89 resultados para LIQUID-EQUILIBRIA
em Consorci de Serveis Universitaris de Catalunya (CSUC), Spain
Resumo:
Consider a Riemannian manifold equipped with an infinitesimal isometry. For this setup, a unified treatment is provided, solely in the language of Riemannian geometry, of techniques in reduction, linearization, and stability of relative equilibria. In particular, for mechanical control systems, an explicit characterization is given for the manner in which reduction by an infinitesimal isometry, and linearization along a controlled trajectory "commute." As part of the development, relationships are derived between the Jacobi equation of geodesic variation and concepts from reduction theory, such as the curvature of the mechanical connection and the effective potential. As an application of our techniques, fiber and base stability of relative equilibria are studied. The paper also serves as a tutorial of Riemannian geometric methods applicable in the intersection of mechanics and control theory.
Resumo:
We analyze (non-deterministic) contests with anonymous contest success functions. There is no restriction on the number of contestants or on their valuations for the prize. We provide intuitive and easily verifiable conditions for the existence of an equilibrium with properties similar to the one of the (deterministic) all-pay auction. Since these conditions are fulfilled for a wide array of situations, the predictions of this equilibrium are very robust to the specific details of the contest. An application of this result contributes to fill a gap in the analysis of the popular Tullock rent- seeking game because it characterizes properties of an equilibrium for increasing returns to scale larger than two, for any number of contestants and in contests with or without a common value. Keywords: (non-) deterministic contest, all-pay auction, contest success functions. JEL Classification Numbers: C72 (Noncooperative Games), D72 (Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections), D44 (Auctions).
Resumo:
A multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multiunit demands consists of a set of sellers that own a given number of indivisible units of (potentially many different) goods and a set of buyers who value those units and want to buy at most an exogenously fixed number of units. We define a competitive equilibrium for this generalized assignment game and prove its existence by using only linear programming. In particular, we show how to compute equilibrium price vectors from the solutions of the dual linear program associated to the primal linear program defined to find optimal assignments. Using only linear programming tools, we also show (i) that the set of competitive equilibria (pairs of price vectors and assignments) has a Cartesian product structure: each equilibrium price vector is part of a competitive equilibrium with all optimal assignments, and vice versa; (ii) that the set of (restricted) equilibrium price vectors has a natural lattice structure; and (iii) how this structure is translated into the set of agents' utilities that are attainable at equilibrium.
Resumo:
We study two cooperative solutions of a market with indivisible goods modeled as a generalized assignment game: Set-wise stability and Core. We first establish that the Set-wise stable set is contained in the Core and it contains the non-empty set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. We then state and prove three limit results for replicated markets. First, the sequence of Cores of replicated markets converges to the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs when the number of replicas tends to infinity. Second, the Set-wise stable set of a two-fold replicated market already coincides with the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. Third, for any number of replicas there is a market with a Core payoff that is not a competitive equilibrium payoff.
Resumo:
A mathematical model is developed to analyse the combined flow and solidification of a liquid in a small pipe or two-dimensional channel. In either case the problem reduces to solving a single equation for the position of the solidification front. Results show that for a large range of flow rates the closure time is approximately constant, and the value depends primarily on the wall temperature and channel width. However, the ice shape at closure will be very different for low and high fluxes. As the flow rate increases the closure time starts to depend on the flow rate until the closure time increases dramatically, subsequently the pipe will never close.
Resumo:
Systematic asymptotic methods are used to formulate a model for the extensional flow of a thin sheet of nematic liquid crystal. With no external body forces applied, the model is found to be equivalent to the so-called Trouton model for Newtonian sheets (and fi bers), albeit with a modi fied "Trouton ratio". However, with a symmetry-breaking electric field gradient applied, behavior deviates from the Newtonian case, and the sheet can undergo fi nite-time breakup if a suitable destabilizing field is applied. Some simple exact solutions are presented to illustrate the results in certain idealized limits, as well as sample numerical results to the full model equations.
