Label Space Reduction in All-Optical Label Switchiing Networks

Report for the scientific sojourn at the Department of Information Technology (INTEC) at the Ghent University, Belgium, from january to june 2007. All-Optical Label Swapping (AOLS) forms a key technology towards the implementation of All-Optical Packet Switching nodes (AOPS) for the future optical Internet. The capital expenditures of the deployment of AOLS increases with the size of the label spaces (i.e. the number of used labels), since a special optical device is needed for each recognized label on every node. Label space sizes are affected by the wayin which demands are routed. For instance, while shortest-path routing leads to the usage of fewer labels but high link utilization, minimum interference routing leads to the opposite. This project studies and proposes All-Optical Label Stacking (AOLStack), which is an extension of the AOLS architecture. AOLStack aims at reducing label spaces while easing the compromise with link utilization. In this project, an Integer Lineal Program is proposed with the objective of analyzing the softening of the aforementioned trade-off due to AOLStack. Furthermore, a heuristic aiming at finding good solutions in polynomial-time is proposed as well. Simulation results show that AOLStack either a) reduces the label spaces with a low increase in the link utilization or, similarly, b) uses better the residual bandwidth to decrease the number of labels even more.

The Role of Information in Contemporary Migration. More Sources but Less Informed

La migració internacional contemporània és integrada en un procés d'interconnexió global definit per les revolucions del transport i de les tecnologies de la informació i la comunicació. Una de les conseqüències d'aquesta interconnexió global és que les persones migrants tenen més capacitat per a processar informació tant abans com després de marxar. Aquests canvis podrien tenir implicacions inesperades per a la migració contemporània pel que fa a la capacitat de les persones migrants per a prendre decisions més informades, la reducció de la incertesa en contextos migratoris, el desdibuixament del concepte de distància o la decisió d'emigrar cap a llocs més llunyans. Aquesta recerca és important, ja que la manca de coneixement sobre aquesta qüestió podria contribuir a fer augmentar la distància entre els objectius de les polítiques de migració i els seus resultats. El paper que tenen els agents de la informació en els contextos migratoris també podria canviar. En aquest escenari, perquè les polítiques de migració siguin més efectives, s'haurà de tenir en compte la major capacitat de la població migrant de processar la informació i les fonts d'informació en què es confia. Aquest article demostra que l'equació més informació equival a més ben informat no es compleix sempre. Fins i tot en l'era de la informació, les fonts no fiables, les expectatives falses, la sobreinformació i els rumors encara són presents en els contextos migratoris. Tanmateix, defensem l'argument que aquests efectes no volguts es podrien reduir complint quatre requisits de la informació fiable: que sigui exhaustiva, que sigui rellevant, que s'hi confiï i que sigui actualitzada.

Turnout, political preferences and information: Experimental evidence from Perú

Electoral institutions that encourage citizens to vote are widely used around the world. Yet littleis known about the effects of such institutions on voter participation and the composition of the electorate.In this paper, I combine a field experiment with a change in Peruvian voting laws to identify theeffect of monetary (dis-)incentives on voting. Using the random variation in the fine for abstention andan objective measure of turnout at the individual level, I estimate the elasticity of voting with respectto cost to be -0.21. Consistent with the theoretical model presented, the reduction in turnout inducedby the reduction in the fine is driven by voters who (i) are in the center of the political spectrum, (ii)are less interested in politics, and (iii) hold less political information. However, voters who respondto changes in the cost of abstention do not have different preferences for policies than those who voteregardless of the cost. Further, involvement in politics, as measured by the decision to acquire politicalinformation, seems to be independent of the level of the fine. Additional results indicate that thereduction in the fine does not affect the incidence of vote buying, but increases the price paid for avote.

Accounting information and the prediction of farm viability

Until recently farm management made little use of accounting and agriculture has been largely excluded from the scope of accounting standards. This article examines the current use of accounting in agriculture and points theneed to establish accounting standards for agriculture. Empirical evidence shows that accounting can make a significant contribution to agricultural management and farm viability and could also be important for other agents involved in agricultural decision making. Existing literature on failureprediction models and farm viability prediction studies provide the starting point for our research, in which two dichotomous logit models were applied to subsamples of viable and unviable farms in Catalonia, Spain. The firstmodel considered only non-financial variables, while the other also considered financial ones. When accounting variables were added to the model, a significant reduction in deviance was observed.

