European employment strategy and spanish labour market policies

The paper aim is to analyse the influence of the European Employment Strategy (EES)in the implementation of the Spanish labour market policies. The first part of the paper describes the evolution and content of the EES. In the second one, the definition of activation is also explained. In addition to that, the ways how the EES develops and promotes active labour market policies are examined. The evolution of labour market policies in Spain and the current configuration of both active and passive policies are studied in the next three chapters. In these parts, the paper investigates to which extent the provisions of the EES have been implemented in Spain. The paper shows that: i) activation has been rising in the European countries since the implementation of the EES; ii) this fact has also happened in relative terms (comparing the evolution of active to passive policies); iii) Spain has been one of the countries which has led these processes; iv) the EES seems to have been influencing

Innovation or Imitation? The effect of spillovers and competitive pressure on firms' R&D strategy choice

This article provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of a firm's optimal R&D strategy choice. In this paper a firm's R&D strategy is assumed to be endogenous and allowed to depend on both internal firms. characteristics and external factors. Firms choose between two strategies, either they engage in R&D or abstain from own R&D and imitate the outcomes of innovators. In the theoretical model this yields three types of equilibria in which either all firms innovate, some firms innovate and others imitate, or no firm innovates. Firms'equilibrium strategies crucially depend on external factors. We find that the efficiency of intellectual property rights protection positively affects firms'incentives to engage in R&D, while competitive pressure has a negative effect. In addition, smaller firms are found to be more likely to become imitators when the product is homogeneous and the level of spillovers is high. These results are supported by empirical evidence for German .rms from manufacturing and services sectors. Regarding social welfare our results indicate that strengthening intellectual property protection can have an ambiguous effect. In markets characterized by a high rate of innovation a reduction of intellectual property rights protection can discourage innovative performance substantially. However, a reduction of patent protection can also increase social welfare because it may induce imitation. This indicates that policy issues such as the optimal length and breadth of patent protection cannot be resolved without taking into account specific market and firm characteristics. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C35, D43, L13, L22, O31. Keywords: Innovation; imitation; spillovers; product differentiation; market competition; intellectual property rights protection.

Labour market in the Catalan cotton textile sector: Employment and fertility (1850-1913)

This paper deals whit the dynamics of the Catalan textile labour market (theSpanish region that concentrated most of the industrial and factory activity duringthe 19 Century) and offers hypotheses and results on the impact it had on livingstandards and fertility levels. We observe the formation of an uneven labourmarket in which male supply for labour (excluding women and children) grewmuch faster than the demand. We stress the fact that labour supply is verydependant on institutional factors liked to the transmition of household propertybetween generations. Instead the slow path of growth of adult males demand forlabour is witnessing the limits of this industry to expand and to compete ininternational markets. The strategy of working class families to adapt to scarceopportunities of employment we document here is the diminution of legitimatefertility levels. Fertility control is the direct instrument we think workers have tocontrol their number in a situation that was likely to create labour surpluses in theshort and mid run.

Reputation and honesty in a market for information

Previous works on asymmetric information in asset markets tendto focus on the potential gains in the asset market itself. We focus on the market for information and conduct an experimental study to explore, in a game of finite but uncertain duration, whether reputation can be an effective constraint on deliberate misinformation. At the beginning of each period, an uninformed potential asset buyer can purchase information, at a fixed price and from a fully-informed source, about the value of the asset in that period. The informational insiders cannot purchase the asset and are given short-term incentives to provide false information when the asset value is low. Our model predicts that, in accordance with the Folk Theorem, Pareto-superior outcomes featuring truthful revelation should be sustainable. However, this depends critically on beliefs about rationality and behavior. We find that, overall, sellers are truthful 89% of the time. More significantly, the observed frequency of truthfulness is 81% when the asset value is low. Our result is consistent with both mixed-strategy and trigger strategy interpretations and provides evidence that most subjects correctly anticipate rational behavior. We discuss applications to financial markets, media regulation, and the stability of cartels.

