Evaluating the impact of public subsidies on a firm's performance: A quasi-experimental approach

Many regional governments in developed countries design programs to improve the competitiveness of local firms. In this paper, we evaluate the effectiveness of public programs whose aim is to enhance the performance of firms located in Catalonia (Spain). We compare the performance of publicly subsidised companies (treated) with that of similar, but unsubsidised companies (non-treated). We use the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) methodology to construct a control group which, with respect to its observable characteristics, is as similar as possible to the treated group, and that allows us to identify firms which retain the same propensity to receive public subsidies. Once a valid comparison group has been established, we compare the respective performance of each firm. As a result, we find that recipient firms, on average, change their business practices, improve their performance, and increase their value added as a direct result of public subsidy programs.

Performance assessment and league tables. Comparing like with like.

We formulate performance assessment as a problem of causal analysis and outline an approach based on the missing data principle for its solution. It is particularly relevant in the context of so-called league tables for educational, health-care and other public-service institutions. The proposed solution avoids comparisons of institutions that have substantially different clientele (intake).

Performance assessment and league tables. Comparing like with like

We formulate performance assessment as a problem of causal analysis and outline an approach based on the missing data principle for its solution. It is particularly relevant in the context of so-called league tables for educational, health-care and other public-service institutions. The proposed solution avoids comparisons of institutions that have substantially different clientele (intake).

Business cycles, unemployment insurance and the calibration of matching models

This paper theoretically and empirically documents a puzzle that arises when an RBC economy with a job matching function is used to model unemployment. The standard model can generate sufficiently large cyclical fluctuations in unemployment, or a sufficiently small response of unemployment to labor market policies, but it cannot do both. Variable search and separation, finite UI benefit duration, efficiency wages, and capital all fail to resolve this puzzle. However, either sticky wages or match-specific productivity shocks can improve the model's performance by making the firm's flow of surplus more procyclical, which makes hiring more procyclical too.

Exact representation of antenna system diversity performance from input parameter description

A simplc formulation Io compute thc envelope correlation of anantenna divemiry system is dcrired. 11 is shown how to compute theenvelope correlation hom the S-parameter descnplian of the antennasystem. This approach has the advantage that i t does not require thecomputation nor the measurement of the radiation panem of theantenna system. It also offers the advantage of providing a clcaunderstanding ofthe effects ofmutual coupling and input match on thediversity performance of the antcnnii system.

Evaluating the impact of public subsidies on a firm's performance: a quasi-experimental approach

Many regional governments in developed countries design programs to improve the competitiveness of local firms. In this paper, we evaluate the effectiveness of public programs whose aim is to enhance the performance of firms located in Catalonia (Spain). We compare the performance of publicly subsidised companies (treated) with that of similar, but unsubsidised companies (non-treated). We use the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) methodology to construct a control group which, with respect to its observable characteristics, is as similar as possible to the treated group, and that allows us to identify firms which retain the same propensity to receive public subsidies. Once a valid comparison group has been established, we compare the respective performance of each firm. As a result, we find that recipient firms, on average, change their business practices, improve their performance, and increase their value added as a direct result of public subsidy programs.

Evaluating the impact of public subsidies on a firm's performance: a quasi-experimental approach

Many regional governments in developed countries design programs to improve the competitiveness of local firms. In this paper, we evaluate the effectiveness of public programs whose aim is to enhance the performance of firms located in Catalonia (Spain). We compare the performance of publicly subsidised companies (treated) with that of similar, but unsubsidised companies (non-treated). We use the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) methodology to construct a control group which, with respect to its observable characteristics, is as similar as possible to the treated group, and that allows us to identify firms which retain the same propensity to receive public subsidies. Once a valid comparison group has been established, we compare the respective performance of each firm. As a result, we find that recipient firms, on average, change their business practices, improve their performance, and increase their value added as a direct result of public subsidy programs.

