Quantitative analysis of image factors in a cultural heritage tourist destination

The tourism consumer’s purchase decision process is, to a great extent, conditioned by the image the tourist has of the different destinations that make up his or her choice set. In a highly competitive international tourist market, those responsible for destinations’ promotion and development policies seek differentiation strategies so that they may position the destinations in the most suitable market segments for their product in order to improve their attractiveness to visitors and increase or consolidate the economic benefits that tourism activity generates in their territory. To this end, the main objective we set ourselves in this paper is the empirical analysis of the factors that determine the image formation of Tarragona city as a cultural heritage destination. Without a doubt, UNESCO’s declaration of Tarragona’s artistic and monumental legacies as World Heritage site in the year 2000 meant important international recognition of the quality of the cultural and patrimonial elements offered by the city to the visitors who choose it as a tourist destination. It also represents a strategic opportunity to boost the city’s promotion of tourism and its consolidation as a unique destination given its cultural and patrimonial characteristics. Our work is based on the use of structured and unstructured techniques to identify the factors that determine Tarragona’s tourist destination image and that have a decisive influence on visitors’ process of choice of destination. In addition to being able to ascertain Tarragona’s global tourist image, we consider that the heterogeneity of its visitors requires a more detailed study that enables us to segment visitor typology. We consider that the information provided by these results may prove of great interest to those responsible for local tourism policy, both when designing products and when promoting the destination.

Dynamic perceptual mapping

Perceptual maps have been used for decades by market researchers to illuminatethem about the similarity between brands in terms of a set of attributes, to position consumersrelative to brands in terms of their preferences, or to study how demographic and psychometricvariables relate to consumer choice. Invariably these maps are two-dimensional and static. Aswe enter the era of electronic publishing, the possibilities for dynamic graphics are opening up.We demonstrate the usefulness of introducing motion into perceptual maps through fourexamples. The first example shows how a perceptual map can be viewed in three dimensions,and the second one moves between two analyses of the data that were collected according todifferent protocols. In a third example we move from the best view of the data at the individuallevel to one which focuses on between-group differences in aggregated data. A final exampleconsiders the case when several demographic variables or market segments are available foreach respondent, showing an animation with increasingly detailed demographic comparisons.These examples of dynamic maps use several data sets from marketing and social scienceresearch.

Quality safeguards and regulation of online pharmacies

Using econometric evidence, this article confirms that distribution ofmedicines online is split into two market segments of very diversequality, and identifies the factors that drive quality and qualityassurance in this activity. Unlike fraudulent, rogue, websites, whichoffer scant guarantees and usually sell just a few medicines withoutprescription, online pharmacies offering insurance coverage and linkedto conventional pharmacies typically sell a wholerange of drugs, require third-party medical prescriptions and provideabundant information to patients. It is shown that, where onlinepharmacies are allowed to act legally, market forces enhance quality,as private insurers require professional standards, and specialized thirdparties make a business of certifying them. Furthermore, older onlinepharmacies and those running conventional operations offer higherquality, probably because of reputational investments. Overall, this evidence supports licensing online pharmacies, especiallyconsidering that prohibiting them is ineffective against fraudulent sites.

Financial development, labor and market regulations and growth

This paper investigates the importance that market regulation and financial imperfections have on firm growth. We analyse institutions af- fecting labor market as Employment Protection Laws (EP) and Product Market Regulation (PM). We show that together with the beneficial effects of financial development, a firm will get less financing, and thus investless, in a weak financial market (finance effect), the strictness of product and labor market regulations also affect firm growth (labor effect). In particular, we show that the stricter the rules the more detrimental the influence on growth in sectoral value added for a large number of countries. We also show that the labor effect overcomes the positive finance effect.

Security prices and market transparency: the role of prior information

This paper analyzes the role of traders' priors (proper versus improper) on the implications of market transparency by comparing a pre-trade transparent market with an opaque market in a set-up based on Madhavan (1996). We show that prices may be more informative in the opaque market, regardless of how priors are modelled. In contrast, the comparison of market liquidity and volatility in the two market structures are affected by prior specification. Key words: Market microstructure, Transparency, Prior information

Labour market frictions, social policies, and barriers to technology adoption

Barriers to technological changes have recently been shown to be a key element in explaining differences in output per worker across countries. This study examines the role that labour market features and institutions have in explaining barriers to technology adoption. I build a model that includes labour market frictions, capital market imperfections and heterogeneity in workers' skills. I found that the unemployment rate together with the welfare losses that workers experiment after displacement are key factors in explaining the existence of barriers to technology adoption. Moreover, I found that none of these factors alone is sufficient to build these barriers. The theory also suggests that welfare policies like the unemployment insurance system may enhance these kinds of barriers while policies like a severance payment system financed by an income tax seem to be more effective in eliminating them.

