predicted a less liberal orientation. Mexican cultural identification interacted with SES such that those who held a weaker Mexican identity, but came from a higher social class were less liberal and more moderate in their political orientation. Weak Mexican identification and higher SES also predicted weaker endorsement of bicultural acculturation attitudes, which in turn, mediated the differences in political orientation. The acceptance of one’s ethnic identity and endorsement of bicultural attitudes predicted a more liberal political orientation. In light of these findings, political candidates should be cautious in how they pander to Latino constituents—referencing the groups’ ethnic culture or customs may distance constituents who are not strongly identified with their ethnic culture.

Traducción de un fragmento del libro NS-Offizier war ich nicht de Ute Althaus

El presente trabajo consiste en la traducción del alemán al español de un fragmento del libro NS-Offizzier war ich nicht (Ute Althaus), en el cual se aborda el tópico del nacionalsocialismo desde el ámbito familiar y bajo una perspectiva psico-social.

Growth, Democracy, and Civil War

Does economic growth affect the likelihood of civil war? Answering this question requires dealing with reverse causation. Our approach exploits that international commodity prices have a significant effect on the income growth of Sub-Saharan African countries. We show that lower income growth makes civil war more likely in non-democracies. This effect is significantly weaker in democracies; as a result, we find no link between growth and civil war in these countries. Our reducedform results also indicate that lower international commodity price growth has no effect on civil war in democracies, but raises the likelihood of civil war incidence and onset in nondemocracies.

The Three Horsemen of Growth: Plague, War and Urbanization in Early Modern Europe

How did Europe overtake China? We construct a simple Malthusian model with two sectors, and use it to explain how European per capita incomes and urbanization rates could surge ahead of Chinese ones. That living standards could exceed subsistence levels at all in a Malthusian setting should be surprising. Rising fertility and falling mortality ought to have reversed any gains. We show that productivity growth in Europe can only explain a small fraction of rising living standards. Population dynamics - changes of the birth and death schedules - were far more important drivers of the longrun Malthusian equilibrium. The Black Death raised wages substantially, creating important knock-on effects. Because of Engel's Law, demand for urban products increased, raising urban wages and attracting migrants from rural areas. European cities were unhealthy, especially compared to Far Eastern ones. Urbanization pushed up aggregate death rates. This effect was reinforced by more frequent wars (fed by city wealth) and disease spread by trade. Thus, higher wages themselves reduced population pressure. Without technological change, our model can account for the sharp rise in European urbanization as well as permanently higher per capita incomes. We complement our calibration exercise with a detailed analysis of intra-European growth in the early modern period. Using a panel of European states in the period 1300-1700, we show that war frequency can explain a good share of the divergent fortunes within Europe.

International commodity prices, growth and the outbreak of Civil War in Sub-Saharan Africa

To learn more about the effect of economic conditions oncivil war, we examine whether Sub-Saharan civil wars aremore likely to start following downturns in the internationalprice of countries main export commodities. The data showa robust effect of commodity price downturns on the outbreakof civil wars. We also find that Sub-Saharan countries aremore likely to see civil wars following economic downturnsin their main OECD export destinations.

The aftermath of Civil War

Using an event-study methodology, this paper analyzes the aftermath of civil war in a cross-section of countries. It focuses on those experiences where the end of conflict marks the beginning of a relatively lasting peace. The paper considers 41 countries involved in internal wars in the period 1960-2003. In order to provide a comprehensive evaluation of the aftermath of war, the paper considers a host of social areas represented by basic indicators of economic performance, health and education, political development, demographic trends, and conflict and security issues. For each of these indicators, the paper first compares the post- and pre-war situations and then examines their dynamic trends during the post-conflict period. It conducts this analysis both in absolute and relative terms, the latter in relation to control groups of otherwise similar countries. The paper concludes that, even though war has devastating effects and its aftermath can be immensely difficult, when the end of war marks the beginning of lasting peace, recovery and improvement are indeed achieved.

The colonial origins of Civil War

The dominant hypothesis in the literature that studies conflict is that poverty is the main cause of civil wars. We instead analyze the effect of institutions on civil war, controlling for income per capita. In our set up, institutions are endogenous and colonial origins affect civil wars through their legacy on institutions. Our results indicate that institutions, proxied by the protection of property rights, rule of law and the efficiency of the legal system, are a fundamental cause of civil war. In particular, an improvement in institutions from the median value in the sample to the 75th percentile is associated with a 38 percentage points reduction in the incidence of civil wars. Moreover, once institutions are included as explaining civil wars, income does not have any effect on civil war, either directly or indirectly.

Malthusian dynamism and the rise of Europe: Make war, not love

This paper argues that Malthusian regimes are capable of sustained changes in per capita incomes. Shifting mortality and fertility schedules can lead to different steady-state income levels, with long periods of growth during the transition. Europe checked the downward pressure on wages through late marriage, which reduced fertility, and a mortality regime that combined high death rates with high incomes. We argue that both emerged as a result of the Black Death.