Feature-based matching of underwater images

This work investigates performance of recent feature-based matching techniques when applied to registration of underwater images. Matching methods are tested versus different contrast enhancing pre-processing of images. As a result of the performed experiments for various dominating in images underwater artifacts and present deformation, the outperforming preprocessing, detection and description methods are proposed

Measuring sustained superior performance at the firm level

This paper proposes a two-dimensional Strategic Performance Measure (SPM) to evaluate the achievement of sustained superior performance. This proposal builds primarily on the fact that, under the strategic management perspective, a firm's prevalent objective is the pursuit of sustained superior performance. Three basic conceptual dimensions stem from this objective: relativity, sign dependence, and dynamism. These are the foundations of the SPM, which carries out a separate evaluation of the attained superior performance and of its sustainability over time. In contrast to existing measures of performance, the SPM provides: (i) a dynamic approach by considering the progress or regress in performance over time, and (ii) a cardinal measurement of performance differences and its changes over time. The paper also proposes an axiomatic framework that a measure of strategic performance should comply with to be theoretically and managerially sound. Finally, an empirical illustration of the Spanish banking sector during 1987-1999 is herein provided by discussing some relevant cases.

Single period Markowitz portfolio selection, performance gauging and duality: a variation on Luenberger's shortage function

Markowitz portfolio theory (1952) has induced research into the efficiency of portfolio management. This paper studies existing nonparametric efficiency measurement approaches for single period portfolio selection from a theoretical perspective and generalises currently used efficiency measures into the full mean-variance space. Therefore, we introduce the efficiency improvement possibility function (a variation on the shortage function), study its axiomatic properties in the context of Markowitz efficient frontier, and establish a link to the indirect mean-variance utility function. This framework allows distinguishing between portfolio efficiency and allocative efficiency. Furthermore, it permits retrieving information about the revealed risk aversion of investors. The efficiency improvement possibility function thus provides a more general framework for gauging the efficiency of portfolio management using nonparametric frontier envelopment methods based on quadratic optimisation.

Dynamic matching and bargaining: the role of deadlines

We consider a dynamic model where traders in each period are matched randomly into pairs who then bargain about the division of a fixed surplus. When agreement is reached the traders leave the market. Traders who do not come to an agreement return next period in which they will be matched again, as long as their deadline has not expired yet. New traders enter exogenously in each period. We assume that traders within a pair know each other's deadline. We define and characterize the stationary equilibrium configurations. Traders with longer deadlines fare better than traders with short deadlines. It is shown that the heterogeneity of deadlines may cause delay. It is then shown that a centralized mechanism that controls the matching protocol, but does not interfere with the bargaining, eliminates all delay. Even though this efficient centralized mechanism is not as good for traders with long deadlines, it is shown that in a model where all traders can choose which mechanism to

Median stable matching for college admission

We give a simple and concise proof that so-called generalized median stable matchings are well-defined stable matchings for college admissions problems. Furthermore, we discuss the fairness properties of median stable matchings and conclude with two illustrative examples of college admissions markets, the lattices of stable matchings, and the corresponding generalized median stable matchings.

Corrigendum to "On randomized matching mechanisms" [Economic Theory 8(1996)377-381]

Ma (1996) studied the random order mechanism, a matching mechanism suggested by Roth and Vande Vate (1990) for marriage markets. By means of an example he showed that the random order mechanism does not always reach all stable matchings. Although Ma's (1996) result is true, we show that the probability distribution he presented - and therefore the proof of his Claim 2 - is not correct. The mistake in the calculations by Ma (1996) is due to the fact that even though the example looks very symmetric, some of the calculations are not as ''symmetric.''

Paths to stability for matching markets with couples

We study two-sided matching markets with couples and show that for a natural preference domain for couples, the domain of weakly responsive preferences, stable outcomes can always be reached by means of decentralized decision making. Starting from an arbitrary matching, we construct a path of matchings obtained from `satisfying' blocking coalitions that yields a stable matching. Hence, we establish a generalization of Roth and Vande Vate's (1990) result on path convergence to stability for decentralized singles markets. Furthermore, we show that when stable matchings exist, but preferences are not weakly responsive, for some initial matchings there may not exist any path obtained from `satisfying' blocking coalitions that yields a stable matching.