Information Mobility: Information Dissemination in Mobile Networks

En el nostre projecte, considerem un escenari urbà o interurbà on persones amb dispositius mòbils (smartphones) o vehicles equipats amb interfícies de comunicació, estan interessats en compartir fitxers entre ells o descarregar-los al creuar Punts d’Accés (APs) propers a la carretera. Estudiem la possibilitat d’utilizar la cooperació en les trobades casuals entre nodes per augmentar la velocitat de descàrrega global. Amb aquest objectiu, plantejem algoritmes per a la selecció de quins paquets, per a quins destins i quins transportistes s’escullen en cada moment. Mitjançant extenses simulacions, mostrem com les cooperacions carry&forward dels nodes augmenten significativament la velocitat de descàrrega dels usuaris, i com aquest resultat es manté per a diversos patrons de mobilitat, col•locacions d'AP i càrregues de la xarxa. Per altra banda, aparells com els smartphones, on la targeta de WiFi està encesa contínuament, consumeixen l'energia de la bateria en poques hores. En molts escenaris, una targeta WiFi sempre activa és poc útil, perque sovint no hi ha necessitat de transmissió o recepció. Aquest fet es veu agreujat en les Delay Tolerant Networks (DTN), on els nodes intercanvien dades quan es creuen i en tenen l’oportunitat. Les tècniques de gestió de l’estalvi d’energia permeten extendre la duració de les bateries. El nostre projecte analitza els avantatges i inconvenients que apareixen quan els nodes apaguen períodicament la seva targeta wireless per a estalviar energia en escenaris DTN. Els nostres resultats mostren les condicions en que un node pot desconnectar la bateria sense afectar la probabilitat de contacte amb altres nodes, i les condicions en que aquesta disminueix. Per exemple, es demostra que la vida del node pot ser duplicada mantenint la probabilitat de contacte a 1. I que aquesta disminueix ràpidament en intentar augmentar més la vida útil.

Challenges and opportunities for science journalists in adopting new technologies: the case of Spain = Retos y oportunidades para los periodistas científicos en la adopción de las nuevas tecnologías: el caso de España

This paper analyses the adoption of new information and communication technologies (ICTs) by Spanish journalists specialising in science. Applying an ethnographic research model, this study was based on a wide sample of professionals, aiming to evaluate the extent by which science journalists have adopted the new media and changed the way they use information sources. In addition, interviewees were asked whether in their opinion the Web 2.0 has had an impact on the quality of the news. The integration of formats certainly implies a few issues for today’s newsrooms. Finally, with the purpose of improving the practice of science information dissemination, the authors put forward a few proposals, namely: Increasing the training of Spanish science journalists in the field of new technologies; Emphasising the accuracy of the information and the validation of sources; Rethinking the mandates and the tasks of information professionals.

A semantic model of selective dissemination of information for digital libraries

In this paper we present the theoretical and methodologicalfoundations for the development of a multi-agentSelective Dissemination of Information (SDI) servicemodel that applies Semantic Web technologies for specializeddigital libraries. These technologies make possibleachieving more efficient information management,improving agent–user communication processes, andfacilitating accurate access to relevant resources. Othertools used are fuzzy linguistic modelling techniques(which make possible easing the interaction betweenusers and system) and natural language processing(NLP) techniques for semiautomatic thesaurus generation.Also, RSS feeds are used as “current awareness bulletins”to generate personalized bibliographic alerts.

DOI: The "Big Brother" in the dissemination of scientific documentation

Rapid growth in the availability and use of digital documents has prompted the development of instruments to handle them. A most important example of these instruments are digital identifiers, which provide a codification system that allows digital items, usually up to the level of a computer file, to be singled out and located. Digital identifiers make up standardized global systems applied to specific products or areas. They are part of the very many identifiers developed to handle large numbers of items and large amounts of information for transactional purposes, which often have a global span. Digital identifiers include the ubiquitous Global Trade Item Number (GTIN), a code that unequivocally identifies trade items all around the world. The GTIN can take on several configurations depending on its application. These include: EAN-13, EAN-8, EAN-14, and UCC-12. EAN-13 is the code used for retail products in order to facilitate trade at the point of sale; its widely known symbol or graphical form is the EAN/UPC-13 bar code...

