Delegation and information sharing in oligopoly

Information sharing in oligopoly has been analyzed by assuming that firms behave as a sole economic agent. In this paper I assume that ownership and management are separated. Managers are allowed to falsely report their costs to owners and rivals. Under such circumstances, if owners want to achieve information sharing they must use managerial contracts that implement truthful cost reporting by managers as a dominant strategy. I show that, contrary to the classical result, without the inclusion of message-dependent payments in managerial contracts there will be no information sharing. On the other hand, with the inclusion of such publicly observable payments and credible ex-ante commitment by owners not to modify these payments, there will be perfect information sharing without the need for third parties. Keywords: Information sharing, Delegation, Managerial contracts. JEL classification numbers: D21, D82, L13, L21

Information-sharing implications of horizontal mergers

We analyze the effects of uncertainty and private information on horizontal mergers. Firms face uncertain demands or costs and receive private signals. They may decide to merge sharing their private information. If the uncertainty parameters are independent and the signals are perfect, uncertainty generates an informational advantage only to the merging firms, increasing merger incentives and decreasing free-riding effects. Thus, mergers become more profitable and stable. These results generalize to the case of correlated parameters if the correlation is not very severe, and for perfect correlation if the firms receive noisy signals. From the normative point of view, mergers are socially less harmful compared to deterministic markets and may even be welfare enhancing. If the signals are, instead, publicly observed, uncertainty does not necessarily give more incentives to merge, and mergers are not always less socially harmful.

Avaluació i disseny de la base de dades d'un IES Implementació del mòdul per la gestió dels treballs de recerca

Aquest projecte es centra en el desenvolupament d'una aplicació web dinàmica per un Institut d'Estudis Secundaris, per tal d'afegir molta funcionalitat a una part de l'actual web estàtica de la que disposen i que permetrà compartir la informació d'una manera fàcil i pràctica.

Open Learning Network : the evidence of OER impact

Much of the initial work on Open Educational Resources (OER) has inevitably concentrated on how to produce the resources themselves and to establish the idea in the community. It is now eight years since the term OER was first used and more than ten years since the concept of open content was described and a greater focus is now emerging on the way in which OER can influence policy and change the way in which educational systems help people learn. The Open University UK and Carnegie Mellon University are working in partnership on the OLnet (Open Learning Network), funded by The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation with the aims to search out the evidence for use and reuse of OER and to establish a network for information sharing about research in the field. This means both gathering evidence and developing approaches for how to research and understand ways to learn in a more open world, particularly linked to OER, but also looking at other influences.

Endogenous spillovers, increased competition and re-organization waves

We consider an entrepreneur that is the sole producer of a costreducing skill, but the entrepreneur that hires a team to usethe skill cannot prevent collusive trade for the innovation related knowledge between employees and competitors. We showthat there are two types of diffusion avoiding strategies forthe entrepreneur to preempt collusive communication i) settingup a large productive capacity (the traditional firm) and ii)keeping a small team (the lean firm). The traditional firm ischaracterized by its many "marginal" employees that work shortdays, receive flat wages and are incompletely informed about the innovation. The lean firm is small in number of employees,engages in complete information sharing among members, that are paid with stock option schemes. We find that the lean firm is superior to the traditional firm when technological entry costsare low and when the sector is immature.

R&D cooperation and spillovers: Some empirical evidence

This paper provides some first empirical evidence on the relationshipbetween R&D spillovers and R&D cooperation. The results suggest disentangling different aspects of know-how flows. Firms which rate incoming spillovers more importantly and who can limit outgoing spillovers by a more effective protection of know-how, are more likely to cooperate in R&D. Our analysis also finds that cooperating firms have higher incoming spillovers and higher protection of know-how, indicating that cooperation may serve as a vehicle to manage information flows. Our results thus suggest that on the one hand the information sharing and coordination aspects of incoming spillovers are crucial in understanding cooperation, while on the other hand, protection against outgoing spillovers is important for firms to engage in stable cooperative agreements by reducing free-rider problems. Distinguishing different types of cooperative partners reveals that while managing outgoing spillovers is less critical in alliances with non-commercial research partners than between vertically related partners, the incoming spillovers seem to be more critical in understanding the former type of R&D cooperation.