Resumo:
We performed a comprehensive study to assess the fit for purpose of four chromatographic conditions for the determination of six groups of marine lipophilic toxins (okadaic acid and dinophysistoxins, pectenotoxins, azaspiracids, yessotoxins, gymnodimine and spirolides) by LC-MS/MS to select the most suitable conditions as stated by the European Union Reference Laboratory for Marine Biotoxins (EURLMB). For every case, the elution gradient has been optimized to achieve a total run-time cycle of 12 min. We performed a single-laboratory validation for the analysis of three relevant matrices for the seafood aquaculture industry (mussels, pacific oysters and clams), and for sea urchins for which no data about lipophilic toxins have been reported before. Moreover, we have compared the method performance under alkaline conditions using two quantification strategies: the external standard calibration (EXS) and the matrix-matched standard calibration (MMS). Alkaline conditions were the only scenario that allowed detection windows with polarity switching in a 3200 QTrap mass spectrometer, thus the analysis of all toxins can be accomplished in a single run, increasing sample throughput. The limits of quantification under alkaline conditions met the validation requirements established by the EURLMB for all toxins and matrices, while the remaining conditions failed in some cases. The accuracy of the method and the matrix effects where generally dependent on the mobile phases and the seafood species. The MMS had a moderate positive impact on method accuracy for crude extracts, but it showed poor trueness for seafood species other than mussels when analyzing hydrolyzed extracts. Alkaline conditions with EXS and recovery correction for OA were selected as the most proper conditions in the context of our laboratory. This comparative study can help other laboratories to choose the best conditions for the implementation of LC-MS/MS according to their own necessities.
Resumo:
The subject of this project is about “Energy Dispersive X-Ray Fluorescence ” (EDXRF).This technique can be used for a tremendous variety of elemental analysis applications.It provides one of the simplest, most accurate and most economic analytical methods for thedetermination of the chemical composition of many types of materials.The purposes of this project are:- To give some basic information about Energy Dispersive X-ray Fluorescence.- To perform qualitative and quantitative analysis of different samples (water-dissolutions,powders, oils,..) in order to define the sensitivity and detection limits of the equipment.- To make a comprehensive and easy-to-use manual of the ‘ARL QUANT’X EnergyDispersive X-Ray Fluorescence’ apparatus
Resumo:
We extend Aumann's theorem [Aumann 1987], deriving correlated equilibria as a consequence of common priors and common knowledge of rationality, by explicitly allowing for non-rational behavior. Wereplace the assumption of common knowledge of rationality with a substantially weaker one, joint p-belief of rationality, where agents believe the other agents are rational with probability p or more. We show that behavior in this case constitutes a kind of correlated equilibrium satisfying certain p-belief constraints, and that it varies continuously in the parameters p and, for p sufficiently close to one,with high probability is supported on strategies that survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. Finally, we extend the analysis to characterizing rational expectations of interimtypes, to games of incomplete information, as well as to the case of non-common priors.
Resumo:
The first generation models of currency crises have often been criticized because they predict that, in the absence of very large triggering shocks, currency attacks should be predictable and lead to small devaluations. This paper shows that these features of first generation models are not robust to the inclusion of private information. In particular, this paper analyzes a generalization of the Krugman-Flood-Garber (KFG) model, which relaxes the assumption that all consumers are perfectly informed about the level of fundamentals. In this environment, the KFG equilibrium of zero devaluation is only one of many possible equilibria. In all the other equilibria, the lack of perfect information delays the attack on the currency past the point at which the shadow exchange rate equals the peg, giving rise to unpredictable and discrete devaluations.
Resumo:
We will call a game a reachable (pure strategy) equilibria game if startingfrom any strategy by any player, by a sequence of best-response moves weare able to reach a (pure strategy) equilibrium. We give a characterizationof all finite strategy space duopolies with reachable equilibria. Wedescribe some applications of the sufficient conditions of the characterization.
Resumo:
We show that every finite N-player normal form game possesses a correlated equilibrium with a precise lower bound on the number of outcomes to which it assigns zero probability. In particular, the largest games with a unique fully supported correlated equilibrium are two-player games; moreover, the lower bound grows exponentially in the number of players N.