Protective or counter-productive? Labor market institutions and the effect of immigration on EU natives

We estimate the effect of immigrant flows on native employment in WesternEurope, and then ask whether the employment consequences of immigrationvary with institutions that affect labor market flexibility. Reducedflexibility may protect natives from immigrant competition in the nearterm, but our theoretical framework suggests that reduced flexibility islikely to increase the negative impact of immigration on equilibriumemployment. In models without interactions, OLS estimates for a panel ofEuropean countries in the 1980s and 1990s show small, mostly negativeimmigration effects. To reduce bias from the possible endogeneity ofimmigration flows, we use the fact that many immigrants arriving after1991 were refugees from the Balkan wars. An IV strategy based onvariation in the number of immigrants from former Yugoslavia generateslarger though mostly insignificant negative estimates. We then estimatemodels allowing interactions between the employment response toimmigration and institutional characteristics including business entrycosts. These results, limited to the sample of native men, generallysuggest that reduced flexibility increases the negative impact ofimmigration. Many of the estimated interaction terms are significant,and imply a significant negative effect on employment in countrieswith restrictive institutions.

Deciding the sale of a life policy in the viatical market: Implications on individual welfare

[cat] En aquest article, es presenta un model econòmic que permet determinar la venda o no d'una pòlissa de vida (total o en part) per part d'un assegurat malalt terminal en el mercat dels viatical settlements. Aquest mercat va aparèixer a finals de la dècada dels 80 a conseqüència de l'epidèmia de la SIDA. Actualment, representa una part del mercat dels life settlements. Les pòlisses que es comercialitzen en el mercat dels viaticals són aquelles on l'assegurat és malalt terminal amb una esperança de vida de dos anys o menys. El model és discret i considera només dos períodes (anys), ja que aquesta és la vida residual màxima que contempla el mercat. L'agent posseix una riquesa inicial que ha de repartir entre consum i herència. S'introdueix en primer lloc la funció d'utilitat esperada del decisor i, utilitzant programació dinàmica, es dedueix l'estratègia que reporta una utilitat més gran (no vendre/vendre (en part) la pòlissa en el moment zero/vendre (en part) la pòlissa en el moment ú). L'òptim depèn del preu de la pòlissa venuda i de paràmetres personals de l'individu. Es troba una expressió analítica per l'estratègia òptima i es realitza un anàlisi de sensibilitat.

Deciding the sale of a life policy in the viatical market: Implications on individual welfare

[cat] En aquest article, es presenta un model econòmic que permet determinar la venda o no d'una pòlissa de vida (total o en part) per part d'un assegurat malalt terminal en el mercat dels viatical settlements. Aquest mercat va aparèixer a finals de la dècada dels 80 a conseqüència de l'epidèmia de la SIDA. Actualment, representa una part del mercat dels life settlements. Les pòlisses que es comercialitzen en el mercat dels viaticals són aquelles on l'assegurat és malalt terminal amb una esperança de vida de dos anys o menys. El model és discret i considera només dos períodes (anys), ja que aquesta és la vida residual màxima que contempla el mercat. L'agent posseix una riquesa inicial que ha de repartir entre consum i herència. S'introdueix en primer lloc la funció d'utilitat esperada del decisor i, utilitzant programació dinàmica, es dedueix l'estratègia que reporta una utilitat més gran (no vendre/vendre (en part) la pòlissa en el moment zero/vendre (en part) la pòlissa en el moment ú). L'òptim depèn del preu de la pòlissa venuda i de paràmetres personals de l'individu. Es troba una expressió analítica per l'estratègia òptima i es realitza un anàlisi de sensibilitat.

Price rivalry in airline markets: A study of a successful strategy of a network carrier against a low-cost carrier

Competition in airline markets may be tough. In this context, network carriers have two alternative strategies to compete with low-cost carriers. First, they may establish a low-cost subsidiary. Second, they may try to reduce costs using the main brand. This paper examines a successful strategy of the first type implemented by Iberia in the Spanish domestic market. Our analysis of data and the estimation of a pricing equation show that Iberia has been able to charge lower prices than rivals with its low-cost subsidiary. The pricing policy of the Spanish network carrier has been particularly aggressive in less dense routes and shorter routes.