Dynamic stackelberg game with risk-averse players: optimal risk-sharing under asymmetric information

The objective of this paper is to clarify the interactive nature of the leader-follower relationship when both players are endogenously risk-averse. The analysis is placed in the context of a dynamic closed-loop Stackelberg game with private information. The case of a risk-neutral leader, very often discussed in the literature, is only a borderline possibility in the present study. Each player in the game is characterized by a risk-averse type which is unknown to his opponent. The goal of the leader is to implement an optimal incentive compatible risk-sharing contract. The proposed approach provides a qualitative analysis of adaptive risk behavior profiles for asymmetrically informed players in the context of dynamic strategic interactions modelled as incentive Stackelberg games.

Information Mobility: Information Dissemination in Mobile Networks

En el nostre projecte, considerem un escenari urbà o interurbà on persones amb dispositius mòbils (smartphones) o vehicles equipats amb interfícies de comunicació, estan interessats en compartir fitxers entre ells o descarregar-los al creuar Punts d’Accés (APs) propers a la carretera. Estudiem la possibilitat d’utilizar la cooperació en les trobades casuals entre nodes per augmentar la velocitat de descàrrega global. Amb aquest objectiu, plantejem algoritmes per a la selecció de quins paquets, per a quins destins i quins transportistes s’escullen en cada moment. Mitjançant extenses simulacions, mostrem com les cooperacions carry&forward dels nodes augmenten significativament la velocitat de descàrrega dels usuaris, i com aquest resultat es manté per a diversos patrons de mobilitat, col•locacions d'AP i càrregues de la xarxa. Per altra banda, aparells com els smartphones, on la targeta de WiFi està encesa contínuament, consumeixen l'energia de la bateria en poques hores. En molts escenaris, una targeta WiFi sempre activa és poc útil, perque sovint no hi ha necessitat de transmissió o recepció. Aquest fet es veu agreujat en les Delay Tolerant Networks (DTN), on els nodes intercanvien dades quan es creuen i en tenen l’oportunitat. Les tècniques de gestió de l’estalvi d’energia permeten extendre la duració de les bateries. El nostre projecte analitza els avantatges i inconvenients que apareixen quan els nodes apaguen períodicament la seva targeta wireless per a estalviar energia en escenaris DTN. Els nostres resultats mostren les condicions en que un node pot desconnectar la bateria sense afectar la probabilitat de contacte amb altres nodes, i les condicions en que aquesta disminueix. Per exemple, es demostra que la vida del node pot ser duplicada mantenint la probabilitat de contacte a 1. I que aquesta disminueix ràpidament en intentar augmentar més la vida útil.

Noise and aggregation of information in large markets

We study a novel class of noisy rational expectations equilibria in markets with largenumber of agents. We show that, as long as noise increases with the number of agents inthe economy, the limiting competitive equilibrium is well-defined and leads to non-trivialinformation acquisition, perfect information aggregation, and partially revealing prices,even if per capita noise tends to zero. We find that in such equilibrium risk sharing and price revelation play dierent roles than in the standard limiting economy in which per capita noise is not negligible. We apply our model to study information sales by a monopolist, information acquisition in multi-asset markets, and derivatives trading. Thelimiting equilibria are shown to be perfectly competitive, even when a strategic solutionconcept is used.

Setting standards: Information accumulation in development

We propose a model in which economic relations and institutions in advancedand less developed economies differ as these societies have access to different amounts of information. This lack of information makes it hard to give the right incentives to managers and entrepreneurs. We argue that differences in the amount of information arise because of the differences in the scale of activities in rich and poor economies; namely, there is too little repetition of similar activities in pooreconomies, thus insufficient information to set the appropriate standards for firm performance. Our model predicts a number of institutional and structural transformations as the economy accumulates capital and information.

