Optimal law enforcement under asymmetric information

In this paper, we focus on the problem created by asymmetric informationabout the enforcer's (agent's) costs associated to enforcement expenditure. This adverse selection problem affects optimal law enforcement because a low cost enforcer may conceal its information by imitating a high cost enforcer, and must then be given a compensation to be induced to reveal its true costs. The government faces a trade-off between minimizing the enforcer's compensation and maximizing the net surplus of harmful acts. As a consequence, the probability of apprehension and punishment is usually reduced leading to more offenses being committed. We show that asymmetry of information does not affect law enforcement as long as raising public funds is costless. The consideration of costly raising of public funds permits to establish the positive correlation between asymmetry of information between government and enforcers andthe crime rate.

Accessing Legal Information in Catalonia. Open Acces to Legislation and Case Law

The article outlines free online legal resources to conduct research on Catalan and Spanish legislation and case-law. Most of these resources are primary sources made public by government bodies. The list shows how the Spanish and Catalan governments, in their attempt to promote equal access to legislation and case-law, cover the different jurisdictions. The text also mentions some resources to conduct historical legal research about legislation and case law, and some free legal private websites.

Net Neutrality and other challenges for the future of the Internet. Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Internet, Law & Politics. Universitat Oberta de Catalunya, Barcelona, 11-12 July, 2011

Peer-reviewed

Challenges and Opportunities of Online Entertainment. Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Internet, Law & Politics. Universitat Oberta de Catalunya, Barcelona, 9-10 July, 2012.

El VIII Congrés Internacional Internet, Dret i Política (IDP 2012) que s'ha dut a terme a Barcelona els dies 9 i 10 de juliol de 2012 sota el títol genèric de "Reptes i oportunitats de l'entreteniment en línia", ha abordat alguns dels principals reptes als que s'enfronta la societat de la informació des de la perspectiva jurídica i politològica. Concretament, els temes centrals han estat el debat sobre l'entreteniment a la xarxa, així com altres qüestions relacionades amb Internet i els drets de propietat intel·lectual, la privacitat, la seguretat o la llibertat d'expressió.

Categorization of bibsonomy tags to apply privacy-preserving mechanisms.

In this technical report, we approach one of the practical aspects when it comes to represent users' interests from their tagging activity, namely the categorization of tags into high-level categories of interest. The reason is that the representation of user profiles on the basis of the myriad of tags available on the Web is certainly unfeasible from various practical perspectives; mainly concerningthe unavailability of data to reliably, accurately measure interests across such fine-grained categorization, and, should the data be available, its overwhelming computational intractability. Motivated by this, our study presents the results of a categorization process whereby a collection of tags posted at BibSonomy #http://www.bibsonomy.org# are classified into 5 categories of interest. The methodology used to conduct such categorization is in line with other works in the field.

The Law of Impersonal Transactions: Meaning and Difficulties

Most economic interactions happen in a context of sequential exchange in which innocent third parties suffer information asymmetry with respect to previous "originative" contracts. The law reduces transaction costs by protecting these third parties but preserves some element of consent by property right holders to avoid damaging property enforcement-e.g., it is they as principals who authorize agents in originative contracts. Judicial verifiability of these originative contracts is obtained either as an automatic byproduct of transactions or, when these would have remained private, by requiring them to be made public. Protecting third parties produces a sort of legal commodity which is easy to trade impersonally, improving the allocation and specialization of resources. Historical delay in generalizing this legal commoditization paradigm is attributed to path dependency-the law first developed for personal trade-and an unbalance in vested interests, as luddite legal professionals face weak public bureaucracies.

Common law and civil law as pro-market adaptations

We argue that in the development of the Western legal system, cognitive departures are themain determinant of the optimal degree of judicial rule-making. Judicial discretion, seen here as the main distinguishing feature between both legal systems, is introduced in civil law jurisdictions to protect, rather than to limit, freedom of contract against potential judicial backlash. Such protection was unnecessary in common law countries, where free-market relations enjoyed safer judicial ground mainly due to their relatively gradual evolution, their reliance on practitioners as judges, and the earlier development of institutional checks and balances that supported private property rights. In our framework, differences in costs and benefits associated with self-interest and lack of information require a cognitive failure to be active.

The economics of organized crime and optimal law enforcement

This paper extends the optimal law enforcement literature to organized crime.We model the criminal organization as a vertical structure where the principal extracts some rents from the agents through extortion. Depending on the principal's information set, threats may or may not be credible. As long as threats are credible, the principal is able to fully extract rents.In that case, the results obtained by applying standard theory of optimal law enforcement are robust: we argue for a tougher policy. However, when threats are not credible, the principal is not able to fully extract rents and there is violence. Moreover, we show that it is not necessarily true that a tougher law enforcement policy should be chosen when in presence of organized crime.

Dynamic optimal law enforcement with learning

We incorporate the process of enforcement learning by assuming that the agency's current marginal cost is a decreasing function of its past experience of detecting and convicting. The agency accumulates data and information (on criminals, on opportunities of crime) enhancing the ability to apprehend in the future at a lower marginal cost.We focus on the impact of enforcement learning on optimal stationary compliance rules. In particular, we show that the optimal stationary fine could be less-than-maximal and the optimal stationary probability of detection could be higher-than-otherwise.

The law of impersonal transactions

Most economic interactions happen in a context of sequential exchangein which innocent third parties suffer information asymmetry with respect toprevious "originative" contracts. The law reduces transaction costs byprotecting these third parties but preserves some element of consent byproperty rightholders to avoid damaging property enforcement?e.g., it isthey, as principals, who authorize agents in originative contracts. Judicialverifiability of these originative contracts is obtained either as an automaticbyproduct of transactions or, when these would have remained private, byrequiring them to be made public. Protecting third parties produces a legalcommodity which is easy to trade impersonally, improving the allocationand specialization of resources. Historical delay in generalizing this legalcommoditization paradigm is attributed to path dependency?the law firstdeveloped for personal trade?and an unbalance in vested interests, asluddite legal professionals face weak public bureaucracies.

Installation Information requirements in the GPLv3 and LGPLv3

One of the major changes introduced in the GPLv3 and LGPLv3 is the clause preventing "tivoisation". Richard Stallman defines Tivoisation as "the practice of designing hardware so that a modified version cannot function properly". In this presentation we will go through the reasons of why the information installation requirement was introduced, how you can comply with this requirement and why you may want to think about it now rather than later.

Asymptotic equivalence between the unconditional maximum likelihood and the square-law nonlinearity symbol timing estimation

This paper provides a systematic approach to theproblem of nondata aided symbol-timing estimation for linearmodulations. The study is performed under the unconditionalmaximum likelihood framework where the carrier-frequencyerror is included as a nuisance parameter in the mathematicalderivation. The second-order moments of the received signal arefound to be the sufficient statistics for the problem at hand and theyallow the provision of a robust performance in the presence of acarrier-frequency error uncertainty. We particularly focus on theexploitation of the cyclostationary property of linear modulations.This enables us to derive simple and closed-form symbol-timingestimators which are found to be based on the well-known squaretiming recovery method by Oerder and Meyr. Finally, we generalizethe OM method to the case of linear modulations withoffset formats. In this case, the square-law nonlinearity is foundto provide not only the symbol-timing but also the carrier-phaseerror.

Internet, Law and Politics. A decade of transformations.

Proceedings of Internet, Law and Politics. A decade of transformations.