ISO standars on test methods for water radioactivity monitoring

Water is vital to humans and each of us needs at least 1.5 L of safe water a day to drink. Beginning as long ago as 1958 the World Health Organization (WHO) has published guidelines to help ensure water is safe to drink. Focused from the start on monitoring radionuclides in water, and continually cooperating with WHO, the International Standardization Organization (ISO) has been publishing standards on radioactivity test methods since 1978. As reliable, comparable and"fit for purpose" results are an essential requirement for any public health decision based on radioactivity measurements, international standards of tested and validated radionuclide test methods are an important tool for production of such measurements. This paper presents the ISO standards already published that could be used as normative references by testing laboratories in charge of radioactivity monitoring of drinking water as well as those currently under drafting and the prospect of standardized fast test methods in response to a nuclear accident.

Intellectual property rights and efficient firm organization

I show that intellectual property rights yield static efficiency gains, irrespective oftheir dynamic role in fostering innovation. I develop a property-rights model of firmorganization with two dimensions of non-contractible investment. In equilibrium, thefirst best is attained if and only if ownership of tangible and intangible assets is equallyprotected. If IP rights are weaker, firm structure is distorted and efficiency declines:the entrepreneur must either integrate her suppliers, which prompts a decline in theirinvestment; or else risk their defection, which entails a waste of her human capital. Mymodel predicts greater prevalence of vertical integration where IP rights are weaker,and a switch from integration to outsourcing over the product cycle. Both empiricalpredictions are consistent with evidence on multinational companies. As a normativeimplication, I find that IP rights should be strong but narrowly defined, to protect abusiness without holding up its potential spin-offs.

Importance of international linkages for local know-how flows. Some econometric evidence from Belgium

External knowledge is an important input for the innovation process of firms. Increasingly, this knowledge is likely to originate fromoutside of their national borders. This explains the preoccupationof policymakers with stimulating local technology transfers coming from international firms. We find that firms that have access to the international technology market are more likely to transfer technology to the local economy. In doing so, we qualify the traditional assertion that multinational firms are more likelyto transfer technology to the local economy. Once controlled for the superior access to the international technology market that multinationals enjoy, we find that these firms are not more likelyto transfer technology to the local economy compared to exportingor local firms that have access to the international technology market. In summary, the main result of this paper is that it isnot so much the international character of the firms, but rathertheir access to the international technology market that is important for generating external knowledge transfers to the local economy.

A theory of international conflict management and sanctioning

In this paper we analyze sanctioning policies in international law. We develop a model of international military conflict where the conflicting countries can be a target of international sanctions. These sanctions constitute an equilibrium outcome of an international political market for sanctions, where different countries trade political influence. We show that the level of sanctions in equilibrium is strictly positive but limited, in the sense that higher sanctions would exacerbate the military conflict, not reduce it. We then propose an alternative interpretation to the perceived lack of effectiveness of international sanctions, by showing that the problem might not be one of undersanctioning but of oversanctioning.

Combating corruption in international business transactions

We analyze the impact of different types of international conventions thatrequire signatory countries to penalize domestic firms that are found tohave bribed foreign public officials. We analyze enforcement of penaltiesunder a convention styled after the OECD's 'Convention on Combating Briberyof Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions', in whichsignatory countries commit to prosecuting firms that have bribed publicofficials of any foreign country. We compare the results with the case inwhich the convention requires signatory countries to commit to prosecutingfirms that have bribed public officials of signatory countries only.We argue that the second type of convention is more likely to ensureenforcement of penalties on firms found to have bribed foreign publicofficials.