Labour market frictions, social policies, and barriers to technology adoption

Barriers to technological changes have recently been shown to be a key element in explaining differences in output per worker across countries. This study examines the role that labour market features and institutions have in explaining barriers to technology adoption. I build a model that includes labour market frictions, capital market imperfections and heterogeneity in workers' skills. I found that the unemployment rate together with the welfare losses that workers experiment after displacement are key factors in explaining the existence of barriers to technology adoption. Moreover, I found that none of these factors alone is sufficient to build these barriers. The theory also suggests that welfare policies like the unemployment insurance system may enhance these kinds of barriers while policies like a severance payment system financed by an income tax seem to be more effective in eliminating them.

Technological adoption in health care

This paper addresses the impact of payment systems on the rate of technology adoption. We present a model where technological shift is driven by demand uncertainty, increased patients' benefit, financial variables, and the reimbursement system to providers. Two payment systems are studied: cost reimbursement and (two variants of) DRG. According to the system considered, adoption occurs either when patients' benefits are large enough or when the differential reimbursement across technologies offsets the cost of adoption. Cost reimbursement leads to higher adoption of the new technology if the rate of reimbursement is high relative to the margin of new vs. old technology reimbursement under DRG. Having larger patient benefits favors more adoption under the cost reimbursement payment system, provided that adoption occurs initially under both payment systems.

Trade liberalization, exports and technology upgrading: Evidence on the impact of MERCOSUR on Argentinean firms

This paper studies the impact of a regional free trade agreement, MERCOSUR, on technologyupgrading by Argentinean firms. To guide empirical work, I introduce technology choice inMelitz s (2003) model of trade with heterogeneous firms. The joint treatment of the technologyadoption and exporting choices shows that the increase in revenues produced by trade integrationcan induce exporters to upgrade technology. An empirical test of the model reveals that firms inindustries facing higher reductions in Brazil s tariffs increase their investment in technologyfaster. The effect of tariffs on entry in the export market and technology adoption is highest inthe upper-middle range of the firm size distribution, as predicted by the model.

Technology Catching-up and the Role of Institutions

The aim of the paper is to investigate the role played by differences in Institutional Quality on the process of technology catch-up across countries. Empirical evidence shows how countries endowed with better institutions are those experiencing higher TFP growth rates, faster rates of technology adoption and hence being those more rapidly closing the gap with the frontier. Conversely, countries lacking some minimum institutional level are shown to diverge in the long run and not to catch-up. Some institutions, however, play an ambiguous role in the creation and adoption of technology. We find that the tightening of Intellectual Property Rights reduces the ability of followers to freely imitate technology slowing down their catchup rate. This negative effect is stronger the farther the countriesare found from the frontier. Other institutional categories such as openness to trade, instead, benefit both leaders and followers.

Competing engines of growth: Innovation and standardization

We study a dynamic general equilibrium model where innovation takes theform of the introduction of new goods whose production requires skilled workers.Innovation is followed by a costly process of standardization, whereby these newgoods are adapted to be produced using unskilled labor. Our framework highlightsa number of novel results. First, standardization is both an engine of growth anda potential barrier to it. As a result, growth is an inverse U-shaped function ofthe standardization rate (and of competition). Second, we characterize the growthand welfare maximizing speed of standardization. We show how optimal protection of intellectual property rights affecting the cost of standardization vary withthe skill-endowment, the elasticity of substitution between goods and other parameters. Third, we show that, depending on how competition between innovatingand standardizing firms is modelled and on parameter values, a new type of multiplicity of equilibria may arise. Finally, we study the implications of our model forthe skill-premium and we illustrate novel reasons for linking North-South trade tointellectual property rights protection.

Human capital, the structure of production and growth

Do high levels of human capital foster economic growth by facilitating technology adoption? If so, countries with more human capital should have adopted more rapidly the skilled-labor augmenting technologies becoming available since the 1970 s. High human capital levels should therefore have translated into fast growth in more compared to less human-capital-intensive industries in the 1980 s. Theories of international specialization point to human capital accumulation as another important determinant of growth in human-capital-intensive industries. Using data for a large sample of countries, we find significant positive effects of human capital levels and human capital accumulation on output and employment growth in human-capital-intensive industries.

Technological change and the wealth of nations

We discuss a unified theory of directed technological change and technologyadoption that can shed light on the causes of persistent productivity differencesacross countries. In our model, new technologies are designed in advanced countries and diffuse endogenously to less developed countries. Our framework is richenough to highlight three broad reasons for productivity differences: inappropriatetechnologies, policy-induced barriers to technology adoption, and within-countrymisallocations across sectors due to policy distortions. We also discuss the effectsof two aspects of globalization, trade in goods and migration, on the wealth ofnations through their impact on the direction of technical progress. By doing so,we illustrate some of the equalizing and unequalizing forces of globalization.

Structural development accounting

We construct and estimate a unified model combining three of the main sources ofcross-country income disparities: differences in factor endowments, barriers to technologyadoption and the inappropriateness of frontier technologies to local conditions. The keycomponents are different types of workers, distortions to capital accumulation, directedtechnical change, costly adoption and spillovers from the world technology frontier. Despiteits parsimonious parametrization, our empirical model provides a good fit of GDP data forup to 86 countries in 1970 and 122 countries in 2000. Removing barriers to technologyadoption would increase the output per worker of the average non-OECD country relativeto the US from 0.19 to 0.61, while increasing skill premia in all countries. Removing barriersto trade in goods amplifies income disparities, induces skill-biased technology adoptionand increases skill premia in the majority of countries. These results are reverted if tradeliberalization is coupled with international IPR protection.