Double implementation in a market for indivisible goods with a price constraint

I consider the problem of assigning agents to objects where each agent must pay the price of the object he gets and prices must sum to a given number. The objective is to select an assignment-price pair that is envy-free with respect to the true preferences. I prove that the proposed mechanism will implement both in Nash and strong Nash the set of envy-free allocations. The distinguishing feature of the mechanism is that it treats the announced preferences as the true ones and selects an envy-free allocation with respect to the announced preferences.

Interest rate determination in the interbank market

The purpose of this paper is to study the determinants of equilibrium in the market for daily funds. We use the EONIA panel database which includes daily information on the lending rates applied by contributing commercial banks. The data clearly shows an increase in both the time series volatility and the cross section dispersion of rates towards the end of the reserve maintenance period. These increases are highly correlated. With respect to quantities, we find that the volume of trade as well as the use of the standing facilities are also larger at the end of the maintenance period. Our theoretical model shows how the operational framework of monetary policy causes a reduction in the elasticity of the supply of funds by banks throughout the reserve maintenance period. This reduction in the elasticity together with market segmentation and heterogeneity are able to generate distributions for the interest rates and quantities traded with the same properties as in the data.

Imperfect competition and market liquidity with a supply informed trader

We develop a model of insider trading where agents have private information either about liquidation value or about supply and behave strategically to maximize their profits. The supply informed trader plays a dual role in market making and in information revelation. This trader not only reveals a part of the information he owns, but he also induces the other traders to reveal more of their private information. The presence of different types of information decreases market liquidity and induces non-monotonicity of the market indicators with respect to the variance of liquidation value. Replacing the noise introduced by liquidity traders with a random supply also allows us to study the effect the shocks on different components of supply have on prices and quantities.

Competition with forward contracts: a laboratory analysis motivated by electricity market design

We use experiments to study the efficiency effects for a market as a whole of adding the possibility of forward contracting to a pre-existing spot market. We deal separately with the cases where spot market competition is in quantities and where it is in supply functions. In both cases we compare the effect of adding a contract market with the introduction of an additional competitor, changing the market structure from a triopoly to a quadropoly. We find that, as theory suggests, for both types of competition the introduction of a forward market significantly lowers prices. The combination of supply function competition with a forward market leads to high efficiency levels.

The daily market for funds in Europe: what has changed with the EMU?

This paper presents evidence that the existence of deposit and lending facilities combined with an averaging provision for the reserve requirement are powerful tools to stabilize the overnight rate. We reach this conclusion by comparing the behavior of this rate in Germany before and after the start of the EMU. The analysis of the German experience is useful because it allows to isolate the effects on the overnight rate of these particular instruments of monetary policy. To show that this outcome is a general conclusion and not a particular result of the German market, we develop a theoretical model of reserve management which is able to reproduce our empirical findings.

The provision of quality in a bilateral search market

We accomplish two goals. First, we provide a non-cooperative foundation for the use of the Nash bargaining solution in search markets. This finding should help to close the rift between the search and the matching-and-bargaining literature. Second, we establish that the diversity of quality offered (at an increasing price-quality ratio) in a decentralized market is an equilibrium phenomenon - even in the limit as search frictions disappear.

Can competition in the credit market be excessive?

We study how market power affects investment and welfare when banks choose between restricting loan sizes and monitoring, in order to alleviate an underlying moral hazard problem. The impact of market power on aggregate welfare is the result of two countervailing effects. An increase in banks' market power results in: (i) higher lending rates, which worsens the borrower's incentive problem and reduces investment by unmonitored firms, (ii) higher monitoring effort, which reduces the proportion of credit-constrained firms. Whenever the second effect dominates, it is optimal to provide banks with some degree of market power.

Do market conditions affect gift exchange? Evidence from experimental markets with excess supply and excess demand

We study whether people's behavior in unbalanced gift exchange markets with repeated interaction are affected by whether they are on the excess supply side or the excess demand side of the market. Our analysis is based on the comparison of behavior between two types of experimental gift exchange markets, which vary only with respect to whether first or second movers are on the long side of the market. The direction of market imbalance could influence subjects' behavior, as second movers (workers) might react differently to favorable actions by first movers (firms) in the two cases. While our data show strong deviations from the standard game-theoretic prediction, we find mainly secondary treatment effects. Wage offers are not higher when there is an excess supply of firms, and workers do not respond more favorably to a given wage when there is an excess supply of labor. The state of competition does not appear to have strong effects in our data. We also present data from single-period sessions that show substantial gift exchange even without repeated interactions.

Interactions between product and labour market reforms

Labour market reforms face very often opposition from the employed workers, because it normally reduces their wages. Also product market regulations are regularly biased towards too much benefitting the firms. As a result there remain many frictions in both the labour and product markets that hinder an optimal functioning of the economy. These issues have recently received a lot of attention in the economics literature and scholars have been looking for politically viable reforms in both markets. However, despite its potential importance, there has been done virtually no research on the interaction between reforms in product and labour markets. We find that when combining reforms, the opposition for reforms decreases considerably. This is because there exist complementarities and the gains in total welfare can be more evenly distributed over the interest groups. Moreover, the interaction of reforms offers a way out for the so-called 'sclerosis' effect.