Financial development, labor and market regulations and growth

This paper investigates the importance that market regulation and financial imperfections have on firm growth. We analyse institutions af- fecting labor market as Employment Protection Laws (EP) and Product Market Regulation (PM). We show that together with the beneficial effects of financial development, a firm will get less financing, and thus investless, in a weak financial market (finance effect), the strictness of product and labor market regulations also affect firm growth (labor effect). In particular, we show that the stricter the rules the more detrimental the influence on growth in sectoral value added for a large number of countries. We also show that the labor effect overcomes the positive finance effect.

Security prices and market transparency: the role of prior information

This paper analyzes the role of traders' priors (proper versus improper) on the implications of market transparency by comparing a pre-trade transparent market with an opaque market in a set-up based on Madhavan (1996). We show that prices may be more informative in the opaque market, regardless of how priors are modelled. In contrast, the comparison of market liquidity and volatility in the two market structures are affected by prior specification. Key words: Market microstructure, Transparency, Prior information

Labour market frictions, social policies, and barriers to technology adoption

Barriers to technological changes have recently been shown to be a key element in explaining differences in output per worker across countries. This study examines the role that labour market features and institutions have in explaining barriers to technology adoption. I build a model that includes labour market frictions, capital market imperfections and heterogeneity in workers' skills. I found that the unemployment rate together with the welfare losses that workers experiment after displacement are key factors in explaining the existence of barriers to technology adoption. Moreover, I found that none of these factors alone is sufficient to build these barriers. The theory also suggests that welfare policies like the unemployment insurance system may enhance these kinds of barriers while policies like a severance payment system financed by an income tax seem to be more effective in eliminating them.

Double implementation in a market for indivisible goods with a price constraint

I consider the problem of assigning agents to objects where each agent must pay the price of the object he gets and prices must sum to a given number. The objective is to select an assignment-price pair that is envy-free with respect to the true preferences. I prove that the proposed mechanism will implement both in Nash and strong Nash the set of envy-free allocations. The distinguishing feature of the mechanism is that it treats the announced preferences as the true ones and selects an envy-free allocation with respect to the announced preferences.

Interest rate determination in the interbank market

The purpose of this paper is to study the determinants of equilibrium in the market for daily funds. We use the EONIA panel database which includes daily information on the lending rates applied by contributing commercial banks. The data clearly shows an increase in both the time series volatility and the cross section dispersion of rates towards the end of the reserve maintenance period. These increases are highly correlated. With respect to quantities, we find that the volume of trade as well as the use of the standing facilities are also larger at the end of the maintenance period. Our theoretical model shows how the operational framework of monetary policy causes a reduction in the elasticity of the supply of funds by banks throughout the reserve maintenance period. This reduction in the elasticity together with market segmentation and heterogeneity are able to generate distributions for the interest rates and quantities traded with the same properties as in the data.

Imperfect competition and market liquidity with a supply informed trader

We develop a model of insider trading where agents have private information either about liquidation value or about supply and behave strategically to maximize their profits. The supply informed trader plays a dual role in market making and in information revelation. This trader not only reveals a part of the information he owns, but he also induces the other traders to reveal more of their private information. The presence of different types of information decreases market liquidity and induces non-monotonicity of the market indicators with respect to the variance of liquidation value. Replacing the noise introduced by liquidity traders with a random supply also allows us to study the effect the shocks on different components of supply have on prices and quantities.

Competition with forward contracts: a laboratory analysis motivated by electricity market design

We use experiments to study the efficiency effects for a market as a whole of adding the possibility of forward contracting to a pre-existing spot market. We deal separately with the cases where spot market competition is in quantities and where it is in supply functions. In both cases we compare the effect of adding a contract market with the introduction of an additional competitor, changing the market structure from a triopoly to a quadropoly. We find that, as theory suggests, for both types of competition the introduction of a forward market significantly lowers prices. The combination of supply function competition with a forward market leads to high efficiency levels.