Dissemination of periodic mammography and patterns of use, by birth cohort, in Catalonia (Spain)

Background: In Catalonia (Spain) breast cancer mortality has declined since the beginning of the 1990s. The dissemination of early detection by mammography and the introduction of adjuvant treatments are among the possible causes of this decrease, and both were almost coincident in time. Thus, understanding how these procedures were incorporated into use in the general population and in women diagnosed with breast cancer is very important for assessing their contribution to the reduction in breast cancer mortality. In this work we have modeled the dissemination of periodic mammography and described repeat mammography behavior in Catalonia from 1975 to 2006. Methods: Cross-sectional data from three Catalan Health Surveys for the calendar years 1994, 2002 and 2006 was used. The dissemination of mammography by birth cohort was modeled using a mixed effects model and repeat mammography behavior was described by age and survey year. Results: For women born from 1938 to 1952, mammography clearly had a period effect, meaning that they started to have periodic mammograms at the same calendar years but at different ages. The age at which approximately 50% of the women were receiving periodic mammograms went from 57.8 years of age for women born in 1938–1942 to 37.3 years of age for women born in 1963–1967. Women in all age groups experienced an increase in periodic mammography use over time, although women in the 50–69 age group have experienced the highest increase. Currently, the target population of the Catalan Breast Cancer Screening Program, 50–69 years of age, is the group that self-reports the highest utilization of periodic mammograms, followed by the 40–49 age group. A higher proportion of women of all age groups have annual mammograms rather than biennial or irregular ones. Conclusion: Mammography in Catalonia became more widely implemented during the 1990s. We estimated when cohorts initiated periodic mammograms and how frequently women are receiving them. These two pieces of information will be entered into a cost-effectiveness model of early detection in Catalonia.

Security prices and market transparency: the role of prior information

This paper analyzes the role of traders' priors (proper versus improper) on the implications of market transparency by comparing a pre-trade transparent market with an opaque market in a set-up based on Madhavan (1996). We show that prices may be more informative in the opaque market, regardless of how priors are modelled. In contrast, the comparison of market liquidity and volatility in the two market structures are affected by prior specification. Key words: Market microstructure, Transparency, Prior information

Delegation and information sharing in oligopoly

Information sharing in oligopoly has been analyzed by assuming that firms behave as a sole economic agent. In this paper I assume that ownership and management are separated. Managers are allowed to falsely report their costs to owners and rivals. Under such circumstances, if owners want to achieve information sharing they must use managerial contracts that implement truthful cost reporting by managers as a dominant strategy. I show that, contrary to the classical result, without the inclusion of message-dependent payments in managerial contracts there will be no information sharing. On the other hand, with the inclusion of such publicly observable payments and credible ex-ante commitment by owners not to modify these payments, there will be perfect information sharing without the need for third parties. Keywords: Information sharing, Delegation, Managerial contracts. JEL classification numbers: D21, D82, L13, L21

The Instrumental voter goes to the news-agent: demand for information, election closeness, and the media

This paper studies the impact of instrumental voting on information demand and mass media behaviour during electoral campaigns. If voters act instrumentally then information demand should increase with the closeness of an election. Mass media are modeled as profit-maximizing firms that take into account information demand, the value of customers to advertisers and the marginal cost of customers. Information supply should be larger in electoral constituencies where the contest is expected to be closer, there is a higher population density, and customers are on average more profitable for advertisers. The impact of electorate size is theoretically undetermined. These conclusions are then tested with comfortable results on data from the 1997 general election in Britain.

Spatial competition between two candidates of different quality: the effects of candidate ideology and private information

This paper examines competition in a spatial model of two-candidate elections, where one candidate enjoys a quality advantage over the other candidate. The candidates care about winning and also have policy preferences. There is two-dimensional private information. Candidate ideal points as well as their tradeoffs between policy preferences and winning are private information. The distribution of this two-dimensional type is common knowledge. The location of the median voter's ideal point is uncertain, with a distribution that is commonly known by both candidates. Pure strategy equilibria always exist in this model. We characterize the effects of increased uncertainty about the median voter, the effect of candidate policy preferences, and the effects of changes in the distribution of private information. We prove that the distribution of candidate policies approaches the mixed equilibrium of Aragones and Palfrey (2002a), when both candidates' weights on policy preferences go to zero.