ESTRO-HERO survey: Radiotherapy staffing in the European countries: Final results from the ESTRO-HERO survey

Background: The ESTRO Health Economics in Radiation Oncology (HERO) project has the overall aim to develop a knowledge base of the provision of radiotherapy in Europe and build a model for health economic evaluation of radiation treatments at the European level. The first milestone was to assess the availability of radiotherapy resources within Europe. This paper presents the personnel data collected in the ESTRO HERO database. Materials and methods: An 84-item questionnaire was sent out to European countries, through their national scientific and professional radiotherapy societies. The current report includes a detailed analysis of radiotherapy staffing (questionnaire items 4760), analysed in relation to the annual number of treatment courses and the socio-economic status of the countries. The analysis was conducted between February and July 2014, and is based on validated responses from 24 of the 40 European countries defined by the European Cancer Observatory (ECO). Results: A large variation between countries was found for most parameters studied. Averages and ranges for personnel numbers per million inhabitants are 12.8 (2.530.9) for radiation oncologists, 7.6 (019.7) for medical physicists, 3.5 (012.6) for dosimetrists, 26.6 (1.978) for RTTs and 14.8 (0.461.0) for radiotherapy nurses. The combined average for physicists and dosimetrists is 9.8 per million inhabitants and 36.9 for RTT and nurses. Radiation oncologists on average treat 208.9 courses per year (range: 99.9348.8), physicists and dosimetrists conjointly treat 303.3 courses (range: 85757.7) and RTT and nurses 76.8 (range: 25.7156.8). In countries with higher GNI per capita, all personnel categories treat fewer courses per annum than in less affluent countries. This relationship is most evident for RTTs and nurses. Different clusters of countries can be distinguished on the basis of available personnel resources and socio-economic status. Conclusions: The average personnel figures in Europe are now consistent with, or even more favourable than the QUARTS recommendations, probably reflecting a combination of better availability as such, in parallel with the current use of more complex treatments than a decade ago. A considerable variation in available personnel and delivered courses per year however persists among the highest and lowest staffing levels. This not only reflects the variation in cancer incidence and socio-economic determinants, but also the stage in technology adoption along with treatment complexity and the different professional roles and responsibilities within each country. Our data underpin the need for accurate prediction models and long-term education and training programmes

Robotics adoption among the elderly

Editorial material

IFRS adoption in Europe: the case of Germany

From 2005 onwards, consolidated financial statements of listed European companies will have to comply with IFRS (IAS). Many German companies began adopting those standards in the 1990s, on a voluntary basis, because of their need to access international capital funding. Spanish companies, by contrast, are not permitted to adopt IFRS before 2005. This paper has two purposes: first, it analyses the financial impact of initial IFRS adoption on the statement of changes in equity and the income statement of individual German companies. Second, and taking into account the German experience, it focuses on the expected impacts on a sample of listed Spanish companies in two industrial sectors: chemical-pharmaceutical and fashion. Our analysis of German companies comprised all non-financial DAX groups applying IFRS plus additional listed companies in the two selected industrial sectors identified above. The impact of initial adoption of IFRS on German companies was, both individually and overall, very significant. The analysis suggests that the expected impact on Spanish companies is likely to be significant but to a lesser degree than in respect of the German companies in the study.

Optimal technology policy: subsidies versus monitoring

We analyze the optimal technology policy to solve a free-riding problem between the members of a RJV. We assume that when intervening the Government suffers an additional adverse selection problem because it is not able to distinguish the value of the potential innovation. Although subsidies and monitoring may be equivalent policy tools to solve firms' free-riding problem, they imply different social losses if the Government is not able to perfectly distinguish the value of the potential innovation. The supremacy of monitoring tools over subsidies is proved to depend on which type of information the Government is able to obtain about firms' R&D performance.

Resum de la tasca realitzada al Center Biomedical Engineering (CBE) del Massachussets Institute of Technology (MIT). Juliol-Agost 2005

Estudi elaborat a partir d’una estada al Center Biomedical Engineering (CBE) del Massachussets Institute of Technology (MIT), durant els mesos de juliol i agost del 2005. S’investiga una metodologia amb l’objectiu d’obtenir biomaterials que puguin actuar de bastida en la interfície os/cartílag, afavorint la diferenciació i creixement cel·lular de cartílag ossificat que pugui actuar d’unió entre l’articulació i l’os. S’experimenta una metodologia per a establir quins són els péptids afavoridors de la formació de teixit ossi utilitzats en materials d’hidroxiapatita. Es conclou que la tecnologia desenvolupada permet disposar d’una plataforma per assajar l’estudi del signaling sobre cèl·lules embrionàries, que permeti desenvolupar materials amb més capacitat diferenciadora.

Optimal monitoring to implement clean technologies when pollution is random

We analyze a model where firms chose a production technology which, together with some random event, determines the final emission level. We consider the coexistence of two alternative technologies: a "clean" technology, and a "dirty" technology. The environmental regulation is based on taxes over reported emissions, and on penalties over unreported emissions. We show that the optimal inspection policy is a cut-off strategy, for several scenarios concerning the observability of the adoption of the clean technology and the cost of adopting it. We also show that the optimal inspection policy induces the firm to adopt the clean technology if the adoption cost is not too high, but the cost levels for which the firm adopts it depend on the scenario.