FAM-MDR: a flexible family-based multifactor dimensionality reduction technique to detect epistasis using related individuals

We propose a novel multifactor dimensionality reduction method for epistasis detection in small or extended pedigrees, FAM-MDR. It combines features of the Genome-wide Rapid Association using Mixed Model And Regression approach (GRAMMAR) with Model-Based MDR (MB-MDR). We focus on continuous traits, although the method is general and can be used for outcomes of any type, including binary and censored traits. When comparing FAM-MDR with Pedigree-based Generalized MDR (PGMDR), which is a generalization of Multifactor Dimensionality Reduction (MDR) to continuous traits and related individuals, FAM-MDR was found to outperform PGMDR in terms of power, in most of the considered simulated scenarios. Additional simulations revealed that PGMDR does not appropriately deal with multiple testing and consequently gives rise to overly optimistic results. FAM-MDR adequately deals with multiple testing in epistasis screens and is in contrast rather conservative, by construction. Furthermore, simulations show that correcting for lower order (main) effects is of utmost importance when claiming epistasis. As Type 2 Diabetes Mellitus (T2DM) is a complex phenotype likely influenced by gene-gene interactions, we applied FAM-MDR to examine data on glucose area-under-the-curve (GAUC), an endophenotype of T2DM for which multiple independent genetic associations have been observed, in the Amish Family Diabetes Study (AFDS). This application reveals that FAM-MDR makes more efficient use of the available data than PGMDR and can deal with multi-generational pedigrees more easily. In conclusion, we have validated FAM-MDR and compared it to PGMDR, the current state-of-the-art MDR method for family data, using both simulations and a practical dataset. FAM-MDR is found to outperform PGMDR in that it handles the multiple testing issue more correctly, has increased power, and efficiently uses all available information.

The Role of Information in Contemporary Migration. More Sources but Less Informed

La migració internacional contemporània és integrada en un procés d'interconnexió global definit per les revolucions del transport i de les tecnologies de la informació i la comunicació. Una de les conseqüències d'aquesta interconnexió global és que les persones migrants tenen més capacitat per a processar informació tant abans com després de marxar. Aquests canvis podrien tenir implicacions inesperades per a la migració contemporània pel que fa a la capacitat de les persones migrants per a prendre decisions més informades, la reducció de la incertesa en contextos migratoris, el desdibuixament del concepte de distància o la decisió d'emigrar cap a llocs més llunyans. Aquesta recerca és important, ja que la manca de coneixement sobre aquesta qüestió podria contribuir a fer augmentar la distància entre els objectius de les polítiques de migració i els seus resultats. El paper que tenen els agents de la informació en els contextos migratoris també podria canviar. En aquest escenari, perquè les polítiques de migració siguin més efectives, s'haurà de tenir en compte la major capacitat de la població migrant de processar la informació i les fonts d'informació en què es confia. Aquest article demostra que l'equació més informació equival a més ben informat no es compleix sempre. Fins i tot en l'era de la informació, les fonts no fiables, les expectatives falses, la sobreinformació i els rumors encara són presents en els contextos migratoris. Tanmateix, defensem l'argument que aquests efectes no volguts es podrien reduir complint quatre requisits de la informació fiable: que sigui exhaustiva, que sigui rellevant, que s'hi confiï i que sigui actualitzada.

Security prices and market transparency: the role of prior information

This paper analyzes the role of traders' priors (proper versus improper) on the implications of market transparency by comparing a pre-trade transparent market with an opaque market in a set-up based on Madhavan (1996). We show that prices may be more informative in the opaque market, regardless of how priors are modelled. In contrast, the comparison of market liquidity and volatility in the two market structures are affected by prior specification. Key words: Market microstructure, Transparency, Prior information

Delegation and information sharing in oligopoly

Information sharing in oligopoly has been analyzed by assuming that firms behave as a sole economic agent. In this paper I assume that ownership and management are separated. Managers are allowed to falsely report their costs to owners and rivals. Under such circumstances, if owners want to achieve information sharing they must use managerial contracts that implement truthful cost reporting by managers as a dominant strategy. I show that, contrary to the classical result, without the inclusion of message-dependent payments in managerial contracts there will be no information sharing. On the other hand, with the inclusion of such publicly observable payments and credible ex-ante commitment by owners not to modify these payments, there will be perfect information sharing without the need for third parties. Keywords: Information sharing, Delegation, Managerial contracts. JEL classification numbers: D21, D82, L13, L21

Interest rate determination in the interbank market

The purpose of this paper is to study the determinants of equilibrium in the market for daily funds. We use the EONIA panel database which includes daily information on the lending rates applied by contributing commercial banks. The data clearly shows an increase in both the time series volatility and the cross section dispersion of rates towards the end of the reserve maintenance period. These increases are highly correlated. With respect to quantities, we find that the volume of trade as well as the use of the standing facilities are also larger at the end of the maintenance period. Our theoretical model shows how the operational framework of monetary policy causes a reduction in the elasticity of the supply of funds by banks throughout the reserve maintenance period. This reduction in the elasticity together with market segmentation and heterogeneity are able to generate distributions for the interest rates and quantities traded with the same properties as in the data.