Information-sharing implications of horizontal mergers

We analyze the effects of uncertainty and private information on horizontal mergers. Firms face uncertain demands or costs and receive private signals. They may decide to merge sharing their private information. If the uncertainty parameters are independent and the signals are perfect, uncertainty generates an informational advantage only to the merging firms, increasing merger incentives and decreasing free-riding effects. Thus, mergers become more profitable and stable. These results generalize to the case of correlated parameters if the correlation is not very severe, and for perfect correlation if the firms receive noisy signals. From the normative point of view, mergers are socially less harmful compared to deterministic markets and may even be welfare enhancing. If the signals are, instead, publicly observed, uncertainty does not necessarily give more incentives to merge, and mergers are not always less socially harmful.

Asymmetric demand information in uniform and discriminatory call auctions: an experimental analysis motivated by electricity markets

We study the outcomes of experimental multi-unit uniform and discriminatory auctions with demand uncertainty. Our study is motivated by the ongoing debate about market design in the electricity industry. Our main aim is to compare the effect of asymmetric demand-information between sellers on the performance of the two auction institutions. In our baseline conditions all sellers have the same information, whereas in our treatment conditions some sellers have better information than others. In both information conditions we find that average transaction prices and price volatility are not significantly different under the two auction institutions. However, when there is asymmetric information among sellers the discriminatory auction is significantly less efficient. These results are not in line with the typical arguments made in favor of discriminatory pricing in electricity industries; namely, lower consumer prices and less price volatility. Moreover, our results provide some indication that discriminatory auctions reduce technical efficiency relative to uniform auctions.

General equilibrium with asymmetric information: a dual approach

We study markets where the characteristics or decisions of certain agents are relevant but not known to their trading partners. Assuming exclusive transactions, the environment is described as a continuum economy with indivisible commodities. We characterize incentive efficient allocations as solutions to linear programming problems and appeal to duality theory to demonstrate the generic existence of external effects in these markets. Because under certain conditions such effects may generate non-convexities, randomization emerges as a theoretic possibility. In characterizing market equilibria we show that, consistently with the personalized nature of transactions, prices are generally non-linear in the underlying consumption. On the other hand, external effects may have critical implications for market efficiency. With adverse selection, in fact, cross-subsidization across agents with different private information may be necessary for optimality, and so, the market need not even achieve an incentive efficient allocation. In contrast, for the case of a single commodity, we find that when informational asymmetries arise after the trading period (e.g. moral hazard; ex post hidden types) external effects are fully internalized at a market equilibrium.

Mediation incomplete information bargaining with filtered communication

We analyze a continuous-time bilateral double auction in the presence of two-sided incomplete information and a smallest money unit. A distinguishing feature of our model is that intermediate concessions are not observable by the adversary: they are only communicated to a passive auctioneer. An alternative interpretation is that of mediated bargaining. We show that an equilibrium using only the extreme agreements always exists and display the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of (perfect Bayesian) equilibra which yield intermediate agreements. For the symmetric case with uniform type distribution we numerically calculate the equilibria. We find that the equilibrium which does not use compromise agreements is the least efficient, however, the rest of the equilibria yield the lower social welfare the higher number of compromise agreements are used.

Allocative and productive efficiency in REE with asymetric information

We characterize the divergence between informational and economic efficiency in a rational expectations competitive market with asymmetric information about the costs of production. We find that prices may contain too much or too little information with respect to incentive efficient allocations depending on whether the main role of the price is, respectively, the traditional as index of scarcity or informational. Only when REE degenerate to Cournot equilibria the market solution does not show llocative inefficiency. With multidimensional uncertainty we find that the REE price does not have in general the incentive efficient information mix: It pays to sacrifice allocative efficiency at the REE to improve productive efficiency.