Measuring researchers' use of scholarly information through social bookmarking data: a case study of BibSonomy

This paper explores the possibility of using data from social bookmarking services to measure the use of information by academic researchers. Social bookmarking data can be used to augment participative methods (e.g. interviews and surveys) and other, non-participative methods (e.g. citation analysis and transaction logs) to measure the use of scholarly information. We use BibSonomy, a free resource-sharing system, as a case study. Results show that published journal articles are by far the most popular type of source bookmarked, followed by conference proceedings and books. Commercial journal publisher platforms are the most popular type of information resource bookmarked, followed by websites, records in databases and digital repositories. Usage of open access information resources is low in comparison with toll access journals. In the case of open access repositories, there is a marked preference for the use of subject-based repositories over institutional repositories. The results are consistent with those observed in related studies based on surveys and citation analysis, confirming the possible use of bookmarking data in studies of information behaviour in academic settings. The main advantages of using social bookmarking data are that is an unobtrusive approach, it captures the reading habits of researchers who are not necessarily authors, and data are readily available. The main limitation is that a significant amount of human resources is required in cleaning and standardizing the data.

Provision of supplementary materials in Library and Information Science scholarly journals

Purpose This study seeks to analyse the policies of library and information science (LIS) journals regarding the publication of supplementary materials, the number of journals and articles that include this feature, the kind of supplementary materials published with regard to their function in the article, the formats employed and the access provided to readers. Design/methodology/approach The study analysed the instructions for authors of LIS journals indexed in the ISI Journal Citation Reports, as well as the supplementary materials attached to the articles published in their 2011 online volumes. Findings Large publishers are more likely to have a policy regarding the publication of supplementary materials, and policies are usually homogeneous across all the journals of a given publisher. Most policies state the acceptance of supplementary materials, and even journals without a policy also publish supplementary materials. The majority of supplementary materials provided in LIS articles are extended methodological explanations and additional results in the form of textual information in PDF or Word files. Some toll-access journals provide open access to any reader to these files. Originality/value This study provides new insights into the characteristics of supplementary materials in LIS journals. The results may be used by journal publishers to establish a policy on the publication of supplementary materials and, more broadly, to develop data sharing initiatives in academic settings.

Sharing Open Source License and Copyright Data with SPDX

Organizations across the globe are creating and distributing products that include open source software. To ensure compliance with the open source licenses, each company needs to evaluate exactly what open source licenses and copyrights are included - resulting in duplicated effort and redundancy. This talk will provide an overview of a new Software Package Data Exchange (SPDX) specification. This specification will provide a common format to share information about the open source licenses and copyrights that are included in any software package, with the goal of saving time and improving data accuracy. This talk will review the progress of the initiative; discuss the benefits to organizations using open source and share information on how you can contribute.

Provision of supplementary materials in Library and Information Science scholarly journals

Purpose- This study seeks to analyse the policies of library and information science (LIS) journals regarding the publication of supplementary materials, the number of journals and articles that include this feature, the kind of supplementary materials published with regard to their function in the article, the formats employed and the access provided to readers. Design/methodology/approach- The study analysed the instructions for authors of LIS journals indexed in the ISI Journal Citation Reports, as well as the supplementary materials attached to the articles published in their 2011 online volumes. Findings- Large publishers are more likely to have a policy regarding the publication of supplementary materials, and policies are usually homogeneous across all the journals of a given publisher. Most policies state the acceptance of supplementary materials, and even journals without a policy also publish supplementary materials. The majority of supplementary materials provided in LIS articles are extended methodological explanations and additional results in the form of textual information in PDF or Word files. Some toll-access journals provide open access to any reader to these files. Originality/value- This study provides new insights into the characteristics of supplementary materials in LIS journals. The results may be used by journal publishers to establish a policy on the publication of supplementary materials and, more broadly, to develop data sharing initiatives in academic settings.

Security prices and market transparency: the role of prior information

This paper analyzes the role of traders' priors (proper versus improper) on the implications of market transparency by comparing a pre-trade transparent market with an opaque market in a set-up based on Madhavan (1996). We show that prices may be more informative in the opaque market, regardless of how priors are modelled. In contrast, the comparison of market liquidity and volatility in the two market structures are affected by prior specification. Key words: Market microstructure, Transparency, Prior information