The Instrumental voter goes to the news-agent: demand for information, election closeness, and the media

This paper studies the impact of instrumental voting on information demand and mass media behaviour during electoral campaigns. If voters act instrumentally then information demand should increase with the closeness of an election. Mass media are modeled as profit-maximizing firms that take into account information demand, the value of customers to advertisers and the marginal cost of customers. Information supply should be larger in electoral constituencies where the contest is expected to be closer, there is a higher population density, and customers are on average more profitable for advertisers. The impact of electorate size is theoretically undetermined. These conclusions are then tested with comfortable results on data from the 1997 general election in Britain.

Spatial competition between two candidates of different quality: the effects of candidate ideology and private information

This paper examines competition in a spatial model of two-candidate elections, where one candidate enjoys a quality advantage over the other candidate. The candidates care about winning and also have policy preferences. There is two-dimensional private information. Candidate ideal points as well as their tradeoffs between policy preferences and winning are private information. The distribution of this two-dimensional type is common knowledge. The location of the median voter's ideal point is uncertain, with a distribution that is commonly known by both candidates. Pure strategy equilibria always exist in this model. We characterize the effects of increased uncertainty about the median voter, the effect of candidate policy preferences, and the effects of changes in the distribution of private information. We prove that the distribution of candidate policies approaches the mixed equilibrium of Aragones and Palfrey (2002a), when both candidates' weights on policy preferences go to zero.

Information-sharing implications of horizontal mergers

We analyze the effects of uncertainty and private information on horizontal mergers. Firms face uncertain demands or costs and receive private signals. They may decide to merge sharing their private information. If the uncertainty parameters are independent and the signals are perfect, uncertainty generates an informational advantage only to the merging firms, increasing merger incentives and decreasing free-riding effects. Thus, mergers become more profitable and stable. These results generalize to the case of correlated parameters if the correlation is not very severe, and for perfect correlation if the firms receive noisy signals. From the normative point of view, mergers are socially less harmful compared to deterministic markets and may even be welfare enhancing. If the signals are, instead, publicly observed, uncertainty does not necessarily give more incentives to merge, and mergers are not always less socially harmful.

Asymmetric demand information in uniform and discriminatory call auctions: an experimental analysis motivated by electricity markets

We study the outcomes of experimental multi-unit uniform and discriminatory auctions with demand uncertainty. Our study is motivated by the ongoing debate about market design in the electricity industry. Our main aim is to compare the effect of asymmetric demand-information between sellers on the performance of the two auction institutions. In our baseline conditions all sellers have the same information, whereas in our treatment conditions some sellers have better information than others. In both information conditions we find that average transaction prices and price volatility are not significantly different under the two auction institutions. However, when there is asymmetric information among sellers the discriminatory auction is significantly less efficient. These results are not in line with the typical arguments made in favor of discriminatory pricing in electricity industries; namely, lower consumer prices and less price volatility. Moreover, our results provide some indication that discriminatory auctions reduce technical efficiency relative to uniform auctions.

General equilibrium with asymmetric information: a dual approach

We study markets where the characteristics or decisions of certain agents are relevant but not known to their trading partners. Assuming exclusive transactions, the environment is described as a continuum economy with indivisible commodities. We characterize incentive efficient allocations as solutions to linear programming problems and appeal to duality theory to demonstrate the generic existence of external effects in these markets. Because under certain conditions such effects may generate non-convexities, randomization emerges as a theoretic possibility. In characterizing market equilibria we show that, consistently with the personalized nature of transactions, prices are generally non-linear in the underlying consumption. On the other hand, external effects may have critical implications for market efficiency. With adverse selection, in fact, cross-subsidization across agents with different private information may be necessary for optimality, and so, the market need not even achieve an incentive efficient allocation. In contrast, for the case of a single commodity, we find that when informational asymmetries arise after the trading period (e.g. moral hazard; ex post hidden types) external effects are fully internalized at a market equilibrium.